

Errata Sheet

Of the two documents in English already distributed as Def. Doc. No. 1161, the one which consists of 42 pages will be used. The parts of the above document to be offered to the Tribunal are as follows:

English.

Page 18, 1st paragraph.

Page 32, 4th paragraph.

From page 34, 2nd paragraph to page 40, 1st paragraph.

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PROBLEMS OF THE  
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AIMS AND RESULTS OF  
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC POLICIES  
IN PACIFIC COUNTRIES

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DOCUMENT IV

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CHINESE  
COMMUNIST MOVEMENT <sup>1/</sup>

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INTRODUCTION

The Chinese Communist Party was established at Shanghai in 1920 with Chen Tu-hsiu as the central figure. In the following year its First National Congress was held at Shanghai. The three succeeding congresses were called at Canton in 1922, 1923, and 1925; the fifth was convoked at Hankow in 1927, and in the following year the sixth was held in Moscow.

<sup>1/</sup> Revised and greatly abbreviated by the Editors from the original data-paper The Red Influence in China. Because of the controversial nature of the subject the Editors wish to emphasize the fact that neither the Japanese Council nor the Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations assumes any responsibility for the author's statements and interpretations. The paper is printed in the belief that it provides useful information on a relatively little-known question, and because it illustrates some of the views held by certain sections of the Japanese public.

After 1923 the Communist Party, as a branch of the Comintern, launched upon the task of sovietizing the Far East. During the period from 1925 to 1927, when the party was at the height of its power, the number of members was said to have reached five hundred thousand. The acquisition of such a large number of members at that time was due, however, to the adoption of Sun Yat-sen's three great policies for the execution of the National Revolution, namely, the China-Soviet Union confederacy, the toleration of the Communists in the Kuomintang, and the acquisition of the support of the peasants and the workmen. After the 'Purification' coups d'etat of April 1927 (executed by Chiang Kai-shek in Shanghai on April 12 and by Li Chi-shen in Canton on April 15) the party gradually lost its influence until finally it was compelled to become an illegal organization resorting to underground tactics. But by the outbreak of such extraordinary incidents as the Canton Commune and the establishment of the Changsha Soviet of August 1930, it proved that its influence had by no means vanished and that its latent power was not a negligible factor in Chinese politics. The Red Army and the Soviet Area which were formed early in 1928 repulsed the five general drives of the National Army under Chiang Kai-shek, and in 1931 even went so far as to organize at Juichin a proletarian regime called the Provisional Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic. The large-scale campaign which exhausted the greater half of the annual military expenditures of the Nanking Government finally succeeded in driving the main forces of the Red Army out of Juichin, but this expulsion of the Communist Army may be said to have been a strategic retreat on the part of the Red forces. The fact that without engaging in any pitched battle with the Nanking Army, and consequently without suffering any serious losses in the fighting force, the Red forces proceeded westward in a vast contingent points to the likelihood of their future recovery. One part of this army entered Shensi from Kansu after marching through the provinces of Hunan, Kwangtung, Kweichow, Yunnan, and Szechwan. Finally, at the end of February 1936, the Red forces invaded Shansi. The Red Army which invaded Shansi withdrew to Shensi as soon as the Central Army had completed its

military preparations, and is now making raids in Shensi and Kansu. Furthermore, in districts of Szechwan and Sikang Provinces there are strong divisions of the Red Army, and their movements are such as to merit particular attention.

Concerning the communist movement in China the Report of the League Commission on the Sino-Japanese Dispute has mentioned a few characteristic points and has indicated the fact that the Chinese Communist Party is a strong adversary of the Nanking Government.

'Communism in China not only means, as in most countries other than the U.S.S.R., either a political doctrine held by certain members of existing parties, or the organization of a special party to compete for power with other political parties. It has become an actual rival of the National Government. It possesses its own law, army and government, and its own territorial sphere of action. For this state of affairs there is no parallel in any other country. Moreover, in China the disturbance created by the communist war is made more serious by the fact that the country is going through a critical period of internal reconstruction, still further complicated during the last eleven months by an external crisis of exceptional gravity. The National Government seems to be determined to regain the control of the districts under communist influence, and to pursue in these districts, once their recovery is achieved, a policy of economic rehabilitation; but in its military campaigns, apart from difficulties already mentioned, both internal and external, which weaken its position, it is hampered by lack of funds and defective communications. The problem of communism in China is thus linked with the larger problem of national reconstruction.'

In order to understand the process in the development of the Chinese Communist Party and its Red Army, it is necessary to consider whether or not the social situation of that time was adapted to that progress. The clarification of the social situation which fostered the progress of this communist movement is the key to which great importance must be attached in forecasting the future of the party and the Red Army.



After the People's Revolution in 1911 struggles among the cliques of militarists arose; peace and order disappeared, and bandit raids became exceedingly prevalent. Furthermore, due to the development of capitalistic economy in the cities which accompanies the entrance of foreign capital, the economy of the rural communities with their remnants of feudalism gradually collapsed and as a result a proletariat was created. It was only natural that the various movements of the proletarians should respond to communism, which has for its motto the complete overthrow of imperialism, the warlords, and the gentry. But even though there existed ample room for the diffusion of communistic ideals in China, it is doubtful whether the activities of the Chinese Communist Party alone could have brought about such a remarkable progress. The chief motive power of this rapid development was in all probability furnished by the spiritual and material support rendered by the Comintern. In discussing the Chinese Communist Party it is therefore necessary to attach much importance to its relation with the Comintern and the Soviet Union.

The communist movement in China originated in the cities, but did not develop there. Rather, the movement took root in the rural communities and intensified the peasants' revolution. When viewed from the standpoint of Marxism the course that this revolution followed is decidedly unorthodox.

Among the reasons for the failure of the movement to progress in the cities the following are most noteworthy: (1) the influence of the various foreign Powers in the major cities (foreign concessions and their garrisons) and their suppression of sovietization; (2) the lack of co-operation among the regimes in various localities, and the various hostile measures against one another for maintaining their power; (3) difficulty in enlisting the support of factory workers and ordinary workers; (4) the lack of balance and different degrees of development in the revolutionary movement in the various districts; (5) the habitual policy of suppression by the Nanking Government.

The reasons for the success in the rural communities after the failure in the cities are the following: (1) fraudulence on the part of the local government officials and the unrest of the peasants; (2) communist sympathies of the native bandits, 'Red Spears' (Hung Chiang Hui) and 'Great Powers' (Ta Li Hui); (3) strife among the cliques of militarists and the frequent occurrence of civil war; (4) ignorance and simplicity of the peasants themselves.

But, generally speaking, what induced the peasants to embrace the ideas of communism and to approve the activities of both the Chinese Communist Party and the Red Army was the adoption of the policy to liberate the peasants from debts and lack of land. This emancipation attracted the peasants more than any other economic policy and won them over whole-heartedly.

Although it is difficult to ascertain to what extent the policies of the Chinese Communist Party are enforced in the Soviet districts a summary of the economic, social, educational, and religious programmes will serve to illustrate one phase of the activities.

In the Juichin Soviet Government's labour policy the eight-hour working day was enforced (six hours for minors of 16-18 years, four hours for children of 14-16 years). Each labourer was allowed at least forty-six hours of continuous rest every week. Furthermore, under special articles and clauses relative to minimum wages, health, security, unemployment, and other social insurances, the Soviet endeavoured to ameliorate the living conditions of the people.

In the domain of economic policy the confiscation and nationalization of all banks, factories, mines, communication, and transportation enterprises was enforced. In accordance with an agreement, foreign industrialists were allowed to continue their production under the compulsory condition that they submit to the enforcement of all laws of the Soviet Government. But in case these enterprisers acted contrary to this condition, they were to be treated as counter-revolutionists and their enterprises immediately confiscated and nationalized.

The industrial and manufacturing enterprises of Chinese capitalists were left in the hands of the former proprietors, but controlled through the Factory Committee and the Labour Union. In case of a sabotage in production, a lock-out, a breach of a Soviet law, or a participation in anti-revolutionary activity, their enterprises were to be confiscated.

Freedom of commerce was guaranteed, but the Soviet authorities fought against the raising of prices on the part of the merchants. By abolishing the old taxation system and establishing a unified graduated system, the Soviet made the burden on the wealthier classes much heavier. It also strove further to ameliorate the living conditions of the workmen, the poor people in the cities, and the masses of both the poor and the middle-class peasants.

With a view to guaranteeing the complete emancipation of women, the abolition of the system of selling daughters as wives, freedom of marriage and divorce under the condition that registration be made in the 'State Organ', and the prevention of the Tonyanghsi system (adopting of young girls for future daughters-in-law) were enforced.

Much attention was paid by the Soviet to the educational and cultural elevation of the populace, and, what is more, it looked upon the widespread enforcement of free education as a duty of the state. Expenses for education were borne by the state. Primary, secondary, and normal schools were established for the young, while clubs and libraries were founded for the education of the adults.

The people under the Soviet did not lose their freedom of worship, but politics and religion were separated. Furthermore, the state did not protect religion, and the people had the right to propagate anti-religious ideas.

The right of the self-determination of various peoples in China was recognized. Furthermore, these peoples were permitted to establish 'independent self-governing states' and participate freely in the Chinese Soviet Union. Foreign labourers in the Soviet districts were granted the same privileges as the Chinese wage-earning masses.

Needless to say, these policies of the Soviet Government won the interest and the support of the peasant masses which had long suffered under the yoke of warlords and bureaucrats. Consequently, the enforcement of the policies by the establishment of Soviet Areas, the distribution of land, and the abolition of debts worked the peasants up to a high pitch of enthusiasm and evoked praise of the communist creed. Although it was exceedingly difficult to imbue the ignorant populace with the ideas of communism, the propaganda of realistic and practical education had a huge success.

What policy did the Nanking Government adopt to counteract this communist movement? From the military standpoint, Chiang Kai-shek's five campaigns against the communist forces did not progress satisfactorily in spite of the vast expenditures incurred by the Nanking Government. In one way this was due to the lack of discipline and organization within the army itself, but in another way the organization and the discipline of the Red Army were far superior, and, in addition to this, there was the support of the peasants. Concerning the means by which the Red Army procured its supplies of arms and ammunition there are various opinions. They were for the most part captured from the anti-communist army during the period when the Red forces had the upper hand. Besides this, there were the purchase by 'bribery' of arms and ammunition from deserters or prisoners of the National Army (for example, one rifle and a hundred cartridges were bought for 20 yuan), the robbing of military goods during their transport (mostly upon secret information from the peasants), and finally the support of the Soviet Union.

To-day, when the Red Army has withdrawn from Central China to the wilderness of the north, the National Government is still underrating the strength of the Communist Army and is endeavouring to advance its punitive programme, but, as was revealed on the occasion of the Red Army's invasion into Shan'xi in February 1936, the power of the Reds still has to be reckoned with. Judging by the raids of the Red Army in the north-western regions, the danger of sovietization is extremely grave.

Imagine the completion of the communication between the Red Army and the Russian invasion into China from the north and the west. That the Nanking Government is wellnigh powerless against this, politically and from the point of view of military force, has already been proved. Here lies the vital reason for hastening the formation of a co-operative system of defence against the sovietization of the north-west.

#### THE RED ARMY

Most of the information concerning the actual movement of the Chinese Communist Army is based on reports from two sources. The first of these is the literature of the Red Army itself, the other is the announcements of the Nanking Government -- the reports of the head of a Provincial Government or the commander of the anti-communist troops. The former contains much propagandist material which aims at agitation and provocation. In contrast, the reports of the Nanking Government strive to make one believe that the government forces are always victorious. These reports become the material for propaganda throughout China in that they are allotted to the various newspapers through government news agencies and inserted in the journals by compulsion. Both sources of information are therefore unreliable, but unfortunately there are practically no other sources or documents upon which one might rely. Actually, the districts where the Red Army has its base, or over which it passed, are those which were Soviet districts in the past or those in which the Soviet regime is established at present. Otherwise they are in remote regions where scarcely any one ventures to enter except the Red Army and its pursuers, the anti-communist troops -- regions where even newspaper correspondents and missionaries dare not enter.

However, by following the intelligence from the two sources mentioned above, an endeavour is made in the following pages to depict in brief the present condition of the Red Army.



Westward March of the Red Army after its Abandonment of Juichin.

In explaining the recent movements of the Red Army it is necessary to commence with its abandonment of Juichin in October 1934. After the Commune at Canton in December 1927, which is called the final decisive battle of the Chinese Revolution, the Chinese Communist Party, which completely lost its bases of activities in the cities, turned the spear-head of its policy towards rural society. Assembling the defeated soldiers of the 'Nanchang Violence' and the Canton Commune, the Chinese Communist Party made preparations for the Red Army in the frontier regions of the provinces of Kwangtung, Fukien, Kiangsi, and Hunan, and attempted to establish a Soviet Area. What is more, this policy of the Chinese Communist Party succeeded, for the Nanking Government was pre-occupied in executing its campaign against the northern militarists and in ridding the Government Army itself of the disquieting warlords. A vast Soviet Area extending over the above-mentioned provinces and an army exceeding one hundred thousand were formed. Furthermore, in Chekiang, Anhwei, Hupeh, Honan, Shensi, and Szechwan Soviet districts were established and Red forces organized. In November 1931, at Juichin in Kiangsi Province, the First National Congress of the Soviet Representatives was held, at which such statements were made:

'Now there are two governments in China. One is the Bourgeois Government of Nanking, the other is the Proletariat Government of Juichin.'

According to the statement made public by the Provisional Government of the Chinese Soviet in 1931:

'The sphere of influence of the Juichin Government extends throughout the eleven provinces in central and southern China. The inhabitants in the Soviet Area number approximately sixty million and the troops which possess artillery and aeroplanes total three hundred thousand. Besides the various administrative headquarters, there is in Juichin a university of the Red Army, and it is said that this city which had a population of less than ten thousand has now expanded into a city of over one hundred thousand inhabitants.'

These are in all probability exaggerated figures, but at the same time they furnish a picture of one phase of the Soviet regime at that time.



Needless to say, the attitude of the Nanking Government towards this Soviet regime is hostile. Nevertheless, even Chiang Kai-shek, who gained a brilliant victory in his struggle for supremacy with the various warlords and who had virtually become the dictator of the Nanking Government, was at a loss as to what to do in the Soviet Areas and in the face of the steadfast resistance of the Red Army within those districts. When the government forces came, the Reds became peasants; upon their departure they again took up their arms and resumed fighting. For a long time this guerrilla warfare has been a source of constant anxiety for the Nanking Government. The five general drives since 1928 were fruitless, and in spite of the fact that the greater half of the expenditures for military operations were lavished upon the preparation for the anti-communist campaign and the mobilization of one million troops, the Government Army was powerless against the guerrilla warfare tactics of the Red forces. After the appropriation of huge sums, chains of blockhouses were built, and the policy of the large-scale construction of roads for speedy transportation of troops was adopted. Towards the summer of 1934 the Nanking Army was finally able to drive the main forces of the Red Army to the south of Kiangsi Province.

Consequently, the Red Army, which was now in a state of disorder, avoided committing itself to a decisive battle with the Nanking forces. It abandoned Juichin and withdrew westwards. At the end of October 1934 the Chu-Mao Army, which numbered one hundred thousand, moved westward to the frontier of Hunan Province. (This army was originally known by the names of Chu Teh, Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army, and Mao Tse-tung, representatives of the Political Department.) Then, pursued by the government forces, the Red Army entered Kweichow from Hunan; thence under pretext of entering Szechwan Province by way of the Yangtze River it executed a great march and advanced to Kweiyang in Kweichow Province. Following this it made an attack upon Kunming, the capital of Yunnan Province. In Kweiyang and Kunming it was preceded by Chiang Kai-shek, who was directing his army by the intelligence received from

his air scouts. Due to air-tight defence, the Red Army was unable to break through, and as a result the communist forces marched northward from Yunnan Province, crossed the Kinsha River, and proceeded to the Huili Region in the mountains of south-western Szechwan. Through the district of Sichang they traversed the Tatuho, and in the spring of 1935 arrived at Tatsienlu or Kangtien, the capital of Hsikang Province. When the westward march of the Red Army is followed on a map, the length of the journey is seen to be really astonishing. The report of the Szechwan Provincial Government on the movement of the Red Army, saying that by the time the Red forces arrived at Tatsienlu they were in want of supplies, must have been true. For ten months after their withdrawal from Juichin the westward march of the Red forces took a zig-zag course, and the fact that they marched from six to ten thousand kilometres must be considered as an astonishing feat. It was thought that the Red forces which assembled in the districts north and west of Chengtu would make preparations to conquer the plains of Szechwan after establishing a Soviet Area, but, first of all, Mao Tse-tung with the whole of his troops succeeded in uniting with the troops of Hsu Hsiang-chien. Hsu Hsiang-chien's army was called the Fourth Red Army. It was an exceedingly strong army which had stayed in the north of Szechwan Province for many years, and its Political Commissioner, Chang Kuo-tao, was one of the oldest leaders of the Chinese Communist Party. The union of this army and the Chu-mao Army has become historical, and for the first time since the abandonment of Juichin the Red Army was in battle array. But in August 1935 this Red Army, which had united, split again as the result of a disruption at a meeting held by the leaders as to the course to be followed in future by the Red Army. Mao Tse-tung, who contended for the northward march, crossed Paishuikiang and entered Kansu Province, while Chang Kuo-tao, who adhered to the policy of proceeding southward, advanced towards the Yaan Region with the majority of the troops of Chu Teh and Hsu Hsiang-chien.

Attack upon Shensi by the North Shensi Red Army.

It is said that the troops which followed Mao Tse-tung to Kansu numbered between nine and ten thousand. They formed their base in the south of Minhsien and were reorganized into the Shensi-Kansu Detachment. Peng Teh-hui, who was heralded as the 'Vereshilov of China' for the heroic part he played in the establishment of the Soviet Government at Changsha, became its Commander-in-Chief, and Lin Piao, Peng Hsueh-feng, and Teng Fa assumed command of the various divisions, with Yeh Chien-ying as Chief of Staff and Mao Tse-tung as the Political Commissioner. This reorganization was executed in September 1935, and soon the Shensi-Kansu Detachment turned its march towards Shensi Province and commenced its activities. The movements of the divisions under Hsu Hai-tung and Liu Tsu-tan, which were in the north of Shensi Province, suddenly became more active, and the danger of the north-west sovietization became more and more acute.

Thereupon the Shensi-Kansu Detachment of the Red Army under Mao Tse-tung and Peng Teh-hui advanced to Shensi Province, picking up associates wherever they could during their journey. In the winter of 1935, or early in the spring of 1936, they united with the division under Hsu Hai-tung, extended the sphere of influence of the Shensi Soviet Government, and completed the establishment of communications with the divisions under Liu Tsu-tan. Liu Tsu-tan's army consisted of three divisions, or approximately twenty thousand soldiers, and the three parties under Hsu Tai-tung consisted of about five thousand troops. All these troops had their base in the north of Shensi Province for a long time, and after their union with the Shensi-Kansu Detachment were able to adopt active measures in their attacks.

Most alarmed by the aforementioned offensive of the Red Army in Shensi Province was General Yen Hsi-shan, who controlled the adjoining Shensi Province. The Province of Shensi is strategically located in that it is hemmed in by precipitous ridges in the north and bordered by the River Hwang in the south and west. Here the 'Shensi Monroe Doctrine' was maintained for decades

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and the inhabitants continued to prohibit the entrance of strangers. Even after the Nanking Government succeeded in exercising its influence throughout China, Shensi did not always obey the decrees of the Government. Its representative in the Kuomintang is but a camouflage of its independence. In reality, it is just as it was under the dictatorship of Yen Hsi-shan. After returning to Shensi from his refuge in Dairen, Yen Hsi-shan himself had originated the ten-year plan for the economic construction of Shensi and did his best in his struggle for the attainment of the principle of benevolent rule. To him the advance of the Chinese Communist Party and the increase in Red forces were serious threats. In the autumn of 1935, when he heard of the reorganization of a portion of the Red forces into the Shensi-Kansu Detachment and its attack upon Shensi, he foresaw the gravity of the danger of the sovietization of North Shensi and appealed loudly to the whole nation that, in the near future, Shensi too would be sovietized. As a counterplan for the 'Land Policy' of the Communist Party he promulgated the 'plan to make all land the property of the State', and thereby endeavoured to secure the support of the populace so as to prevent sovietization. He also adopted other measures for the positive prevention of sovietization by constructing blockhouses and other fortifications and employing the 'advance slowly, fight cautiously' method.

In spite of this the vanguard of the North Shensi Red Army began the attack upon Shensi in the last ten days of February 1936. Already in the hsiens of Chungyang, Shihlou, Yunggho, Liulin, and Shih in the south of Shensi Province a Soviet Area has been formed. On March 2 even Taiyuan, the capital of Shensi Province, was captured by the Reds. Upon piecing the various reports together, it is possible to learn that on the arrival of information concerning the approach of the Red Army the inhabitants along the Tatung-Puchow Railway began to seek refuge in Taiyuan and Shihchiachuang. Martial law was enforced within the walls of Taiyuan, and the Red Army advanced wherever it pleased, as the morale of the anti-communist troops was completely undermined. It has been said that the execution of the so-called guerrilla warfare put the anti-communist forces into confusion.



As to the number of the Red troops which attacked Shansi, reports vary, saying that from five to thirty thousand took part. But that which reported that the main forces stayed behind in Shensi without crossing the Hwangho seems to be authentic, so that the number which engaged in the attack upon Shansi may be estimated at not more than five to six thousand. Early in March, perceiving that six divisions with sixty thousand soldiers would be insufficient for either the defence against or the subjugation of the communist troops, Yen Hsi-shan sought the support of the Nanking Government and Sung Che-yuan of the Chi-cha regime (Mopai-Chakar Political Council). It was forecast that this request for support would result in the formation of a joint policy between Yen Hsi-shan and Sung Che-yuan as a measure for the prevention of the sovietization of the north-west, but the Chi-cha regime's support of Shansi was not realized. After some negotiations, the Central Army and the Mercenary Forces came to the support of Shansi from the Nanking Government. With due respect to the 'Mamoo Doctrine of Shansi' Yen Hsi-shan had merely demanded military funds and arms from the Nanking Government and opposed the actual entrance of the Central Army into Shansi. Without a reply, Chiang Kai-shek sent troops into Shansi by way of Yuncheng and the Chengtai and the Taokow-Chinghua Railways. Judging by his action on the occasion of the westward retreat of the Chu-Mao Red Army, when he deprived the two provinces of Kweichow and Kiangsi of their military rights, the pouring in of troops into Shansi Province was a foregone conclusion. From this action of Chiang Kai-shek it is possible to foresee his control over Shansi. In the negotiations between Chiang Kai-shek and Yen Hsi-shan it was quite natural that close communication as regards military tactics was lacking between the Shansi Army under Yang Ai-yuan and the armies dispatched by Chang Kai-shek.

Taking advantage of the weakness in the military operations of the anti-communist forces, the Red Army was making attack after attack in the various localities, but towards the end of March, when the distribution of the anti-communist forces was perfected, the communist forces returned to Shensi Province, and conditions at present are such that only a few are left in Shansi



Province. As to the Red advance to Shansi, various conjectures have been made. Some maintain that the Red Army foraged in order to replenish its supplies, while others maintain that the Reds endeavoured to form a Soviet Area in Shansi in preparation for the opening of the Comintern Route (International Route) to Suiyuan and Outer Mongolia. The reason for the Red Army's avoidance of conflict with the anti-communist army in Shensi Province and its advance into Shansi was only the manifestation of the tactics for 'Defence against Attack', for which purpose the Reds endeavoured to use Shansi Province as the scene of their defensive operations. The aim was to replenish supplies. Consequently, it is more appropriate to conjecture that, for this reason, the main forces did not move. It is to be noted that the aim of the Red Army in north Shensi is the anti-Japanese movement, and the causing of disturbances on the Manchoukuo frontier. This is in accordance with the propagandist statement, 'Under the name of the Confederate Army for the struggle against Japan and the overthrow of Chiang Kai-shek, rise in one accord and combat the outside enemies', which is being spread in the various districts of Shansi. This explains the new stratagem of the Chinese Communist Party. The Peking-Tientsin Times of March 5 reports as follows:

'The Red Armies have long eliminated the purely communist catchwords of the Third International from their propaganda and manifestoes. The silence on the subject of the domestic political issues has turned from the negative to the positive approach. They no longer revile those whom they have regarded as their enemies in this country. They openly advocate, on the contrary, the organization of a united front of all patriotic elements for a struggle against Japan.'

Concerning the limits of the sovietized area of Shansi, it is difficult to obtain accurate accounts. Actually, there is logical contradiction between the report which states that the Communist Army enforced communism after establishing a Soviet Area, and that which stresses the elimination of the purely communistic slogans from the propaganda and manifestoes. Furthermore, it is said among the tradesmen in Taiyuan that the peasants in the sovietized district are whole-heartedly welcoming the introduction and enforcement of the financial and economic policy of the Chinese Communist Party.

Union of the Chu-Hsu and the Hsiao-Ho Armies.

As was mentioned previously, the North Shensi Red Army returned to Shensi Province after forming 'cells of communist organization', and realizing their aim to replenish supplies. These forces now have their bases in the north of Shensi and in the south of Kansu where, in the face of the attacks of the anti-communist army, it seems they are striving to maintain their influence by the skilful employment of their favourite guerrilla tactics and the support of the peasant army. The new course of the march of the Red Army appears to lie in the direction of Suiyuan Province, where the line of defence is comparatively weak. It would be erroneous to conclude that the danger of the sovietization of Shensi Province was removed with the withdrawal of the North Shensi Red Army. On the contrary, the 'cells of communist organization' which the Red Army planted by the skilful execution of its 'defence against attack' strategem will, in all probability, increase the danger of the sovietization of Shensi. This has been done by the Shensi Red Army so that it might again have the opportunity of invading Shensi, and thus the menace of sovietization in China, either from the rear or the flank, has by no means diminished.

After separating from Mao Tse-tung, the main forces of the Red Army under Chu Teh and Hsu Hsiang-chien, which had proceeded southward, were moving in the Tienchuan, Yean, Paohsing, and Lushan districts in Szechwan Province, and in the Tetsienlu Region on the Hsiking border with the hope of occupying the plains of Chengtu. It is said that the plan of the Chu-Hsu Army was either to establish the Szechwan-Chwanpian Soviet Area or to unite with the forces under Hsiao and Ho and proceed northward for the second time. This naturally attracted much attention at the time.

By the Hsiao-Ho Army is meant the joint forces of the troops under Hsiao Ke and Ho Lung. This contingent of thirty thousand troops lingered in the north-western part of Hunan Province. With the progress in the policy of the construction of blockhouses and roads in Hunan Province this army was driven bit by bit towards the frontier of Kweichow Province by the anti-communist forces of the Nanking Government. At the end of November 1935, after

abandoning Hunan Province, it began its march towards Kweichow Province. It was expected to follow the route taken by the Chu-Mao Army in its westward march and proceed to Szechwan, but it lingered for almost six months in the various districts of Yunnan. Finally, in April 1936, it succeeded in uniting with the Chu-Hsu Army in the extreme western part of Szechwan after crossing the hazardous Kinsha River.

According to the statement of Ksueh Yao (Commander of the Second Route anti-Communist Army) to the various newspaper reporters:

'The main forces of the Red Army are in the Taofu and the Tanpa districts with Chen Chang-kao, Chang Kuo-tao and Liu Fo-cheng directing their activities. The Tsiao-Ho Army proceeded to north-western Szechwan after crossing the Kinsha River. One division advanced to Lihua by way of Tinghsiang and the other division proceeded towards Tehjung and Paan. The total number of troops in the two divisions is about fifty thousand.'

In the territory west of Tatsienlu is a grassy district called Kwanwai. The geographical position is such that the dividing ridges are high and rugged. Horseback and ox-carts are the only means of communication with the outside world. The climate is extreme; food-supplies are by no means plentiful, and the anti-communist forces cannot adopt positive measures due to the inconvenience they encounter in transporting supplies and ammunition. Particularly, the presence of the Tayuan Mountain Range on the frontier of Hsi Kang and Szechwan Provinces renders bombardment from aeroplanes impossible for the government troops. Taking advantage of this since the invasion of Hsikang Province, the Red Army has crushed the influence of the Lama priests, who had for many years held control over the province under the pretext of supporting the independence of the weaker races, and has established a special Soviet Government with the existing organ of Lamaism as its foundation. That is to say, the communists are striving to consolidate the foundation for their activities by executing the various policies for the exploitation of the Lama priests -- propagating the slogan to protect Lamaism, to respect the manners and customs of the people, to prevent murder, and to exempt them from taxation. But the real aim of the Red Army is not to stop here, but to cross Szechwan and enter Kansu so as to unite with the North Shensi Army, and thereby consolidate the united front for the struggle against Japan.

Sovietization of Hsiens in North Shensi.

When the Red Army occupies a district, it first of all assembles the populace and holds a meeting at which a Soviet Government will be formed and the land distributed. But in reality the good tracts of land are reserved as 'public land' for the Soviet Government and the Red Army. This land is cultivated by the destitute peasants, and the remaining tracts are distributed to the peasants. Land is granted to the people, but it must be taken into consideration that in order to execute the policy of the Red Army, some 'pulling of the wires' is put into practice. After the distribution of the land, the young men under thirty years of age are recruited into the flying column, the youths ranging from fourteen to twenty are compelled to become vanguards, while the boys under fourteen must join the Pioneer (boy scout) organization. The boys in the Pioneers are given instruction in communism so that the flying column and the youthful vanguards may later form an independent body and become reserves for the Red Army. From the old men and the young women transport corps are organized to aid in the transportation of supplies or the cultivation of the 'public land' or scouting and sentry duty. It is said that the poor peasants, who are given only bad tracts of land, are compelled not only to enlist in the Red Army, but also to present four-tenths of their harvest for the public supplies.

THE CAMPAIGN OF THE NANKING TROOPS AGAINST THE  
COMMUNIST ARMY

First Stage.

After Chiang Kai-shek's coup d'etat of March 1927, which was really the first systematic attack of the Nanking Government against the Red forces, drive after drive was organized for the extermination of the Chinese Communist Party and the Communist Army which were rapidly increasing and gaining influence. The campaign may be divided into three stages:

The First Stage -- from the formation of the National Government (1929) to directly before the Manchurian Incident (1931); that is to say, the period in which the first, second, and third drives were executed.

The Second Stage -- from the outbreak of the Manchurian and Shanghai Incidents (1931-2) to the westward retreat of the Communist Army (1934); that is to say, the period in which the fourth and fifth drives were attempted.

The Third Stage -- after the westward retreat of the Red Army at the end of 1934. It was the stage during which was proposed the new stratagem of the 'united front' of the so-called National Defence Government or the 'anti-Japanese Confederate Army' in connexion with the northward march of the Communist Army -- the period in which the conflict heightened between the Nanking Government and the Red Army.

For the first drive against the Red forces the Nanking Government entrusted Lu Ti-ping with the leadership of the Twelfth, Thirteenth, Eighteenth, and Fiftieth Divisions. But due to a revolt elsewhere, Lu Ti-ping was compelled to send the Twelfth and the Fiftieth Divisions to the scene of the revolt, and as the government forces guarded Kiangsi with only the Eighteenth and the Thirteenth Divisions, the communist forces increased daily. At the close of 1929, when the troops against Yen and Feng had completed their first step, the Red Army was already playing havoc in the southern hsien (counties).

Thus in 1930 the Government ordered the return of the Twelfth and the Fiftieth Divisions to Kiangsi Province and also dispatched the Seventeenth Division further to reinforce the forces in Kiangsi. The troops of the Nanking Government Army now totalled one hundred thousand and were placed under the command of Lu Ti-ping. The drive executed by this army subjugated Kian and the adjoining hsiens, but the Eighteenth Division was completely annihilated and Chang Hui-tsan taken prisoner by the Red forces, because it had proceeded far into hostile territory. The Fiftieth Division also suffered a terrible defeat and lost the majority of its forces.



Then in 1930 commenced the second drive. The Government, which had learned that the cause of the failure of the first drive lay in the lack of unification in the command, finally appointed Ho Ying-chin, the Chief of the Military Department, as Commander-in-Chief of the campaign. In February Ho proceeded to Kiangsi Province, and in view of the fact that his predecessor had failed, due to the careless advancing of troops far into hostile territory, he restored order in the districts by the adoption of the 'gradual' military policy of Tseng Kuo-fan. Then, summoning the garrisons that the various hsiens had organized, he executed his plans with rapidity. In military affairs, too, certain progress was made, but in May the Canton Government was formed and, with the rise of antagonism and rivalry between the two governments, the strength of the Communist Army augmented. As a result the National forces under Sun Lien-chung, Kung Ping-fan, Wang Chin-yu, and others were defeated in succession and Ho fell on the battle-field. Thus ended the second drive.

Chiang Kai-shek from the end of June became Commander-in-Chief of the campaign against the Red Army. After mobilizing as many troops as possible he dispatched them to Kiangsi. This recruited army consisted of three hundred thousand soldiers, and the prospects of success were bright indeed for the third drive. On June 15 the Nineteenth Route Army, which had been attacking from the south, penetrated into Hsingkuo. Three days later Kian, which had been the base of the National Army for a long time, was recovered, and on June 22 Chiang Kai-shek personally directed the attack upon Nanchang. At first the campaign appeared to be in the favour of the National Army, but later the trend of affairs became rather disadvantageous to the forces of Chiang Kai-shek, so that directly before the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident it became possible to forecast that the third drive would end as disastrously as the first two.

At the conference held on January 9, 1932, by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, a statement was made to the following effect:



'In the three drives against the Soviet Government and the Red Army, the Kuomintang militarists have been vanquished. The Red Army has defeated the Kuomintang Army which consisted of more than fifteen divisions. The Red Army has succeeded in procuring in the south of Kiangsi Province more than 20,000 rifles, 5,000,000 rifle shells, more than 2,000,000 rounds of ammunition . . . .'

There is ample reason for believing that some difference existed in the report of the Red Army and that of the Kuomintang, but at any rate there was no argument whatever to the fact that the third drive did not bring about any significant results. Especially convincing was this fact when, at the close of 1931, a mutiny occurred among the soldiers of the whole of Sun Lien-chung's Twenty-sixth Army of approximately twenty thousand, and completely nullified what little the drive had accomplished. This revolt also led to the capture of Fuchuan (Lin-chuan), the strategic spot of Fukien and Kiangsi, by the Communist Army.

#### Second Stage.

The second stage of the campaign marked the period when China encountered many disasters both politically and economically. In addition to the famine among the peasants, frequent floods, and poor crops, the storm of industrial depression swept the cities. Repeatedly, rumours of a financial crisis in the National Government were to be heard, and even among its leaders waverings could be discerned. During this period the army of the Communist Party, which used this social instability as the background of its activities, strengthened to a remarkable degree, and in at least one-sixth of China Soviet districts were formed. For this reason the Government under Chiang Kai-shek, after calling upon the entire financial capacity and ability of the Kuomintang, launched its desperate drive against the Communist Army. Chiang Kai-shek spent most of these days either at Wuchan or Nanchang, for the National Government deemed it most urgent to combat the communist bandits, even though at this time China's relations with Japan were rather strained.

Early in the year 1933, when the smoke of battle had not yet cleared in Jehol, Chiang Kai-shek spoke to the following effect at Nanchang, from the chair at the Anniversary Week of the 'Enlargement of the Various Departments of the Provincial Branch of the Kuomintang':

'On the outcome of this forthcoming drive against the bandits depends the existence of the Nation. It also is the supreme test of whether or not our race can protect and consolidate itself. Responsibility for the fact that the Communist bandits are not yet wiped out of Kiangsi naturally rests with the Government and myself. This I venture to say is a disgrace to the people of Kiangsi. In order to exterminate the bandits we must first of all be thoroughly convinced that if we are to exist there shall be no bandits, and if the bandits are to exist, we shall cease to exist . . . .'

From this speech a deduction may be made as to Chiang Kai-shek's decision at this stage of the campaign against the bandits.

#### Third Stage.

This third stage takes in the fourth and the fifth drives. The fourth commenced at the end of May 1932, and continued until the end of September. The fifth was executed in two stages, the first of which was begun early in 1933 and terminated at the close of the year, and the second occupied the whole of the year 1934. This fifth drive, in which well-prepared political and economic policies were executed, was divided into two stages, not only for military reasons or the magnitude of its scale, but because, as its slogans stated, it was three-tenths military and seven-tenths political.

At the end of May 1932, when military operations were brought to a close at Shanghai, preparations commenced for the fourth drive against the Communist Army. On June 9 Chiang Kai-shek summoned to Lushan Ho Ying-chin, Commander-in-Chief of the army against the bandits in the Kiangsi, Kwangtung, and Fukien districts, Hsia Tu-yin, Head of the Government of Hupeh Province, Ho Chengchun, Head of the Suiching Office in Hupeh, Hsiung Shih-hui, Head of the Government of Kiangsi Province, Ho Chien, Head of the Government of Hunan, Hsu Yuan-chuan, Commander of the Tenth Army, Chien Ta-chun, Commander of the Thirteenth Army, and Chen Cheng, Commander of the Eighteenth Army, to hold a conference for the extermination of the communist forces in the five provinces

of Hunan, Hupeh, Honan, Kiangsi, and Anhwei. At this conference the following items were decided: (1) During the months of June and July the Finance Department shall appropriate 350 million yuan for the campaign; Kiangsi shall collect and pay 4 million yuan at the end of June; Hupeh, 3 million; Honan and Anhwei, each 2½ million, and Hunan 2 million yuan, respectively. (2) The Communist Army shall be concentrated before the end of June, and the general attack upon it shall begin on July 1. (3) The military commander of each province shall obey the orders of the Chairman of the Military Committee and report on the progress of the drives and on the conditions of the Communist Army. (4) The plan of the campaign shall be as follows: (a) organize an army of volunteers against the Red forces; (b) unify the armed forces of the populace; (c) restore order in the territory of the bandits; (d) rehabilitate the rural communities; (e) relieve the refugees; (f) regulate the local governments; (g) encourage meritorious service of the hsien magistrates; and (h) construct roads in Honan, Hupeh, Anhwei, Kiangsi, Hunan, Kwangtung, and Fukien Provinces and thereby make two 'enveloping attacks' upon the communist forces.

The army that took the field in the next drive consisted of 81 divisions, 29 brigades, and 39 parties, and the number of soldiers exceeded 630,000. First of all the major attacks were directed at the Red forces which had their bases in the north of Kiangsi, Hupeh, Anhwei, and Hunan. But for the first three months (from June to September) the morale of the punitive forces was weak, and many of the National soldiers deserted their ranks and went over to the enemy. As a result the communist troops took the offensive, and it was reported that in the Wuchang-Changsha Railway region and in Nanchang the National Army was often in grave danger.

Greatly agitated by the general trend of affairs, Chiang Kai-shek issued orders to the effect that none were to retreat. Through the efforts and courage of the general, the attacks of the invading army gradually became fruitless at the beginning of September. By the middle of September, the Red troops were driven back as far as Hunghu, and towards the end of the month Kinkiachai in Anhwei came under the sway of the government forces.

To be sure, the fourth drive succeeded in checking the direct menace of the Wuhan Government, but when considered from the point of view of the whole of China, no concrete results were brought about, thus necessitating the fifth drive.

The fifth drive was concentrated upon the attack on the district under the 'Central Soviet Government'. Both in ferocity and length the drive was unprecedented in this campaign. For reasons mentioned in a preceding paragraph, it was executed in two stages. In the first stage, forces were advanced from Nanchang, Fukien, and Canton. In Fukien Tsai Ting-kai took command of the 'Left Route' Army, in Nanchang Chen Cheng assumed command of the 'Central Route' Army, in Canton Yu Han-mao was chosen to lead the 'Right Route' Army, and Chiang Kai-shek personally gave orders as Commander-in-Chief of the expedition, with Chen Chi-tang assisting him as Vice-Commander.

For about one year before the Fukien Incident the National Army advanced foot by foot against the enemy after establishing a firm economic blockade. Day after day furious see-saw battles were exchanged, but, even according to the report of the National Army, the numerical ratio of the National and the Communist Armies, which was six to three at the beginning of the year, became six to eight in favour of the Red Army. Furthermore, the National-Revolutionary Government was established at Fukien, and as a result of the conciliation between it and the Chinese Soviet Government the battle line of the punitive forces collapsed, together with its economic blockade.

The second stage of the drive began early in 1934. In this drive Chiang Kai-shek planned an enveloping attack from four directions. After appointing Ku Cho-tung, Chiang Ting-wen, Chen Chi-tang, and Ho Chien as commanders of the North, East, South, and West Route Armies, he himself gave orders to the forces from the head-quarters at Nanchang. To the North Route Army, which was assigned the most difficult task, the pick of the soldiers was allotted. Then, setting up an economic blockade and adopting the most cautious methods, Chiang Kai-shek gradually bore down upon the Red forces,

and finally in October the main forces of the Communist Army were compelled to withdraw towards the west. In forcing the Red Army to move, the national forces succeeded, but apart from this no other fruits were reaped from their strenuous efforts, for the Communist Army merely made long marches towards the north-west without any apparent loss in the strength of its troops. The escape of the Red Army from the projected enveloping attack of the National Army may be considered to be a military success on the part of the communist forces, but when viewed from a different angle, the fact that with thorough preparation the forces of Chiang Kai-shek executed the 'Szechwan plan' and prevented the Red Army from establishing its base in Szechwan is a success on the part of the National Army. But when considered from the present critical political situation in China, it was a decided failure, as far as the military strategy was concerned, for the government forces to have allowed the Communist Army to proceed northward.

Political and Economic Policy in the Campaign against the Communist Army.

'The reason for our not being able to exterminate the communist bandits does not lie in the fact that our forces are insufficient. It is due to the lack of moral force on our part.' These were the words with which Chiang Kai-shek began his address to the graduating class of the 'Short Term Military School' for the officers of the Government Army. To be sure, that which caused the unsatisfactory progress of the government forces under Chiang Kai-shek, even at the time when they out-numbered the Red troops tenfold, had its root in the fact that morally and politically the national forces were far inferior to the communist forces. The chief reason for the failure lay in the dissension within the army itself; the second reason was that the peasants were in favour of joining the Communist Army, and thirdly, the Communist Army was, in spite of the scarcity of its troops, gradually able to work the superior forces of the Government to exhaustion by the clever employment of guerrilla warfare, which can only be executed with the support of the peasants. As the campaign proceeded, the tactics of the punitive forces became more



prudent, and carefully prepared political and military policies were adopted. 'Three-tenths military and seven-tenths political' was the slogan proposed by Chiang Kai-shek early in the campaign. Consequently, the plan of the national forces was to 'advance slowly and fight with the utmost care; construct roads and fortifications, establish an economic blockade and adopt various other political policies'. These tactics were extraordinarily effective.

(1) 'Advance slowly, Fight cautiously.' By this is meant the tactics which forbid the rapid pursuit of the enemy and the deep encroachment into hostile territory. Upon capturing a certain point, efforts were made to consolidate it so as to frustrate all attempts of recovery by the enemy. Not until this consolidation was completed should an attack on another point be attempted. For example, when a point was taken, a military railroad was to be constructed to that point and fortifications constructed against counter-attacks. The ultimate aim of the adoption of these tactics was to exterminate the communist forces by advancing step by step against them (not giving them an opportunity to increase in number) after the construction of roads and fortifications, and the establishment of an economic blockade. The superiority in the number of troops was to decide the outcome. This strategy may be said to form the fundamental basis for the various measures adopted later in the campaign.

(2) Construction of Roads and Blockhouses. Motor roads for military purposes were constructed in the wake of the advancing troops so as to open a means of rapid communication with the reinforcing troops in the rear and thereby enable effective use of the excellent arms they had in their possession. In Kiangsi Province the length of the completed roads exceeded one thousand six hundred kilometres in 1934, and if projected roads are to be considered, the total will reach four thousand kilometres.

In the campaigns that followed, the fortification consisting of chains of blockhouses played an enormous part in the success of the National Army. The construction of blockhouses is an effective measure in anti-communist operations. Constructed for the most part of bricks and rocks, these



fortifications are usually erected on the summit of hills at such convenient distances from each other that the occupants of one can go to the assistance of another in case of necessity. As a rule the height of the blockhouses is about thirty feet; they are usually three- or four-storied and have loopholes for the snipers. According to military experts, if one of these fortifications is guarded by ten soldiers, it can withstand an attack of five hundred foot soldiers. Against modern arms such fortifications are of no avail, but for the communist troops, which are comparatively poorly armed, these ramparts are objects of great inconvenience. They do not fall before the artillery and the storming guns of the Red Army, and, what is more, it is said that in the event of being captured by the Red Army they will easily be recovered by the national forces. Consequently, these fortifications were constructed either in chains or in small groups at strategic points. The aim in building them in chains was to envelop the sovietized districts and prevent the Red Army from crossing this line.

Chains of blockhouses to encircle the districts under the Soviet Government were constructed in concentric circles. In Kiangsi Province three enveloping lines of blockhouses were formed. In Yungshin Hsien, which had been until recently the base of the anti-communist forces, there are 329 of these ramparts. In Lienhua Hsien, too, approximately 500 are to be found. According to He Chien, almost seven thousand of these blockhouses can be counted on the frontier of the Hunan and Kiangsi Provinces which penetrates to Kwangtung from the south of Hupeh Province. Older statistics reveal that in Kiangsi alone three thousand could be found. The Red Army, which had practically never been defeated in scores of desperate battles, could not help but be defeated ignominiously when they marched into this chain of blockhouses. The defeat of the Fong Cheh-min Division, the only disastrous defeat recorded by the communist forces in Kiangsi, occurred when they entered this enveloping battle line of the Government Army by mistake.

(3) Economic Blockade. After blockading the districts under the Soviet Government by employing chains of blockhouses and cutting their trade relations with non-communist localities, the government forces endeavored to crush the Reds by completely stopping the entry of supplies of salt, ammunition, and other necessities of the army into the Red area. This is the economic blockade which Chiang Kai-shek applied in his campaign. It enabled the government forces to strike a decisive blow at the communist-bandit forces which have their base in the mountains, and endangered the economic life of the sovietized areas. The regulations and the rules concerning this economic blockade were prepared to the minutest detail. On March 4, 1934, the 'Regulations for the Economic Blockade of the Communist Bandits' were issued, followed by the regulations for the 'Purchase of Salt', and the 'Systematic Discrimination of the Sovietized Areas'. Of these three sets of regulations, the final was prepared most minutely.

First of all, the whole area was classified into the 'safe', the 'semi-bandit infested', the 'adjoining', and the 'bandit infested' zones. In the 'adjoining' and the 'semi-bandit infested' zones a rigid economic blockade was to be established; blockhouses were to be constructed and a supervision office for the anti-Bandit Economic Blockade founded in each walled town in the hsiens. Sub-supervision offices were to be established at the strategic points in the transportation systems. The chiefs of these offices were appointed either by the governors of the hsiens or the masters of the boroughs, and were directly responsible to the Administrative Commissioner. The responsibility of the enforcement of the blockade rested with the highest officer in the army stationed in the particular locality, and the officials of the local government saw to the execution under the highest officer. In this way transportation, trade, and purchase of goods were strictly regulated.

Generally speaking, all except those who have special duties are strictly forbidden from entering or leaving the 'bandit zones', and passports are required for those who come from or go into the 'adjoining' and the

'semi-bandit' communities. Furthermore, an office for the examination of mail is established in a 'semi-bandit' infested community.

Transport in 'semi-bandit' and 'adjoining' regions is strictly regulated; all articles of military use must be accompanied by a certificate of the highest military officer; articles of daily necessity must be accompanied by a certificate either of the 'Public Law Commission' or the 'Committee of Public Sales'. In case there was no appropriate warehouse for articles of military purpose, the storing of surplus articles was not permitted. Furthermore, the purchase of goods was strictly controlled, the purchase of commodities by each individual being made through the chief of police or the 'Committee of Public Purchases'. In this way free trade was prohibited, and as a result no surplus permitted for the people. Particularly in the case of such an important commodity as table salt, its sale has been monopolized (Regulation for the Transaction of Table Salt) and each individual allowed to procure three cash<sup>1/</sup> worth for daily use (children one and a half cash). The 'Public Store' sells the salt in accordance with the 'Salt Sale Law', and the sale is therefore strictly controlled.

The sovietized area in Kiangsi suffered as a result of this firm blockade, and a great shortage occurred in the commodities of daily necessity. According to the Kiangnan Bulletin:

'The import of the commodities of the people, be it oil, salt, or cloth, is almost prohibitive, due to the rigid enforcement of the economic blockade by the East and the South Route Armies. The result is that the price of salt has soared to even three yuan per catty. Even so, all would be well if it were procurable, but as it stands it is sold in very few places. The people of this district have spent years almost without tasting salt.'

(4) Political Policy and Centralization. By the political policy is meant chiefly the rehabilitation of the land, rationalization of the rural communities, establishment of a system for the preservation of peace, and the

<sup>1/</sup> One cash is one-thousandth of a yuan or standard dollar.

special educational campaign among the people so as to re-establish order and normal conditions in the sovietized areas and its adjacent districts, relieve distress, and re-establish normal conditions in the rural communities. This was employed in counteraction to the 'Land' and the 'Economic' policies of the Soviet Government.

The measure which played an important part in the campaign against the Red Army was the unification of the administrative organs. In order to make the punitive forces act in a compact body and at the same time execute the economic blockade, a national political unification became vitally necessary. In attaining this centralization many endeavours were made both politically and financially, but one of the direct results of these was the amelioration in the system of the preservation of peace in the various provincial governments and the provincial commissions. In August 1932, on the occasion of the fourth drive, the system of provincial commissions was established by Chiang Kai-shek in the three provinces of Honan, Hupeh, and Anhwei. Each province was divided into a few districts, and Bureaux of Administrative Commissions were established which not only reorganized official discipline, but also became the pivot in the policy of the campaign against the Red bandits. A commissioner was directly appointed by the Chairman of the Military Committee (Chiang Kai-shek) and held additional posts of the magistrate of the hsien or the chief of the area in which he was stationed, and the Chief of the Bureau of the Preservation of Peace to administer the military and civil affairs. In this way Chiang Kai-shek succeeded in regulating local administration in consolidating the centralization and in maintaining the economic blockade which tended to break down under the poor collaboration among the warlords.

The system of the Preservation of Peace, which had been in a state of chaos in the various localities, was now reformed and unified. The Peace Preservation Commissions were further unified by the Administrative Committee, and in June 1934 a Peace Preservation Conference by the eight provinces of Honan, Hupeh, Hunan, Anhwei, Kiangsi, Kiangsu, Chekiang, and Fukien was held

at the Nanchang head-quarters. In this way unification was realized among the eight provinces. This unification was to play an important role in making the local armies come more and more under the influence of Chiang Kai-shek.

(5) Support of the Powers. The fact that Chiang Kai-shek was able to acquire the aid of foreign Powers was decidedly an important reason for facilitating the campaign. A deputy of the League of Nations guided the National Economic Council and planned the 'road policy', and, what was more, many military advisers and airmen were invited from Italy and Germany. It is said that during the five months between November 1933 and March 1934, nearly eighty aeroplanes were sold to China by the foreign Powers; of these France sold eleven, Britain five, and America over fifty (according to the report of the Japanese Government in June 1934).

(6) Results of the Various Policies Adopted. What were the results of the policies executed with so much care? In spite of careful preparations the chains of blockhouses and the economic blockade were on the verge of failure due to the disputes among the warlords, the rising of the peasant soldiers in the various districts, and the penetration of the blockade by the communist forces. Finally, at the end of 1934, the communist forces broke through the economic blockade and moved in great numbers towards Szechwan. The reason for the comparatively easy movement of the Red forces lay in the non-co-operation among the various warlords and the support rendered to the communist troops by the local peasant forces. This is clear from the fact that the Red Army made its movements by following the frontiers of the provinces. It may have been a success on the part of the government forces to have compelled the communist bandits to abandon their base in Kiangsi, but the very fact that they were unable to crush the enemy troops by trapping them may be interpreted as a great failure for the forces of the Nanking Government.

Even in the political policy for the peasants many measures proved unreasonable. The construction of roads and blockhouses was accomplished through the adoption of the corvee system; the peasants who were unable to offer



labour were forced to pay twenty gash per day. For example, of the 329 fortifications constructed in Yungshin Hsien only 15 blockhouses were built by the army. Besides the remaining 299 blockhouses 15 trenches were built by the peasants.

The application of the economic blockade, too, often lacked smoothness. This naturally caused an unreasonable rise in the price of commodities and provoked the oppressed peasants, who were greatly inconvenienced by the return of the landowners after the restoration of land to the former owners.

Contradictions began to arise in the political policy itself, and in the districts where normal conditions had been temporarily restored peace and order could no longer be maintained. Conditions are such that everywhere in the province of Kiangsi travelling into the remote regions is strictly prohibited. This situation is due to the fact that the life of the peasants is not stabilized, and that the agrarian policy of the Nanking Government is in striking contrast to that of the Soviet Government.

#### PRESENT SITUATION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY'S ANTI-IMPERIALISM MOVEMENT

At the Sixth Conference of the Chinese Communist Party, which was held at Moscow in July 1928, the two great tasks of the party were decided upon: (1) Drive out the Imperialists from China and complete a real unification of China. (2) By the democratic system abolish the private ownership of land by the landholding class and execute a 'land revolution' so that the peasants may shatter the semi-feudalistic bonds in the existing land system.

Thus, the anti-imperialism movement is not the only fundamental aim of the Chinese Communist Party. The combination of these two policies has varied greatly during the changing times that followed. During the revolution of 1925-7 the anti-imperialism movement advanced before the other; later the two were again brought together by the Land Revolution; and in the stages of the so-called 'Soviet Revolution' the two were united in the Soviet Government.

When the movement of the Chinese Communist Party entered the stage of the so-called 'Soviet Revolution', the anti-imperialism movement became vitally connected with the struggle of the Chinese Communist Party and the Red Army against the Kuomintang Government. The strife intensified, and in sequence to various material developments many changes were brought about in the two policies of the Chinese Communist Party. This development became manifest particularly after the Manchurian Incident of 1931, and finally in 1935 it culminated in the epochal formation of the so-called 'New Strategy'. The outstanding events which ensued were: (1) the transmission of the telegram for the 'Declaration of War Against Japan'; (2) the transmission of the telegram relative to the 'Agreement for Joint Strategy Against Japan', and (3) the 'Formation of the Northern Army against Japan'.

Taking advantage of the anti-foreign atmosphere created by the Manchurian and Shanghai Incidents which followed, the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Soviet Government combined together the drives for anti-imperialism and the defence against the government forces. The aim of the Chinese Communist Party in executing this action was to utilize the anti-foreign atmosphere created throughout China as its weapon against the fifth drive of the Kuomintang.

In January 1933, just before the large-scale fifth drive of the Kuomintang, the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Soviet Government telegraphed the 'Joint Manifesto for the Resistance against Japan'. This action was repeated in April, and the substance of the manifesto was as follows:

'Under the following conditions the Red Army of China will enter into an agreement on the plan of campaign with any armed forces and prepare to confront the aggression of Japanese Imperialism. (1) Immediately cease the attacks upon the Soviet Areas. (2) Protect the democratic rights of the people (liberty of meeting, unions, speech, publication, and demonstration and the release of those imprisoned on political offences. (3) Arm the people, form armed bodies of volunteers and thereby defend China, preserve its independence and territorial integrity and strive for the unification of China.'

In this way the Chinese Communist Party endeavoured to confront the fifth drive of the Kuomintang by forming an alliance with any armed forces regardless of whether they might be those of warlords. What reinforced this message was the establishment of the 'People's Revolutionary Government' in Fuhien. As a result of this, the fifth drive of the Nanking Government had to be abandoned for some time.

On July 15, 1934, when the fifth drive was in its second stage, the Chinese Communist Army issued the 'Manifesto for the Northward March of the Red Army of Workmen and Peasants', and after organizing a vanguard army for the anti-Japanese campaign to the north dispatched it with all possible speed. Simultaneously with this move, anti-foreign demonstrations called the 'People's Armed Self-Defence Movement' were originated in Shanghai and in the other leading cities proposing the 'Fundamental Policy for the Chinese People's anti-Japanese Military Operations'. In answer to the call of the Communist Army in its anti-imperialism movement, extensive activities were begun in the various localities. These were the anti-imperialism activities of the Red Army during its stay in Kiangsi. The noteworthy characteristic of these movements is that the main activity of the Red Army at this time was to fight off the campaign of the Nanking Government; in reality the anti-Japanese movement was of secondary importance. Directly after dispatching the army for the Northern Campaign against the Japanese, Chu Teh, the leader of the Red Army, during the course of his speech which stressed the urgency of repulsing the government forces, said:

'The Red Army consisting of peasants and workmen is the only armed force to deliver China from the outrage of Japanese Imperialism. For this reason, our second task is to carry on direct military operations against Japan.'

But in the so-called 'New Strategy', which was made public in August 1935, the mutual relation has been completely changed.

Present Position of the Anti-Imperialism Movement.

What is the 'New Strategy'?

Briefly it is the method by which the Chinese Communist Party is trying to solve its problems through turning the spear-head of the anti-foreign movement towards Japan. Primarily, this measure is directed against Japan; and secondly, the policy towards the Kuomintang will be decided therefrom. This is the change of policy of the Communist Party based on the resolutions passed at the seventh congress of the Comintern. The new policy was made public on August 1, under the names of the People's Commissariat of the Soviet Government and the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

The difference between this policy and the others is that all parties are to join and form a united front, for which purpose a proposal was made for the organization of a National Defence Government and the formation of a Confederate Army against Japan. Consequently, the party which formerly advocated the overthrow of the Kuomintang is now opposed to the dissolution by a foreign Power of the Kuomintang and the 'Blue Shirts' Organization' in North China. In this way the Communist Party is endeavouring to win the warlords and the financiers in one division of the Kuomintang over to the National Defence Government. This may be interpreted as a great change indeed.

Did this change lead to the abandonment of the initial political policy of the party? The answer is in the negative -- the Chinese Communist Party adhered to its fundamental political policy; the change merely indicates the development of the policy. Simultaneously with the change in its policy, the Chinese Communist Party has made partial modifications in the domain of the agrarian and the economic policies. That is to say, certain parts of the various conditions of the land reforms have been moderated. The reason for this is that for the Chinese Communist Party the struggle for the formation of the united front in the anti-imperialist movement is now all important. The party is thoroughly convinced that as long as it follows this line the other problems will either be solved of their own accord or else be easily realized. Wang Min

(Chen Shao-yu), who was one of the central figures of the Chinese Communist Party attending the seventh congress of the Comintern, made a statement to the following effect:

'It is necessary to believe firmly that under such conditions as exist in China of the present day, where there exists a Soviet regime in one part of its territory, the adoption of the tactics for the formation of the anti-imperialistic people's united front by no means weakens but rather consolidates the strength of the position of the Communist Party in its struggle for the future victory of the Soviet Revolution and the consolidation of the proletariat hegemony.'

Again, in connexion with the Soviet Government and the National Defence Government whose task is to form a united front against imperialism, Wang Min has stated:

'The policy of the National Defence Government is not only coincident with the duties of the Soviet Government. For this reason the Soviet Government can and must set an example to the followers of the National Defence Government. But the Soviet Government has for its chief task the complete racial and social liberation of the Chinese, thus it will not be able to restrict its activity merely within the frame of the policy of the National Defence Government. For instance, in order to let the Agrarian Revolution develop, the Soviet Government will, as part of the constitution of the Agrarian Revolution and as its starting point, execute the National Defence Government's policy, by confiscating the land of traitors to the country and endeavour to distribute it to the people. At the same time the Soviet Government will abolish the feudal system of land possession and strive for the realization of the fundamental aim of the Communist Party.'

Thus, simultaneously with its protection of the Communist Party's right to guide, the 'New Strategy' is making it possible for the Chinese Communist Party to win over the people gradually in its plan for the realization of the anti-imperialism movement and the land revolution.

The essential point of the 'New Strategy' is that the full force of the Chinese Communist Party against the so-called 'international imperialism' is

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Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and the Tactics of the Communist Party.



directed towards Japan. This situation is similar to that in 1925, when the spear-head of anti-imperialism was pointed at Britain. In the tactics of the Communist Party, the struggle which the Chinese Communist Party terms 'Resist Japan' is no different from the general anti-imperialism movement of the students, inhabitants of the cities, and the labourers. Secondly, there is the recent manifestation of the anti-Japanese movement created by agitators in the Kuomintang and a part of the capitalists and financiers; and thirdly, there is the failure of the Government Army to exterminate the Reds in Kiangsi, thus permitting the main forces of the Red Army to proceed northward to Szechwan without suffering much loss. Having occupied a vast territory where no economic blockade and no chains of blockhouses exist, the Red Army, which moved towards the north, is now in a position to engage in any sort of warfare and take part in any revolutionary movement. This is indeed a great blow to the Nanking Government.

The Chinese Communist Party is now forming a united front under such favourable circumstances; how is the Nanking Government going to control this movement?

Student Movements. Since the close of 1935, even Chiang Kai-shek's instructions to the representatives of the schools have not been successful in preventing the development of student movements throughout China. In Peiping on December 9, 1935, the students of Tsinghua and Yenching Universities, who were angered by the resolution passed against self-government by the presidents of the universities in Peiping on December 8, visited Sung Cheh-yuan at Wanshoshan and held a demonstration. Upon attempting to enter the city they were stopped by the police at one of the west gates. Within the city, six thousand secondary school and university students rose and finally overcame the patrols after much bloodshed and disorder. Then on December 16, eight thousand students, with those of the National Normal University acting as the pivot, commenced a demonstration after meeting in secrecy. From this movement was formed the Federation of the Students of Peiping consisting of representatives from more than thirty schools. The federation has mobilized the students and is doing its utmost to create an anti-Japanese atmosphere.

In Tientsin, too, a student movement was formed, and in Shanghai students rose in co-operation with their fellows in North China. On December 19 the students of Fudan University presented a petition to the Municipal Government. Furthermore, on December 23, with the students of Fudan University in the central position, the 'Band of Petitioners for the Entrance of Students to Nanking' converted the North Station into the base of their activities. In sympathy with these, approximately two thousand students held a 'sympathy demonstration' on the 24th. In Kaifeng (Honan Province), also, fourteen thousand students from thirty-eight schools, under the pretext of proceeding to Nanking to present a petition, held up the traffic by occupying the station and the passenger trains. Canton, too, was the scene of a student demonstration. On January 3 of the present year the students attacked the police and incurred ten casualties. On March 23, in order to form a unification of the student movements throughout China, the 'Preliminary Organ for the Students' Federation for National Salvation' was formed, and a two-day struggle which followed produced ten casualties. With the nation-wide union of the students, the Student Movement is spreading over the country like wildfire, as if mocking at the powerlessness of the Nanking Government; needless to say, the Chinese Communist Party is its guiding influence.

National Salvation Societies. Fanned either directly or indirectly by the Chinese Communist Party, anti-imperialism associations have begun to be formed in all parts of China in co-operation with this student movement. Particularly active among these is the National Cultural Salvation Association in Shanghai, which occupies the position of the highest guiding organ of the National Salvation Associations. The formation of this society was in co-operation with the student movement in Peiping. It began with the issuance on December 12, 1935, of the so-called 'Manifesto of National Salvation' which bore the signatures of more than two hundred and fifty intellectuals of Shanghai, including Communists, Social Democrats, Nationalists, and members of the Kuomintang. But these personalities were all utilized to advantage by the Chinese Communist Party. This fact was revealed by the 'Statement to the

People' which was published on February 11 by the Communist Party's Central Department of Propaganda.

Furthermore, there exist the following in Shanghai: the Shanghai Women's National Salvation Union, the National Salvation Union of the Trade Unions of Shanghai, the Shanghai Workmen's National Salvation Union, the National Salvation Association of Primary School Teachers of Shanghai, the Shanghai Motion Picture Artists' National Salvation Association, the Shanghai Newspapermen's National Salvation Association, the Shanghai Young Artists' National Salvation Association, and others. With these various associations, the aforementioned Shanghai Students' National Salvation Federation has joined to form the Shanghai National Salvation Federation of all classes of people.<sup>1/</sup>

Union of the Chinese People's Revolution. The participation of some of the wealthy people may be observed in the National Cultural Salvation Association. Furthermore, in answer to the call of the Chinese Communist Party for co-operation in national defence, some of the military people, especially the 'anti-Chiang' group, are now endeavouring to form a united front with the Chinese Communist Party. Chen Ming-shu and Li Chi-shen, the chief leaders of the Fukien Independence Movement, and Tsei Ting-kai, Chu Shou-nien, Ong Chao-huan, and Chiang Kuang-nai, the dauntless generals of the Nineteenth Route Army, had either taken shelter in foreign countries or had made their abodes in Hongkong, Kwantung, and Kwangsi, where they continued their 'anti-Chiang' work. On the occasion of the fifth congress of the Kuomintang, which was held in November 1935, they telegraphed Tsou Lu, Feng Yu-hsiang, and Yen Hsi-shan, who were at that time in Nanking, and demanded: (1) that the Kuomintang abandon its arbitrary one-party rule, (2) the release of all those imprisoned for political offences, (3) the enforcement of the freedom of democracy, and (4) the establishment of a special organ to supervise the finances and national defence programme of the Government.

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More recently, with the Shanghai Federation as a pivot, the All China National Salvation Federation has been organized.

However, they later followed the proposal of the Chinese Communist Party and formed the 'Union of the Chinese National Revolution'. With the publication of its journal, the Journal of National Salvation, the union is doing its utmost in persuading the Hu Han-min Party and the Kwangsi Party to join in forming a 'united front'. Thus, even influential men in the Kuomintang are now assenting to the proposal of the Chinese Communist Party.

The Communist Army in the North and the Campaign against it. The activities of the Communist Army which was dispatched to the north-western regions form a fundamental part of the 'New Strategy' of the party. By about June 1936 the main force of the Red Army was gradually moving northward. The movements of the Red Army in the north are to play an important role in the formation of the united front against imperialism. With Szechwan, Hsikang, Kansu, and Shensi as the bases of their activities, the Red forces have raided Shansi and Suiyuan and are striving to form a united front by establishing communication with the peasant forces and the defence troops of the rural communities which are scattered in the various regions.

Against these Red forces the anti-communist forces in Shansi are at a loss as to when to strike a decisive blow. Among the national troops there are many who desert their ranks to join the Communist Party in opposition to the North China Autonomy Movement.

In the face of these obstacles the anti-communist drive has shown exceedingly poor results, the poorest in the history of the anti-bandit campaign. It was said that the government forces succeeded in preventing the Red troops from entering Szechwan by the execution of Chiang Kai-shek's plan, but later developments proved that they did enter Szechwan. In September 1935 Chiang Kai-shek personally assumed command of the campaign against the Red bandits in the north-west and appointed Chiang Hsueh-liang as Vice-Commander-in-Chief. Then when the former North-east Army and the forces under Yu Hsueh-chung entered Shensi and Kansu the Red Army increased from nine divisions to eleven. The campaign was extremely unsuccessful. In the middle of September 1935 the 110th Division was completely defeated in the vicinity of

Yenan, and the two brigades of the army of Yang Hu-cheng which were stationed at Hsien and two parties of each of the divisions under Feng Chin-tsai and Kao Kwo-tze were disarmed. In December Ching Yo-hsiu, the Commander of the 36th Division, committed suicide, and the Commander of the 120th Division died on the battle-field when his forces were suddenly attacked. Furthermore, one brigade of the army under Yu Hsueh-chung deserted to join the Red forces without fighting. This drive has been a decided failure for the national anti-bandit forces, and the reputation of the Government has suffered considerably.

In addition to these developments in the north-west, there is the growth of the 'Federated anti-Japanese Army of the North-eastern Volunteers'. The so-called 'North-eastern People's Revolutionary Army' under the direction of the Chinese Communist Party has changed its name and affiliated itself to this Federated Army of Volunteers. The Chinese Communists in Manchoukuo are inferior both in number and power to those in China, but nevertheless they form a great obstacle to the growth of Manchoukuo.

The anti-imperialist movement under the 'New Strategy' of the Chinese Communist Party is being steadily continued. As has been mentioned previously, the present anti-Japanese movement is not only the concentrated expression of the anti-imperialism movement, but also part of the drive against the Kuomintang, and it must be admitted that the situation brought about by such a state of affairs is extremely grave.

In view of its ignominious failure to check the Red forces, Japan proposed to the Nanking Government a co-operative plan for defence against the sovietization of the north-west, and emphasized the vital fact that if swift measures were not executed it would be extremely difficult for the inhabitants of North China to be guaranteed safety. In truth, Japan's proposal was not merely for the sake of protecting the boundary of Manchoukuo and the safety of



Yenan, and the two brigades of the army of Yang Hu-cheng which were stationed at Hsien and two parties of each of the divisions under Feng Chin-tsai and Kao Kwo-tze were disarmed. In December Ching Yo-hsiu, the Commander of the 86th Division, committed suicide, and the Commander of the 180th Division died on the battle-field when his forces were suddenly attacked. Furthermore, one brigade of the army under Yu Hsueh-chung deserted to join the Red forces without fighting. This drive has been a decided failure for the national anti-bandit forces, and the reputation of the Government has suffered considerably.

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its people, but also for the preservation of the security of the eighty million inhabitants of North China. For the prevention of the sovietization of the north-west, the subjugation of the Red Army is essential from the military point of view, while, as a political measure, a policy for the rehabilitation of the rural communities is a vital necessity.

Excerpt, pages 343-375

Errata Sheet

Of the two documents in English already distributed as Def. Doc. No. 1161, the one which consists of ~~42~~ pages will be used. The parts of the above document to be offered to the Tribunal are as follows:

English.

Page 18, 1st paragraph.

Page 32, 4th paragraph.

From page 34, 2nd paragraph to page 40, 1st paragraph.

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「一九三六年ノ太平洋ノ諸問題」中ヨリノ抜萃

太平洋諸國ノ社會及經濟政策ノ目的ト結果

一九三六年八月十五日ヨリ二十九日迄ノ加州ヨセミテ國

立公園ニ於ケル第六回太平洋會議議事録

オクスフォード大學刊(ロンドン・ニューヨーク・

トロント)一九三七

(1)

瑞金放棄後の紅軍西遷行

最近に於ける紅軍の動向を説くには、先づ一九三四年十月の瑞金放棄から發端せねばならぬ。支那革命最後の決戦と稱せられる一九二七年十二月の廣東コムミューン以後、都市における活動の基礎を全く喪失し、中國共產黨は、その工作方針を農村社會へ向け、南昌暴動・廣東コムミ

ユーラの落武者を糾合して、廣東・福建・江西・湖南の省境地方に紅軍の整備を行ひ、ソヴェート區域の建設をなさんと試みた。而も、斯かる中國共產黨の工作は、南京政府の北伐遂行・對内軍閥戦争の間斷なき連續等々に惠まれて成功し、前記四省に亘る廣大なるソヴェート區域、十萬を越へる紅軍の結成がなつた。更に、浙江・安徽・湖北・河南・陝西・四川の諸省にもソヴェート區域及び紅軍が発生し、一九三一年十一月には江西省瑞金に於いて、第一回全國ソヴェート代表大會が開かれ「今や、支那には二つ政府がある。一は南京のブルジョア政權であり、一は瑞金のプロレタリア政權である」との氣焰をさへ擧げた。

この瑞金政府——中華ソヴェート臨時政府の發表するところに據れば、一九三一年にはその勢力の及ぶところ中南支那の十一省、ソヴェート區域の住民約六千萬人、飛行機及び大砲を保有する紅軍三十萬。首都



瑞金には行政各官衙のほか、紅軍大學あり、レーニン大學あり、嘗て人口二萬弱の縣城瑞金が、十數萬の都市に膨脹したと言ふ。勿論これは宣傳的意味を多分に有つて誇大な數字ではあらうが、尙ほ當時に於けるソヴェート政權の一斑を語るものである。

紅軍の山西進攻の意圖が那邊に在るやに就いては、その當時全く不可解で、物資の徵發を行つて軍糧の補充を行ふとか、山西にソヴェート區域を組織して経遠・外蒙へ出づる新コミンテルン・ルート（國際路線）の準備工作を行ふとかの諸説が唱へられた。紅軍が陝西省にあつて中央軍の討伐部隊との接觸を避け、進んで山西へ出でたのは、山西省を遊撃地區ならしめやうとする「攻勢防禦」戰術の現れで、その目標は専ら軍糧の補給にあり、従つて主力部隊が動かなかつたと見るのが至當な觀測

であらう。そのなかで、三月十日の電通北平電は、紅軍が山西省西南部八縣に亘つて共產制を實施し、中陽にソヴェート政府が樹立した旨を傳へ、その目的とするところは、「我々紅軍は、抗日の第一線に立つもので戰略上山西を基點とするに過ぎず、全國紅軍の目的は全國一致の國防統一軍並に抗日聯合軍の結成に在る」と豪語して居ると傳へて（『上海日報』三月十一日）居り、三月五日の『ペキン・テンシン・タイムス』（天津）が紅軍の山西進攻を報じて、「中國紅軍は、その宣傳や宣言文から純共產主義的標語を夙に撤廢して居る。……抗日戦を目的とするに愛國分子の統一戦線を公然と表明して居る」と言ひ、

(4)

紅軍の赤化工作の過程を略述すれば、紅軍が或る地點へ達（占領）すれば、先づ民衆を召集して會議を開き、ソヴェート政府を組織して、土

配の分配を行ふ。而し、實際は、上等の土地は紅軍並にソヴェート政府の公田となし、これを貧困者をして耕作せしめる。殘餘の餘り好くない土地を貧困者に分給する。土地の分配を行ふことは事實ではあるが、紅軍の政策を批判する際には、斯うしたカラクリをも考慮に入れねばならぬ。

土地の分配が行はれると、直ちにその土地利益の擁護の爲に、二十歳から三十歳以下の男子は遊撃隊、十四歳から二十歳以下の青年は少年先鋒隊、十四歳以下の兒童は童子團に編入される。共產主義教育は先づピオネールから積極的に施行される。斯くて組織されに遊撃隊・少年先鋒隊を漸次獨立團へ編成し、紅軍の補充部隊とする。老年男子と成年婦人は、運搬隊を組織して糧食の運搬を手傳はしめたり、或は代耕隊を組織して公田代耕を幫助せしめ、或は赤衛軍を組織して偵察・歩哨の職務を

幫助せしめる。更に、年若い婦人を選んで婦女宣傳隊を組織し、紅軍慰勞工作を行ふ。傳へられるところでは、貧困者は土地を入手——勿論好くない土地である——するや、紅軍に對して壯丁を提供しなければならず、更に收穫の十分の四を公糧として提供しなければならぬとのことである。

#### 中國共產黨の反帝國主義運動の現状

中國共產黨第六回大會（一九二八年七月、モスコ）は、黨の中心的任務を「帝國主義者を驅逐し、支那の眞正の統一を完成すること、民主的方式によつて地主階級の土地私有制度を徹底的に轉覆し、土地革命を實行し、支那の農民をして土地制度中の一切の半封建的束縛を完全に紛

評せしめること」の二大任務に決定せらる。従つて反帝運動は中國共產黨が擔ふ最も基本的な任務であると共に、中國共產黨は、この二つの任務を緊密に結び付けてゐるところに他の黨派と區別されるものがある。

併しこの二つの結合には現實の情勢の變化に應じて多少の分離があつた。即ち一九二五——二七年の大革命に於いては反帝國主義運動が先行し、これ以後の時期に於いては土地革命に集中されたが、所謂「ソヴェート」革命の段階に於いては、この二つが「ソヴェート」と言ふ政權の中に緊密に結合された。かくてこの活動を指導してゐる中國共產黨は、中華ソヴェート政府が完全に反帝的政權であると思惟し、これを守る中國紅軍の進撃の一步一步は、例へそれが、江西省の山奥で行はれたものであつても、反帝國主義運動の一步一步であると思惟してゐる。従つて現在の中國共產黨にとつては、國民黨政權の打倒と反帝運動とは全く別



固のものではない。中國共產黨は國民黨の第四次討伐に對する宣言に於いて次の如く謂つてゐる。「我等は國際帝國主義の打倒に向つて前進しなければならぬのであるが、先づ、第四次「圍剿」粉碎のために闘争することは中華ソヴェートを鞏固・擴大ならしめる所以である。又支那民衆の國際帝國主義に對する勝利、民族革命戦争の勝利を促進する所以である。又紅軍の國民黨に對する偉大なる勝利は、正いてその主人公たる帝國主義に對する勝利を意味する」と。これは、中國共產黨の反帝排斥運動の特徴である。従つて、中國共產黨の活動が所謂「ソヴェート革命」の段階に入つて以後、その反帝活動は中國共產黨及び中國紅軍の國民黨政府に對する闘争と緊密に結び付けられて來た。そしてその闘争が激烈となり、種々質的發展をするに従つて、その二つのモメントにも多少の發展、又は種々の變化が持ち來た。特に一九三一年（民國

二十年」の滿洲事變の發生以後に於いては、二の變化は顯著に畫き出されてゐる。そして最後に一九三五年（民國二十四年）に到り、所謂「新方略」たる劃期的な時期を結果するところとなつたのである。これらを劃期的な事件に依つて區別すれば、（一）「對日宣戰」通電、（二）「對日作戰合作協定」通電、（三）北上抗日隊の編成、等々である。

引き續いて起つた滿洲事變・上海事變で沸き起つた排日的空氣を巧みに擱らへ、中國共產黨と中華ソヴェト政府は、南京政府の第四次討伐の直前、二の討伐に對する鬭争と反帝鬭争とを結び付け、その反帝鬭争の矢面に立てる日本に對して宣戰の通電をなした。これは中國共產黨が國民黨の第四次討伐に對抗するために全國に起つた排外思想を自己の力となし、國民黨に對抗せんがためであつた。

更に一九三三年（民國二十二年）一月、國民黨の更に大規模な第五次

討伐の直前、中國共產黨と中華ソヴェート政府は「抗日合作宣言」を發表し、四月二れを通電した。その内容は、

次の條件の下に、中國紅軍は如何なる武裝隊伍とでも戦争の作戰的協定を訂立し、日本帝國主義の侵略に反對する準備を有す。

一、即刻ソヴェート區域の攻撃を停止すること

二、即刻民衆の民主的權利（集會・結社・言論・出版・示威の自由と政治犯の釋放等）を保證すること

三、即刻民衆を武裝し、武裝的義勇軍隊を創立し、以つて支那を保衛し、並に支那の獨立・統一と領土の保全を闘ひ取ることに

かくて中國共產黨はこの宣言に於いては、如何なる武裝隊伍をも、たとへそれが軍閥であつても、反帝國主義運動のために聯合し、かくして、南京政府の討伐軍内の對立につけ入つてその陣營から同盟者を奪ひ取

り、第五次討伐に對せんとし、こののである。その方策は、反帝國主義運動と反國民黨策とを益々緊密に結び付けたのであつた。而してこの通電の効果を裏書きしたものが、一九三三年末に勃發した「福建人民革命政府」であつたと言へる。このために南京政府の第五次討伐は一時中止されねばならなかつたのである。

更に第五次討伐後期に於いては、中國紅軍は七月十五日付を以つて「中國農紅軍北上宣言」を發し、北上抗日先鋒隊を組織し、出動せしめた。そして、これと同時に上海等の都市に於いては、「民族武装自衛運動」と稱する排外運動が生れ、これが、「中國人民對日作戰基本綱領」を提出し、中國紅軍の反帝國主義運動に呼應して、各地に廣汎な活動を行つた。これらが中國紅軍が江西省に居たときの反帝國主義運動で、これらを通じて摘出され得る特徴は、この時期は中國紅軍にとって南京政

府の討伐を撃退する二が主なる活動で、事實上はまだ抗日は「第二」の任務とされてゐたことである。北上抗日先鋒隊を派遣せる直後、中國紅軍の首領朱德は一九三四年八月一日附で紅軍に與へた指令に於いて、第二六討伐撃退の急務を鼓吹しつゝ、北上抗日先鋒隊に言及し、唯ソヴェート勞農紅軍のみが支那を日本帝國主義の蹂躪下より解放する唯一の武装勢力である。故に我等の第二の任務は即ち日本帝國主義と直接に作戦するにある」と言つてゐる。

だが、一九三五年（民國二十四年）八月に到つて發表された所謂「新方略」に於いてはこの相互關係が一變してゐる。

#### 反帝運動の現段階

ではその「新方略」とは如何なるものか。一言にして言へばその排外



主義の鋒を日本に向けると共に、二の抗日の徹底化の中でその他の自己の細領をも解決せんとする万策である。即ち抗日が第一で、その次ぎにこれに従屬して對國民黨の政策が決定されるわけである。これは中國共產黨が、一九三五年度莫斯科に開かれた第七回コミンテルン大會の決議に依據して行へる方向轉換であつて、中華ソヴェト政府人民委員會及び中國共產黨中央委員會の連名にて八月二日の國際反戦デーに發表されたものである。

二の内容が従前のものと異なるところは、全支那の如何なる黨派をも包含して反帝軍一戦線を作らうとすることにあるので、二のために國防政府及び抗日聯軍の組織を提唱してある。そして共產黨は事實上共合作を提唱してゐるのである。従つて今では國民黨打倒を掲げた中國共產黨も今は北支に於ける監衣社、國民黨部の解散にも反對してゐる。かくし

て國民黨中の一部の軍閥・資本家を國防政府の側に奪取しようとしてゐる。二れらは際立つた變化であると言ひ得るだらう。

ではこの共產黨の戰術の轉換は、果して中國共產黨本來のソヴェートの段階にある諸細領を放棄したのであらうか。否、中國共產黨は現在その基本的細領を放棄してゐないのみでなく、この新轉換こそは、その諸細領の發展なのである。勿論中國共產黨はこの轉換と同時に農業政策・經濟政策等の分野に部分的變更を示してゐる。即ち土地革命の諸條件の或る部分は緩和されてゐる。だが、この理由は單一反帝統一戰線のため、の闘争が中國共產黨にとって最も大切な一環であり、それを握つて居れば、その他のものは自動的に或ひは非常に容易く實現され得る見透しを持つてゐるからである。中國共產黨最高指導者の一人たる王明（陳紹禹）は、「領土の一部にソヴェート政權が存在する支那の如き國家の條件

下に於いては、反帝國主義的人民戦線の戦術の正しい適用は、ソヴェート革命の向後の勝利のため、プロレタリアートのヘゲモニー強化のための闘争における共産黨の地位と力を弱めず、却つて強めてあるといふことを強く確信するを要する」(植民地革命運動と共産黨の戦術より引用)と言つて居り、且つ王明は又、反帝統一戦線の政府たる「國防政府」とソヴェート政府との關聯に言及して次の如く言つてゐる。

「國防政府綱領は、ソヴェート政府の任務に對立しないのみか、ソヴェート政府はこの綱領の徹底的實現のために戦ひつゝあり、且つ戦はねばならぬ。故にソヴェート政府はその統治下にある凡ゆる地區において、この綱領を實施し得るし、且つ實施せねばならぬ。ソヴェート政府はそれによつて國防政府の賛成者に範を示さねばならぬ。しかし支那民族の完全なる民族的社會的解放を主要任務とするソヴェート政府は、そ

の活動を單に國防政府の綱領の枠内に制限することは出来ないであらう。例へば農業革命を發展せしめるため、ソヴェート政府は賣國收の土地を沒收し、農民に分配せんとする國防政府の綱領を、農業革命の構成部分として且つ出發點として實行すると同時に、支那における封建的地主的土地所有を徹底的に根絶せんとする共產黨の原則的目標を放棄するを得ないのみならず、所與の主觀的客觀的闘争條件に従つて二の目標を實現すべく闘争する」と。

16

かくて二の「新方略」は中國共產黨に十分な指導權を保證すると共に、中國共產黨はこの手段に依つて漸次大衆を吸收し、自己の本來的綱領——反帝・土地革命を實現せんと企圖しつゝあるのである。

而して最後に二の「新方略」の特質は、中國共產黨の所謂「國際帝國主義」に對する闘争の主要な点が、日本に向けられてゐることである。

二北が一九二五年當時、反帝國主義運動の矢が先づ英國に向けられてゐるのと軌を一にするもので、共產黨の戰術では常に自己の中心敵に向つて集中的反撃を行はんとするため、中國共產黨の稱する「抗日」は、それ自身一般反帝國主義闘争と何等異なるやうな。現在の瞬間に於いては「抗日」と「反帝」とは全然同一のものである。そして更に、それは「反南京政府」も亦同一のものである。

ではこの新方略を可能ならしめてゐる諸條件は何であらうか？ それ  
は、第一は一部の人士に操縦された學生・都市市民・労働者等の執拗な抗日運動の存在である。第二は最近頓に抬頭した國民黨内部又は、支那資本家の一部に續けられる抗日運動の存在である。而して第三は、南京政府が江西省に封鎖した中國紅軍を根絶し得ないばかりでなく、何等の損害をも與へることなく、紅軍の主力部隊を四川に移動せしめ、北上せし



めたことである。二の北上した紅軍は綏遠線も、經濟封鎖も存在しない廣大な土地に盤踞し、支那の各地に自由に機動戰、又はパルチザン戰を行ふことが出來、支那の各地に於ける革命運動の如何なる徴候に對しても參加し得る條件を獲得したのである。而して、二のことは南京政府にとつて重大な打撃であることは自明の理なのである。

中國共產黨はかくの如き條件の上に立つて、今反帝統一戰線を結成しやうとしつゝあるが、南京政府はこれに對して如何に對處しつゝあるだらうか？ これは南京政府の下で行はれつゝある最近の反帝國主義運動と紅軍の活動を見れば判然とするところである。

### 學生運動

昨年末以來、支那全國の學生運動の發展は、蔣介石の學校代表に對する訓話を以てするも何等これを阻止することは出來なかつた。

北平では、昨年十二月八日の北平各學校長の「自治反對」決議に勢を得て、翌九日郊外にある清華、燕京兩大學は萬壽山に冀察政務委員會委員長たる宋哲元を訪れ、デモを行つて北平市中に突入せんとして西直門で官憲に阻止せられた。更に、北平市内の大・中學生約六千名は、各所に蜂起し、遂に官憲と衝突し、流血の慘事を惹起した。越へて十二月十六日には、北平師範大學を中心として約八千名の學生が巧みに集合して示威遊行を開始した。而して此中から三十校以上の代表者より成る北平學生聯合會が結成され、この聯合會は積極的に學生を動員し、反日を鼓吹してゐる。

天津に於いても同様に學生は騒動を惹起した。上海に於いては又北支那に呼應して學生運動を惹起した。十二月十九日、復旦大學生が市政府に請願書を提出した。更に同二十三日には復旦大學生を根幹とする「

「學生入京請願團」は上海北停車場を以て據し、これに同情する上海全市約二千名の學生は、二十四日同情示威遊行を行つた。又河南省開封に於いても三十八校一萬四千の學生は請願の爲に京すると稱し、停車場・客車・古蹟し、交通を杜絶せしめた。更に廣東に於いても學生は示威遊行を行ひ、本年一月三日の示威遊行に際しては公安局員と衝突し、死傷者十數名を出したものである。

而して三月二十八日、全國の學生運動を統一する目的で、「全國學生救國會聯合會籌備會」が結成され、既に北平・天津・上海・温州・杭州・濟南・青島・徐州・曲阜・南京・唐山・保定・武漢・張家口・太原等の學校が同會に参加して居り、五月一日附を以つて秘密裡に『學生呼聲』を發刊し、益々執拗な活動を開始した。この爲め、上海では三月二十四日復旦大學は上海公安局警衛隊に包圍され、二日に亘つて相待峙し、

數十名の買辦者を出した。かくて、この學生の全國的糾合と共に、南京政府の無力を嘲笑するかの如く、學生運動は蔓延しつつある。而して中國共產黨がこれを指導しつつあることは言ふまでもない。

#### 各界救國會の成立

この學生運動と呼應して、中國共產黨の直接的或ひは間接的煽動に依つて反帝國體が各地に續々と成立した。特にそのうち、上海に根城を持つ上海文化界救國會は他の救國會より活潑に活動し、救國團體の最高指導機關たるの地位にある。この救國會の成立は、北平學生の運動に呼應し、昨年十二月十二日附を以つて上海の知識階級分子二百五十餘名の署名を以て所謂「救國宣言」を出したのに始まる。その署名人の中には沈鈞儒（上海法學院教授長）・章乃器（浙江實業銀行副經理）・周劍英（明星映畫會社經理）等々の知名士の名前が連ねられ、國民黨系・共產黨

系・社會民主黨系・國家主義派等の寄せ世帯であるが、全體として中國共産黨側に利用されてゐたことは、二月十一日附を以つて出された國民政府中央宣傳部の「國人に告ぐる書」に依つて明らかになされた。

尚ほこの外に、上海婦女界救國聯合會・上海聯業界救國會・上海工人救國會聯合會・上海各大學教授救國會・上海小學校職員救國聯合會・上海電影界救國會・上海音樂界救國會・上海新聞記者救國會・上海青年文藝界救國會・國難教育社等々が存在し、これに前記の上海學生救國聯合會が加はつて、上海各界救國聯合會が成立してゐる。而して、この上海の救國會を中心にして全國的に救國會の組織が統一せられんとし、中華全國各界救國聯合會の創立が準備せられつつある。

### 中華民族革命同盟



上海文化救國會には章乃器の如き支那資本家が参加してゐたが、更に反蔣軍閥の一部が中國共產黨の合作提議に應じて共同戦線を張らんとする。現在、これが確然と表面化したのは、十九路軍の巨頭に依つて率いられてゐる生産黨である。即ち福建事變の立役者陳銘樞・李濟琛、十九路軍の總將蔡廷鍇・區壽年・翁照垣・蔣光鼐等は、福建事件の失敗後約二年間或は海外に亡命し、或は香港・兩廣に集喰つて執拗に反蔣策動を續け、殊に昨年十一月の五全大會には、當時南京にあつた田和見主義政客鄒魯・馮玉祥・閻錫山等に渾名通電を發して、(一)國民黨は一黨專制を放棄すべし、(二)一切の政治犯を釋放せよ、(三)民主自由を實行せよ、(四)特別機關を設立し政府の財政及び國防計畫を監督せよ、等々を要求してゐたものであるが、その後中國共產黨の提議に應じて、中華民族革命同盟を結成し、機關紙『救國時報』を發行し、胡漢民派・廣西派に對し

ても統一戦線を結成すべく頻りに働きかけてゐる。かくて、曾つての黨國の志士までが共產黨の提議に同意しつつある。北平の大學校長の策動を初めとし、更にその他國民黨の一部にもこれと呼應せんとする空氣は存在すると見られて居る（CCC團）。

#### 北上抗日軍とその討伐

中國共產黨の「新方略」の基本的部分となつてゐると二つの西北に於ける紅軍の活動は、一九三六年六月頃、現在紅軍の主力は漸次北方に移動し、二の地方に於ける紅軍の活動は、單一反帝統一戦線結成のための最善的部分となつてゐる。即ち四川・西康・甘肅・陝西を根據地とし、山西・綏遠に遊撃し、各地に散在する土着農民軍・農村自衛軍と連絡し、戦線の統一に専念しつつあるのである。これに對して山西各地の討伐軍は全く浮腫であつて、中には紅軍に内應するもの多く、二の北進する

DEF 1161

紅軍は無人の境を行くが如く「北支自治」・「内蒙自治」に對抗して、この陝北區を中心に綏遠・山西をその遊撃區として、二れを根幹として統一反帝戦線を結成すべく、二つを先途と地方雜軍・土着軍・一般農民に働きかけてゐるのである。

二れに對して討伐軍の討伐狀況は、剿匪史上未曾有の不振を示してゐる。蒋介石の四川工作に倣つて、四川の中原に紅軍を踏み入れず、朱德・毛澤東の主力を四川に追ひ込んだのは蒋介石の功績に算へられつゝあるも、その後一九三五年九月、蒋介石自から西北剿匪總司令に就任、張學良をその副司令に任命し、舊東北軍に於て李忠軍の陝西・甘肅入りとなり、従前の九箇師より一躍二十一個師の實力を把握するに到りたるも、討伐の狀況は極めて不振である。即ち、昨年九月中旬第百十師は延安附近に全滅し、白水縣駐在の楊虎城軍二旅、及び馮清濟部・高桂滋部各

一團は武装解除せられ、十二月には第百八十六師長井岳秀は自殺し、第百八師は奇襲を受けて師長は戦死した。更に甘肅では于學忠軍一旅は戦はずして毛澤東軍に寝返りした。かくて二の西北に於ける討伐はまさに剿匪史上未嘗有の惨敗で、討伐軍の剿匪能力に對する信用は完全に地に墮ちてゐる。

更に西北に於ける二れらの事態と關聯して滿洲國內に於いても所謂「東北人民革命軍」と國民黨系の「東北義勇軍」が聯合し、中國共產黨の國防政府及び抗日聯軍の戦術に呼應しつつある。滿洲國內に於ける二れらの土匪は、その數に於いても實に於いても支那に於けるものとは非常の差であつて、多きも二三百を出てない。併し二れは滿洲國の健全なる發達にとつて重大なる障礙をなしてゐるのである。

以上、中國共產黨の「新方略」下の反帝運動は執拗に續けられ、中國

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反共黨の所期する事態の二三の兆候ははつきりと感知し得るのである。  
而して前述せる如く、現在の反日運動が反帝運動の集中的表現であり、  
即ちそれが反國民黨の活動である以上、この事態が演ずる結果は由々し  
きものと言はざるを得ないのである。



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英 文

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- 第四〇頁第二節ノ前（六行目）迄

PROBLEMS OF THE  
PACIFIC, 1936

AIMS AND RESULTS OF  
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC POLICIES  
IN PACIFIC COUNTRIES



Proceedings of the Sixth Conference of the  
Institute of Pacific Relations, Yosemite  
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\* \* \* \* \*

Trade negotiations between the United States and Japan have thus far been confined to the control of individual items imported from Japan. As Japanese have pointed out, only a very small proportion of the total Japanese imports to the United States offer substantial competition to American manufacturers, and the articles which have become subjects of negotiation and agreement are chiefly 'sundries' such as cotton rugs, pencils, matches, potteries, tuna fish, &c. Despite their relatively small absolute value, the rapid increase in these import items has been accorded wide and unfavourable publicity by those American business interests which felt themselves subject to unfair competition. The adjustments made by the two countries have involved not only increased protective tariffs by the United States, but also the development of a system of voluntary export control by Japan. Examples of the various forms of trade control adopted by Japan, either through agreement with the United States or voluntarily, are described in a Japanese data paper as follows:

The United States Tariff Commission reported to the Government that they considered it necessary to levy a further duty of considerably higher rate on the Japanese pencils imported into the United States. The Japanese Government, however, requested that the proposed tariff increase should not be effected as they would undertake to restrict the quantity of pencils to be exported to the United States on their own responsibility. Their negotiation was successful. In April 1934, an unofficial gentleman's agreement was reached by the two Governments under which Japan contracted to limit exports of pencils to America within 125,000 gross per year, 25,000 gross per month, and 45,000 gross per three months. The agreement was put in force on May 1, 1934. The following is an outline of the control scheme of pencil-export and production practised in Japan.

'Control of pencil-production: (a) The Japan Federation of Manufacturers' Associations of Pencils for Exportation has the power, under governmental supervision, to fix a maximum quantity of production of pencils for exportation to the United States. (b) A control-certificate issued by the Federation shall be attached to every package of pencils manufactured by members of the associations for exportation to the United States. (c) Members of the associations shall not sell pencils for exportation to the United States without the above certificate. (d) Members of the associations shall limit the sales of pencils for exportation to the United States exclusively to members of the Exporters' Association of Pencils for the United States.

'Control of pencil-export: (a) The Exporters' Association of Pencils for the U.S.A. shall be established to which every exporter of pencils for the United States shall belong. (b) As regards the pencils which are shipped to the United States, a control-certificate issued by the Japanese Federation of Manufacturers' Associations of Pencils for Exportation shall be attached to every package of such pencils; no pencils without such certificate shall be exported to the United States. (c) As regards the pencils exported after April 1, 1934, a written export-approval by the said Federation, together with invoice and export declaration, shall be presented to the Customs Office. (d) After April 1, 1934, definite quota for the exportation to the United States shall be agreed upon among members of the Exporters' Association. Japan proposed some alterations, but the agreement was renewed from May 1, 1935, without any important alterations, as Japan's proposal was not presented sufficiently in advance to allow thorough discussions.

Cotton piece-goods.

'As imports of Japanese cotton piece-goods gave rise to a wide-spread outcry against Japanese competition by cotton manufacturers in the United States, both Japanese importers in New York and the manufacturers and exporters in Japan agreed that something must be done to remedy the situation. Accordingly, in April 1935, an Exporters' Association of Cotton Tissues for the United States was organized with a view to undertaking a voluntary control of the export quantity and price. On the part of the United States, the Cabinet Committee on Cotton Textiles drafted a report after four months' study, and the President introduced this report before the Congress in August 1935. One of the recommendations put forward therein was an attempt to adjust the trade relations between the two countries without resorting to a tariff action. In due course, the American Government proposed a scheme to limit imports of Japanese cotton piece-goods. But, as a result of governmental negotiations, it has been agreed that the manufacturers in Japan should undertake to control the exportation of the goods on a voluntary basis. It seems that the manufacturers in the United States, too, are satisfied with this arrangement, expecting to see an agreement on concrete figures be reached in due course.

Canned and frozen tuna fish.

'In January 1934, the American Government raised the duty on canned tuna fish to 50 per cent. ad valorem and further threatened to prohibit its importation altogether. In order to meet the situation, a voluntary quota-plan was attempted in Japan and, at the same time, the representatives of both the canned and frozen tuna fish industrialists were sent to the United States with a view to working out a compromise with the American interests. They met the Californian canning industrialists at San Pedro on March 6 and after. At first the American representatives proposed 7,000 tons and 3,000 tons as import quotas of canned and frozen tuna fish respectively, but, as opinion within the Japanese delegation itself was divided, later they proposed another set of figures: canned fish, 5,000 tons, and frozen fish, 5,000 tons, with the same total of

10,000 tons. Replying to this proposal, the Japanese side asked for 6,500 tons (325,000 boxes) and 3,500 tons (250,000 boxes) for canned and frozen fish respectively, and also proposed that this arrangement should be continued for two years. But as soon as the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act was put into effect on June 12, the American attitude became noticeably uncompromising, and at the meeting of the delegates held on the same day, American rejected the Japanese proposal. Since this breakdown of the negotiation, the atmosphere in the United States has become more unfavourable than ever; but Japan is keeping up the efforts to appease the American feeling by restricting the exports.

#### Potteries.

'At a public hearing held by the Tariff Commission, the American manufacturers of potteries demanded that import quotas should be applied, on the basis of about one half of the imports in 1933 to those items of Japanese potteries which were competing with theirs. The Japanese Government pointed out, however, that since November 1933, a voluntary export-control had been effected by the Japan Federation of Exporters' Associations of Potteries. After a series of negotiations, the American Government conceded and handed an unofficial memorandum, stating that they would not resort to a tariff-increase or quota regulations, but would inform the Japanese Government of such steps beforehand, should it be found necessary to adopt such in the future. Furthering the export-control, the Japan Federation of Exporters' Associations of Potteries in November 1935 put into force a regulation for the minimum export price of soup-plates for exportation to the United States, and also provided for a regulation for export-control of certain specific plates for the use of hotels and restaurants in that country.

#### Matches.

'On the one hand, the United States Tariff Commission decided provisionally to increase the duty on Japanese matches by 20 per cent. and, on the other, the American manufacturers intimated that this proposed tariff action



would be avoided, if Japan was willing to limit matches exports within 40,000 tons a year and also to raise their price to such a level as would not unduly depress the market price in the United States. The Japanese manufacturers counter-proposed to fix the export-quota at 60,000 tons or 3,000,000 gross per year, on the basis of Japan's exports in the year 1933. In the meantime, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, in view of the decidedly unfavourable atmosphere among the American manufacturers against Japanese matches, promoted the organization of an Exporters' Association of Matches for the United States in January 1934, and this organization began to control both the quantity and the price of the exports from July onward. Finding, however, that the Association had little power against outsiders the Ministry on August 7, 1934, ordered that every exporter of matches to America, irrespective of whether he was a member of the Association or not, should, under the provision of Article 8 of the Exporters' Association Law, be bound after August 10 by the regulation of the Association as regards the general export rule, export quantity, export price, and export agency. Further, as it was considered necessary to arrange for an agreement with countries like Sweden and the U.S.S.R. which are main suppliers of matches to the United States, Japan sponsored a Japan-Sweden-U.S.S.R. tripartite parley in New York in November 1934. The three countries agreed on a quantity- and price-control. However, America has not shown any signs of lowering the high protective tariff on matches.<sup>1/</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

<sup>1/</sup> Teijiro Uyeda, The Recent Development of Japanese Foreign Trade, Japanese Council, 1936, pp. 106-10.

辯護文書一六六

太平洋問題 一九三六年

太平洋沿岸諸國の社會政策並に經濟政策の目的  
及結果に就きて

太平洋問題調査會第五回會議資料

於 カリフォルニア、ヨセミテ国立公園  
自 一九三六年八月十五日至同二十九日

オクスフォード大学一九三七年版

ロンドン

ニューヨーク

トロント

日米通商會談は今日までの所日本からの輸入品の各品目についての條



制に關するもののみについて附せられて來た。日本側の指摘した通り日本商品は合衆國に輸入される日本商品の全体から見て極めて小部分のもののみか合衆國の製造業者に對して實際の競争を挑むものであり、實談協定の問題となつてゐる頃には主として絹織物、鉛筆、マッチ、金線、直等の細品目なのである。是等は實際の額は比較的大したものであるが、意欲にその輸入を増加した爲アメリカの製造業者側では不費な競争をしてゐるものであると考へて日本側に對する不評を強く傳へたのである。日・米兩國は米關税の保護關税の引上げの件のみならず、日本側の自發的輸出統制の促進に關して調整を了つた。米側の同意により或は日本側が目ざつた貿易統制方法の諸列は次の日本側の資料に示されてゐる。

鉛筆、「合衆國關稅委員會は政府に對して合衆國に輸入される日本製鉛筆に對しては更に相當高率の課税が必要であると考えられると報告をしたのである。か日本政府より合衆國向輸出鉛筆の数量を自己の責任に於て制限するやうにするから、その提案の關稅引上の實施は見合

せられたき旨の要請があり、この交渉は成功、一九三四年四月非公式の紳士協定が兩國間に締結された。これによつて、日本は合衆國同輸出鉛筆は年額に於て一二五、〇〇〇クロス以内、月二五、〇〇〇クロス、三ヶ月では四五、〇〇〇クロス以内に制限することを約束した。この協定は一九三四年五月一日に實施された。次に日本に於ける鉛筆製造並に製造統制計劃の大要を述べる

「鉛筆製造に關する統制 a 日本は輸出鉛筆製造業組合聯合は政府の管理の下に合衆國同鉛筆の最高製造量を決定する。

(b) 右聯合より交付する統制證は鉛筆製造業組合員製造の合衆國同鉛筆の梱包毎に貼付せられる。(c) 組合員はこの統制證なしでは合衆國同輸出鉛筆を賣ることは出来ない。(d) 組合員は、合衆國同鉛筆輸出組合員のみに限つて合衆國同輸出鉛筆を賣る。

「鉛筆輸出統制 (a) 合衆國同鉛筆輸出商組合が設立され合衆國同鉛筆輸出業者は總て之に加入する。(b) 合衆國同輸出鉛筆に就いては、日本輸出鉛筆製造業組合から交付される統制證がこの輸出鉛筆の梱包毎に貼

付されこの證が無ければ、合衆國に回けて鉛筆を輸出することは出来ない。a) 一九三四年四月一日以後に輸出される鉛筆に就いては、上記聯盟よりの輸出證明書に送状と輸出申告書を添えて税關に提出する。b) 一九三四年四月一日以後は合衆國同輸出の割當量は輸出商組合員の間に於て協定せられる。日本側より若干の變更の申入れを行つたのであるが、前以て充分の諮議をするだけの時間の餘裕を與えなかつた爲、この協定は大した變更もなく一九三五年五月一日から實施された

#### 綿織物

日本よりの綿織物の輸入に對しては合衆國綿織物業者から日本との競争に就いての反對が廣く万々から起つたのでニューヨークの日本輸出商も日本内地織物業者並に輸出商達も何らかこの局面を打開させる方法を講じなければならぬと考え一九三五年四月には合衆國同綿織物輸出商組合が組織されて輸出綿織物の數量價格に就いて自發的に統制を行うことになつた。合衆國側としては綿織物に關する内閣委員會に於て四ヶ月に亘る検討の後報告案が作成され、一九三五年八月、國會に於て大統領よりこの報告が提出された。この報告の中に



は兩國の通商關係は關稅政策によらずに調整する方法を模索してゐる一環があつた。やかて合衆國政府から日本綿織物輸入制限案の申入れがあつたが政府間の交渉の結果、日本の製造業者が自發的に製品の輸出統制をしようと云ふことか協定された。而して合衆國綿織物業者も亦此の協定に満足しやかて具體的な數字に關して協定が見られると期待してゐる。

## 諸の通詰及冷凍

一九三四年一月アメリカ政府は諸の通詰に課する税率を價格に従つて五割引き上げ、更にその輸入を全然禁止すると威嚇した。此の事態に對處するために、日本に於ては自主的割當を計畫すると同時に、アメリカの關係者と妥協を計る目的を以て諸の通詰及冷凍業者の代表が合衆國へ派遣された。彼等は三月六日以降サンペドロに於てカルホルニア通詰業者と會見した。最初アメリカの代表者は諸の通詰及冷凍の輸入割當として夫々七千噸と三千噸を提案した。日本代表團の中で意見が纏まらなかつたので其後アメリカ側は別の一對の數字を提案した。

即ち合衆一萬噸に變りはないか。通詰五千噸冷凍五千噸であつた。此の提案に答へて日本側は通詰及冷凍に對して夫々六千五百噸（三十萬五千箱）と三千五百噸（二十五萬箱）を要求し、更に此の協定は二ヶ年間繼續すべきことを提案した。併し相互貿易協定條例が六月十一日實施されると直ぐアメリカの態度は著しく非妥協的となり同日開かれた代表者會議に於てアメリカ側は日本の提案を拒絶した。此の交渉決裂以後合衆國の空氣は以前よりは一層悪惡となつた、併し日本は

輸出を してアメリカの感情を緩和する努力を傾けた。

### 陶 器

關稅委員會によつて開かれた公開會議に於てアメリカ陶器製造業者は  
 一九三三年の輸入約半分に基いてアメリカ製陶器と競争中の日本製  
 陶器（の品目）に輸入割當を適用すべし、との要求を提出した。併し  
 日本政府は一九三三年十一月以來日本陶器輸出組合聯盟が自主的に出  
 産割當を實施してゐる事を指摘した。

交渉を重ねた結果、アメリカ政府は漸歩し非公式覺書を手交した、そ  
 れには税率引上或は割當制限の手段に訴へる意思のないこと、併し將  
 來かゝる措置を採る必要を認め、場合によっては事前に日本政府に通知する  
 旨記してあつた。輸出税制を一段と強化して、日本陶器輸出組合聯盟  
 一九三五年十一月に合衆國輸出スープレの最低輸出價格に關する  
 規則を實施し更に同國に於ける旅館及飲食店用の或る種類の皿の輸出  
 割に關する規則を定めた。

辦

寸

一方に於て合衆國稅委員曾は日本農産寸に課する稅率を暫定的に  
 二割引き上げることと決定したか他方アメリカ農産業者は若し日本か  
 農産の輸出を年に四萬噸以内に制限し且その價格を合衆國に於ける市  
 場價格を不當に下落せしめない標準にまで引き上げる意志を有するな  
 らば、この關稅引上（行爲）提案は避けられることを暗に仄かした。  
 日本の農産業者は一九三三年の日本の輸出に對して輸出總額を年に六  
 萬噸即ち三百萬ドル（哥）に決めることと對進に提案した。果實する  
 外に、兩下省は、アメリカの農産業者の間に於ける日本農産寸に對す  
 る明かに愈惡な空氣に鑑みて、一九三四年一月に合衆國同產寸輸出  
 協定の締結を圖つた、そしてこの協定は七月以來輸出品の数量及價格を  
 統制し始めた。斯し聯盟が局外者に對し殆んど勢力を持たないことか  
 分つたので、兩下省は一九三四年八月七日に命令を發して、アメリカ  
 同產寸輸出業者は聯盟加入の有無を問はず輸出業者聯盟規約第八條の  
 規定に従つて八月十日以後一般的輸出規則を遵守し、輸出價格及輸出

代理店に關する聯盟規約によつて拘束を受ける旨を通告した。更に合衆國同様の主要供給國であるスエーデン、ソ聯の如きと協定を結ぶ必要を感じたので日本は一九三四年十一月に紐育で日本、スエーデン、ソ聯三國會議を開いた。三國は数量及價格統制に同意した。併しアメリカは降寸に對する高率の保護關稅を引き下げる様子を全然見せなかつた。

上田貞次郎

日本外對貿易の最近の發展

日本評論

一九三六年

百六頁—百十頁

拔萃

二十九頁—三十二頁



Def. Doc. # 1161(2)

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「一九三六年ノ太平洋ノ諸問題」中ヨリノ抜萃

太平洋諸國ノ社會及經濟政策ノ目的ト結果

一九三六年八月十五日ヨリ二十九日迄ノ加州ヨセ  
ミテ國立公園ニ於ケル第六回太平洋會議議案録

オクスフォード大學刊(ロンドン・ニュー  
ヨーク・トロント)一九三七

紅軍が或る地域を占領する場合先づ民衆を召集して會議を開き、ソヴェート政府を組織して、土地の分配を行ふ。而し、實際は、上等の土地は紅軍並にソヴェート政府の公田となし、これを貧困者をして耕作せしめるや殘餘の餘り好くない土地を貧困者に分給する。土地は民衆に與へられるが紅軍の政策を遂行する際には、斯うしたカラクリがあることも考慮に入れねばならぬ。

土地の分配が行はれると、二十歳から三十歳以下の男子は別動隊、十四歳から二十歳迄の青年は隊、十四歳以下の兒童はバイオニア(少年團)に強制的に編入される。バイオニアの少年達は共產主義教育を受ける。それは後日別動隊、先鋒隊が獨立した團體となり紅軍の補充部隊を構成せんがためである。老年男子と老年婦人は、運輸隊を組織して補給品の運搬を手傳はしめたり、或は公田代耕を協助せしめ、或は偵察・歩哨の職務を協助せしめる。貧困者は好くない土地を與へられるのみならず紅軍に對して壯丁を供給しなければならず、更に收穫の十分の四を公糧として提供しなければならぬとのことである。

中國共產黨第六回大會（一九二八年七月、モスコ）は、黨の中心的任務を「帝國主義者を驅逐し、支那の眞正の統一を完成すること、民主的方式によつて地主階級の土地私有制度を廢止し土地革命を實行し、支那の農民をして現土地制度の一切の半封建的束縛を紛碎せしめること」の二大任務に決定してゐる。

第五次討伐第二期に於ては、中國紅軍は一九三四年七月十五日付を以つて「中國勞農紅軍北上宣言」を發し北上抗日先鋒隊を組織し可及的速度を以つて出動せしめた。そしてこれと同時に上海等の都市に於ては「民族武装自衛運動」と稱する排外運動が生まれ、これが「中國人民對日軍事作亂基本綱領」を提出し中國紅軍の反帝國主義運動に呼應して各地に廣泛な活動を始めた。これらが中國紅軍が江西省に居たときの反帝國主義運動で、これらを通じて提出され得る特徴は、この時期は中國紅軍にとつて南京政府の討伐を驅退することが主なる活動で、事實上はまだ抗日は「第二」の任務とされてゐたことである。北上抗日先鋒隊を派遣せる直後、中國紅軍の首領朱德は政府軍を驅退する必要を主張する演説で次の如く述べてゐる。

ソヴェート勞農紅軍のみが支那を日本帝國主義の下より解放する唯一の武装勢力である。故に我等の第二の任務は即ち日本に對し直接に軍事作戦を行ふことである。だが、一九三五年（民國二十四年）八月に到つて發表された所謂「新戰略」に於ては二の相互關係が一變してゐる。

### 反帝運動の現段階

ではその「新戦略」とは如何なるものか。一言にして言へばその排外主義のを日本に向ける事により自己の問題を解決せんとする方策である。即ち抗日が第一でその次にこれに従屬して對國民黨の政策が決定されるわけである。これは中國共產黨が第七回コンメンタル大會の決議に依據して行へる方向轉換であつて、中華ソヴェート政府人民委員會及び中國共產黨中央委員會の連名にて八月一日に發表されたものである。

この内容が従前のものと異なるところは全支那の如何なる黨派をも包含して反帝統一戦線を作らうとすることにあるので、このために國防政府及び抗日聯軍の組織を提唱してゐる。従つて曾つては國民黨打倒を掲げた中國共產黨も今は北支に於ける藍衣社、國民黨部の解散が分部からなされることに反對してゐる。かくして國民黨中の一部の軍閥資本家を國防政府の側に奪取しようとしてゐる。これらは際立つた變化であると言ひ得るだらう。



ではこの共産黨の戦術の轉換は果して中國共産黨本來の諸綱領を放棄したのであらうか。否、中國共産黨は現在その基本的綱領を放棄してゐないのみでなく、この新轉換こそは、その諸綱領の發展なのである。勿論中國共産黨はこの轉換と同時に農業政策經濟政策等の分野に部分的變更を示してゐる。即ち土地革命の諸條件の或る部分は緩和されてゐる。この理由は單一反帝統一戦線のための闘争が中國共産黨にとつて最も大切な一環であり、それを據つて居れば、その他のものは自動的に或ひは非常に容易く實現され得る見透しを持つてゐるからである。第七回コミンテルン大會に出席した中國共産黨員中最高指導者の一人たる王明（陳紹）は、「領土の一部にソヴェート政權が存在する支那の如き國家の條件下に於ては反帝國主義的人民戦線の戦術の正しい適用は、ソヴェート革命の同後の勝利のためプロレタリアートのヘゲモニー強化のための闘争における共産黨の地位と力を弱めず、却つて強めてゐるといふことを強く確信するを要する」（註、植民地革命運動と共産黨の戦術より引用）と言つて居り且つ王明は又反帝統一戦線を主張とする「國防政府」とソヴェート政府に言及して次の如く言つてゐる。

「国防政府政策は、ソヴェート政府の任務に對立しないのみか、更にソヴェート政府は国防政府の遺棄者に對し範を示すことが出来るし又示さねばならぬ。しかし支那全民族の完全なる民族的・社会的解放を主要任務とするソヴェート政府は、その活動を軍に国防政府の領の枠内に制限することは出来ないであらう。

例へば農業革命を發展せしめるため、ソヴェート政府は賣國奴の土地を沒收し、農民に分配せんとする国防政府の領を、農業革命の構成部分として且つ出發點として實行すると同時に、支那における封建的地主的土地所有を根絶し共産黨の基本的目標を實現することに努めねばならぬ。

かくてこの「新戦略」は中國共産黨の指導權の保護下に中國共産黨が自己の未來的領たる反帝・土地革命を實現せんとする目的で漸次大衆を吸收することの援助となつてゐる。

而してこの「新戦略」の特質は、中國共産黨の所謂「國際帝國主義」

に對する闘争の主要な仄が、日本に向けられてゐることである。

これが一九二五年當時、反帝國主義運動の矢が先づ向けられてゐたのと軌を一にするもので、共產黨の戦術は中國共產黨の稱する「抗日」が學生、都市市民及労働者の反帝國主義闘争と何等異ならぬ。

第二は最近頗る頭した國民黨内部又は、支那資本家の一部に續けられる抗日運動の存在である。而して第三は、南京政府が江西省の中國紅軍を根絶し得ないばかりでなく、何卒の損傷をも與へることなく、紅軍の主力部隊を四川に移動せしめ、北上せしめたことである。この北上した紅軍は、饑も、經濟封鎖も存在しない廣大な土地に盤し、戦國或は革命運動の如何なるものに對しても参加し得る條件を獲得したのである。而して、このことは南京政府にとつて重大な打撃であることは自明の理である。

中國共產黨は總くこの好條件の上に立つて、今反帝國主義戦線を結成しやまとしつゝあるが、南京政府は此運動を如何にして對處しつゝあるだらうか？

#### 學生運動

一九三五年年末以來、支那全國の學生運動の發展は、蔣介石の學校代表に對する訓話を以てする

も何等これを阻止することは出来なかつた

北平に於ける昨年十二月八日の北京各學校長の「自治反對」決議に激昂した清華、燕京兩大學生は九日萬壽山に宛香元を訪れ、デモを行つて北京一市中に突入せんとして西直門で官憲に阻止せられた。更に北平市内の大、中學生約六千名は、各所に蜂起し流血の争の激遂に官憲に打勝つに至つた。就へて十二月十六日には北平師範大學を中心として約八千名の學生が功みに集合して示威遊行を開始した。而して此中から三十校以上の代表者より成る北平學生聯合會が組織されこの聯合會は執務に學生を動員し反日を鼓吹してゐる。

天津に於いても同様に學生は運動を惹起した。上海に於いては更に北支那に呼應して學生運動を惹起した。十二月十九日、復旦大學生が市政府に請願書を提出した。更に同二十三日には復旦大學生を根幹とする「學生入京請願團」は上海を起程しこれを同時する上海全市約二千名の學生は二十四日同請願示威遊行を決定した。又河南省歸封に於いても三十八校一萬四千の學生は請願の爲赴京すると稱し、停車場、客車を占據し交通を

杜絶せしめた更に廣に於いても學生は示威遊行を行ひ本年一月三日の示威遊行に於ては公安局員と衝突し、死傷者十名を出したのである

而して三月二十八日全国の學生運動を統一する目的で「全國學生救國聯合會準備會」が結成され二日に亘る闘争に於て十名の死傷者を出した

かくてこの學生の全国的統合と共に、南京政府の無力を嘲笑するが如く學生運動は漫延しつつある。而して中國共産黨がこれを指導しつつあることは言ふまでもない



## 救國聯合會

この學生運動と呼應して、中國共產黨の直接的或ひは間接的煽動に依つて反帝團體が各地に續々と成立した。特にそのうち、上海に根城を持つ上海文化救國會は他の救國會より活潑に活動し、救國團體の最高指導機關たるの地位にある。この救國會の成立は、北平學生の運動に呼應し昨年十二月十二日附を以つて上海の知識階級分子二百五十餘名の署名を以て所謂「救國宣言」を出したのに始まる。國民黨系。共產黨系。社會民主黨系。國家主義派等の寄合世帯であるが、全體として中國共產黨側に利用されてゐたことは、二月十一日附を以つて出された共產黨中央宣傳部の「人民に告ぐる書」に依つて明らかにされた。

尙この外に上海に於ては上海婦人救國聯合會。上海聯業界救國會。上海勞動救國會。上海小學校職員救國聯合會。上海電影界救國會。上海新聞記者救國會。上海蠶家救國會等々が存在しこれに前記の上海學生救國聯合會が加盟して各階級救國聯合會が成立してゐる（註、最近上海聯合會を中心にして中華全國各界救國聯合會の創立が行はれるに至つた）。

中華民族革命同盟

上海文化救國會には資本家が参加し  
 が中国共産黨の合作提議に應じて共  
 即ち福建事變の立役者陳名樞・李濟等  
 壽年・蔣照恒・蔣光鼐等は、福建事件の  
 或は香港・平壤に集食つて執拗に反蔣東  
 十一月の五全大會には、當時南京にあつた  
 に連名通電を受けて、(一)國民黨は口和見玉  
 、(二)一切の政治犯を釋放せよ、(三)民主自由を  
 を設立し政府の財政及び国防計畫を監督せよ、  
 ものであるが、その後中国共産黨の提議に應じて  
 盟を結成し、機關紙「救國時報」を發行し、胡漢民  
 しても統一戦線を結成すべく頻りに働きかけてある  
 下の貴州の要人までが共産黨の提議に同意しつつあ  
 る。

てゐたが、更に反蔣軍閥の一部  
 線を張らんしてゐる。現在  
 十九路軍の猛將蔡廷鍔・區  
 大敗後、或は海外に亡命し、  
 馮玉祥・閻錫山等  
 黨專制を放棄すべし、  
 せよ、(四)特別機關  
 を要求してゐた  
 中華民族革命同  
 派・廣西派に對  
 かくて、會つ

Ref Doc 1161147

編纂日本文書一六二(四)

一九三六年太平洋ノ訪問記

太平洋諸國ニ於ケル社會及經濟政策ノ眼目ト結果

一九三六年八月十五日ヨリ廿九日マデキヤリアオル  
ニヤ州ヨセミテ国立公園ニ於テ開催サレタル太平洋  
關係學會 (The Institute of Pacific Relations)  
第六同會議議事録。

オクスフォード大學出版局

一九三七年版倫敦、紐約、トロント又都

× × × × × × ×

文書第二

日本産業最近ノ飛躍ノ諸圖

東京、高橋経済研究所長 高橋白吉

三つの素因

最近ニ於ケル日本産業ノ著シキ發達ハ、往々ニシ  
テ皮相ナ觀察者ニ依ツテ、恰モ突然起ツタ現象テ  
アル様ニ云ハレテキルガ、實ハ過去ノ長期間ニ亘  
ル發展ノ自然ノ行程ノ結果ガ、以下ニ説明スル様  
ナ諸種ノ素因ニ依ツテ造成サレ、突如トシテ最終  
ノ段階ニ飛躍シタルニ過ギナイデアアル。此ノ後  
展ノ實ノ且三つの説明ハ次ニ示ス色々ノ事柄ノ  
通りデアツテ、國情ノ下落ヤ日本ニ於ケル體質俱  
ニ餘リ重キヲ著クベキデアリ。ソノ第一ハ、日



Ref Doc 1161 (4)

露戦役以來政府ト實業家ガ相共ニ努力シテ産業ノ發達  
進捗通計表ガ今ヤソノ實ヲ繪テニ呈ツタコトデ、是  
ヲ更ニ進シテ解剖スルト、

I 過去ノ投資ガ收獲時代ニ邁入ツタコト。2 凡テノ  
試煉ト経験ガ我等ノ所謂日本式製造方法及經營方法  
ヲ樹立スルニ具カツテ刀アリタルコト。

ソノ3ハ、産業ノ合理化、ソノ他諸般ノ機能ノ結果  
ガ現ハレ始メ出シタコト。

ソノ第二ハ、日本産業ノ諸般ノ劣點ガ克服サレタ  
コトデアル。過去ニ於ケル日本産業ノ悩ミハ、I 資  
本ノ供給ト金利ノ高率、2 機械ノ製造及修理ニ對ス  
ル技術ト経験ノ缺乏、3 身價ノ投資的開煉ノ貧弱ト  
低能率、4 産業的先進國ニ比ツテ既ニ占有サレテ  
キル市場ハ商品販賣擴張ノ困難等デアツタ。

併シナガラ、近年産業資本ノ利率ハ大イニ低下サ  
レテ來タ。日本ト英國ノ利率ノ差ハ以前ニハ三%デ  
アツタノガ今ハ一%ニ低減シ尙更ニ減少ノ模様デア  
ル。此ノ傾向ハ、日本ガ資本輸入口カラ資本輸出口  
ニ轉向シタコトニ反照ヲ現ワシテキル。之ニ関連シ  
テ我々ハ、日本ニ於ケル一九二七年ノ財政恐慌ガ貴  
重ナ教訓ヲ日本ニ與ヘタコトヲ忘レテハナラヌ。如  
何トナレバ、ソレ以來日本ノ財政的組織ト、各種ノ  
資本的企業ノ財政的基盤トガ共ニ大イニ改善サレタ  
カラデアル。

PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f87ffb/>



Ref Doc 1161(4)

近年獲得サレルニ至ツル日本工業ノ有利ナル點ヲ最  
デレバ次ノ如キモノデアラウ、(I) 地理的有利性。農  
産原料品ノ生産地デアリ且製造品ノ購買地域デアル  
廣大ナル東亞領域ノ中間ニ在ル日本ノ位仁ハ、原料  
ノ獲得上及工業製品ノ販賣市場ヲ求ムル兩方面カラ  
シテ甚ダ有利デアル。且又日本ハ島國ナルガ故ニ、  
陸上輸送ヨリモ越カニ安價デアル海上輸送丈ケニ依  
存スルコトガ出來ル

(以下次頁)

Def Doc 1161 (4)

(2) 生活標準及社會的習慣ニ關連スル有利性。製造品ヲ輸入スル英領印度、東南亞細亞、ラテン、アメリカ及近東ニ於ケル各農業國ハ、生活標準ト習慣ニ關スル限リ西方ノ各工業先進國ヨリモ遙カニ日本ニ近似シテイルノデアアル。之ガ近年ノ日本工業ノ成功シタ大ナル理由ノ一ツデナケレバナラス。(3) 人口ノ稠密。社會的見地カラハ重大ナ缺點ト視ラレル過剰人口ハ、資本的見地カラハ豊富ナ低賃銀勞働ノ形骸ニ於テ、強力ナ競争武器トシテ役立テ得ル。勞働者ノ生産能力ガ昂上シタ場合殊ニ然リデアアル。(4) 工業勞働者ノ生來ノ性格。日本人ハ低生活標準ノ或ル種族ニ反シ、精神的ニモ、肉体的ニモ且又産業的ニモ全ク高度ナ性格ニ恵マレテキル。若シキ例ノ一トシテ、綿紡績工場ニ働ク娘達ガ、優秀ナ者ノ場合ハ、一ヶ月以内ニ、優秀ナラザル者デモ三ヶ月以内ニ必要ナ技術ニ熟達シテシマフノデアアル。此ノ期間ハ日支事變以來漸次下リ坂トナツテ來タ。(5) 後進者ニ特殊ナ有利性。日本ノ資本家ハ先進諸國ノ經驗カラ教訓ヲ得テ、資本ト勞働ノ關係ガ舊ダシク硬直スルノヲ巧ミニ防イダ。彼等ハ又産業ノ組織事項ヲ熟慮シ進歩的改革ヲ企圖スル點ニ於テ西洋諸國ヨリモ遙カニ極ンデタ。彼等ハ進歩シタ機械其他ノ設備ヲ自由ニ取り入レ、工場ソノ他ノ建設物ノ建築ニハ他ノ現存物ヲ模倣シ或ハ是ヲソレ以上ノ能率の規模ト裝置ニ改

Aug Doc 1161(4)

善ヲサヘ加ヘタ。

次ニ述ベル特殊ノ事情ノ爲、産業ノ發展ニ附隨シテ當然起ルベキ賃銀ノ値上ゲ又ハ他ノ勞働條件ノ改善問題ガ日本ニ於テハ起ラナカツタ。斯ルガ故ニ、製造品値段ノ下落ハ資本家ノ利潤ノ増進ト想候ツテ日本工業ノ競争力ハ加減度ニ高メツタ。投後ニ古イ西洋諸國ニ於ケル工業的發展ノ緩慢サガ日本工業ノ或ルモノニ對シテソノ可能的發展ノ機會ヲ與ヘタ。

#### 直接原因

是等ノ基礎的要因ノ外ニ、近年ニ至リ、ヨリ直接ナ原因ガ加ハツタ。即チソノ第一ハ、一九二九年ニ發生シタ世界的不況デアリ、ソノ第二ハ、日本政府ノ豫算ノ膨脹ト滿洲國ノ發達デアリ、ソノ第三ハ、圓價ノ下落デアル。

世界的不況ハ、日本ニ經濟的擴張ノ機會ヲ與ヘタ、如何トナレバ、日本ノ産業ハ、價額標準ノ下落ニ對シ、西洋ニ於ケル諸國殊ニ硬直シタ經濟關係ガ恐慌突破ニ殆ンド一ツノ致命的障礙ヲ成ス英國等ヨリモ一大順應性ヲ持ツテキタカラデアル。斯クシテ、日本産業ノ競争力ハ是等諸國ニ比較シテ實質的ニ増大シタノデアル。

ソレカラ滿洲事變ハコレニ引續イテ日本政府側ニ

Def Dec 116/112

オケル豫算ノ膨張ト圓ノ下落トラ齊ラシタ。ソシテ  
ソノ兩者共非常ニ有效ナ刺激ヲ日本ノ産業ニ與ヘタ。  
一九三二年（昭和七年）カラ一九三五年（昭和九年）  
迄ノ期間中救済目的ノ爲ノ政府ノ經費ハ六億六千萬  
デアツタ。而ルニ一方軍事目的ノ爲ノ政府ノ經費ハ  
十七億五千萬圓デアツタ。コレラノ經費ノ毎年ノ平  
均六億圓ハ一九三〇年（昭和五年）ノ政府ノ全經費  
ノ四〇パーセントニ等シカツタ。ソシテコレラノ経  
費ハ殆ト國債ニ依ツテ調達サレタ。

現在ノ滿洲國ニ於ケル日本ノ投資ハ約九億圓デア  
ル。滿洲ノ市場ガ日本ニ獲得サレ來ツタトイフ事實  
ハ又見逃サルベキデハナイ。コノ事ガ純益或ハ損失  
ヲ意味シテキルカドウカハ未ダ確カメラレテキナイ  
ケレドモ、通貨ノ下落ガ殊ニ日本ニ利益ヲ齎シタト  
イフ事ハ事實デアル。トイフノハ一九三一年カラ一  
九三五年迄ノ間ニ圓ハ六十パーセント下落シ、一方  
ドルト英貨ノポンドハ各々四一パーセント及ビ三五  
パーセント下落シタ。同時ニソコニハ何故通貨ノ下  
落ガ殊ニ日本ニトツテ有利デアツタカトイフ尙更大  
キナ理由ガアル。ヨーロッパ諸國及ビアメリカ合衆  
國ニ於テハ金ノ輸出禁止ト通貨ノ下落トハ價格ノ崩  
壊ニ起因スル産業上財政上ノクビ違ヒヲ整理スル爲  
ノ必要餘クベカラザル方法デアツタ。併シ不景氣ガ

Def Doc 1161(4)

コレヲノ國々ニ於ケルヨリモ一層早ク始マツタ所ノ  
日本ニ於テハ金本位ガ廢棄サレ圓ガ下落シ始メタノ  
ハ大仕掛ケナ整理ガ安樂界ニ於テ成シ終ヘラレテ  
ラデアツタ。結局歐洲諸國ニ於テハ通貨下落ノ影響  
ハ不景氣ノ負擔ヲ取り除クトイフ積極性ノモノデア  
ツタニ對シ日本ニ於テハソレハ殆ト全ク經濟國內ノ  
日本ノ競争勢力ヲ統合スル事ニ役立ツ積極性ノモノ  
デアツタ。

#### 世界的不景氣ニ於ケル時間的要素

日本ノ近時産業ノ發展ヲ觀察スルニ際シ見逃スコ  
トノ出來ナイ一ノ非常ニ重要ナ事實ハ不景氣が西洋  
諸國ヨリ可成リ早ク日本ヲ訪レタトイフ事デアル。  
トイフノハ一九二七年アメリカ合衆國が依然トシテ  
「永遠ノ繁榮」ヲ享受シテ居ツタ時日本ハ曾ツテ日  
本ヲ訪レタ最大ノ財政恐慌ノ中ノ一ノ眞只中ニアツ  
タ。一九二九年ニ始マツタ不景氣ノ波が全世界ヲ  
ツテ居ツタ時日本ハ前年ニ於テ日本ガ餘糧ナクサレ  
タ恩ヒ切ツタ合理化ト他ノ整理方法トニ感謝シツツ  
不景氣ヲ克服スベク效果的ナ方法ヲ圖メヨウトスル  
方向ヘノ途次ニアツタ。ソレ故日本ガ不景氣ノ中  
ヲ繁榮スベキ最初ノ國デアツタダウトイフ事ハソ  
ノ當時ノ見解カラシテ當然デアツタ。日本ノ不景氣  
ト世界ノ不景氣トノ間ノ時ノ相違ハ日本、アメリカ  
合衆國及ビ大英帝國ニ於ケル株式市場ノ相場指數ノ  
比較ニ依ツテ示サレルダラウ。



Ref Doc 1161145

コレラノ國々ニ於ケル一九二一年（大正十年）ノ價  
ラ一〇〇ト 價スルナラバ一九二九年（昭和四年）  
ノ日本ノ價ハ七一、四デアリ、アメリカ合衆國及ビ  
大英帝國ノ價ハ各々三〇一、一デアルトイフ事カ分  
ルダロウ。一九二一年カラ一五二九年迄ノ間株式ノ價  
格ハ日本ニ於テハ低下シツツアツタガ他ノ二國ニ於  
テハ上リツツアツタ。此ノ傾向ハ寧ろ日本ノ株價指  
數ガソノ底ヲ衝キ幾分早メニ上昇スル傾向ヲ始メタ  
所ノ一九三一年（昭和六年）以來は更サレテ來タ。  
アメリカ合衆國及ビ大英帝國ニ於ケル指數モ又上昇  
シタトイフ事ハ當然デアルガソノ上ハハルカニ少イ。モ  
シ一九三一年ヲ基準年度トスレバ日本ノ一九三五年  
度ノ價ハアメリカ、イギリスヨリモハルカニ高イト  
イフ事ガ分ルダラウ。併シ若シ一九二一年ヲ基準ト  
シテ評價スルナラバ日本ノ指數ハアメリカ合衆國ノ  
一二九、九及ビ大英帝國ノ一一四、四ト比較シテ價  
カニ八四、九ニ過ギナイダラウ。日本ニ於テハ經濟上  
ノ艱難ト犠牲ノ期間ハ一九二〇年（大正九年）三月  
カラ一九三一年（昭和六年）年末ニ及ンタ。日本ノ  
産業ガソノ期間ニ遭遇シタケトベナラナカツタ所ノ  
種々ノ不利ナ出來事ハ（一）一九二〇年（大正九年）三  
月ノ恐慌（二）一九二二年（大正十一年）十一月十二月  
ノ銀行ノ破産、ソシテソノ時政府ノ應急處置ニモ拘

Ref Doc 1161(4)

ラズ約十七ノ銀行ガ破産シタ。

(三)一九二三年(大正十二年)九月ノ地震、(四)一九二七年(昭和二年)二月、三月ノ財政恐慌ソシテソノ時政府ハ支拂延期ヲ宣言シ且ツ日本銀行ヲ通シテ七億ニ上ル支拂ヲ保證シタ。併シ同銀ヲ餘償ナクサレタ銀行ノ數ハ五〇ニモ達シタ(五)一九二九年(昭和四年)ニ於ケル金本位ヘノ早マツタ復歸デアル。ソノ期間中財政的ニ貧弱ナ銀行辨済ガ廣範圖ニ互ツテ實施サレタ、ソシテ國內ニ於ケル普通銀行ノ數ハ一九二二年(大正十一年)ニハ一、七九四。一九二六年(昭和元年)ニハ一、八一七。一九三〇年(昭和五年)ニハ僅カニ四八一デアツタ。一九二一年(大正十年)カラ一九三一年(昭和六年)迄ノ期間中ニ辨済サレタ資本ノ額ハ公認資本、六十億六千萬圓、拂込資本三三億六千萬圓デアツタ。資本ノ減少モ又廣範圖ニ實施サレタ。カクシテ同期間内ニ減少サレタ合計額ハ一三億四千萬圓(拂込資本)デアツタ。産業會社ノ平均配當率ハ一九一八年(大正七年)ニハ三三、二パーセントノ高率デアツタガ一九二一年(大正十年)ニハ一二、七パーセント、一九二八年(昭和三年)ニハ八、八パーセント、一九三一年(昭和六年)ニハ僅カニ五パーセントニ減少サレタ。同シ年ニ定期預金ノ利息率ガ一流銀行ニ於テ四、二バ

Ref Doc 1161(4)

一セント二流銀行ニ於テ四、七バーセントデアツタ  
トイフコトハ注意セラルベキデアル。

### 日本ノ小規模産業

日本産業ノ特徴ヲ知ル事ハ日本ノ貿易振興ニアツカ  
ツテ刀アル勢働状態ト同様ニ日本ニ於ケル近時産業  
ノ發展ヲ理解スルニ必要候ク可カラザルモノデアアル  
顯著ナ特徴ノ一ツハ全日本産業ノ二分ノ一以上ノ設  
設並ニ勢働者數ノ兩者ヲ構成スル所ノ生産ニ多クノ  
小規模産業ノ流布デアアル。西洋諸國ノ小規模産業ト  
異ナリ日本ニ於ケル此等ノ小規模ナ施設ハ大規模産  
業ニ發展スル産業ノ端緒テハナイ等ロソレ等ハ産業  
ノ單位デアリ形ニ於テ小サクハアルガソレ目録充分  
ニ底無シテ居リ、大規模ナ産業ニナリ得ル可能僅ラ  
モツトコロノ小サイ單位テハナイ。コレ等ノ小規模  
ナ産業ハ日本ニ行キ互ツテキル産官的經濟的狀態ニ  
起因シテ生ジタ固有ノモノデアアル。ソレ故ソノ獨得  
ニシテ永續性ノアル繼續ガ期待ツレウルノデアアル。商  
工省ノ定義ニ從ヘバ一號ニ小規模工場ト百人以下ノ  
勢働者ヲ使用スル工場ヲ意味スル、ソシテ機械ガ具  
方ヨリモ一層重要ナ生産ノ要素デアアル所ノ化學産業  
灰ビガス電氣産業ノ場合ニ於テハソレハ各々五十人  
以下灰ビ三十人以下ノ勢働者ヲ使用スル工場ヲ意味ス

Ref Doc 1161(4)

ル。此ノ戦後ニヨリ商工省テ發表シタ工場統計ニ從  
ヒ我々ハ日本ニ於ケル小規模産業ノ重要性ヲ次ノ數  
字（一九三二年（昭和七年））ニ依ツテ示スルガ出來  
ヨウ。小規模工場ノ數ハ全工場ノ數ノ九五、七パーセント、ソコ  
ニ雇ハレテ居ル勞働者ノ數ハ勞働者ノ全數ノ數ノ四  
八、五パーセント、ソノ生産物ノ價格ハ國內生産物  
全量ノ四一、二パーセントヲ構成スル。併シコレ等  
ノ統計ハ五人以上ノ勞働者ヲ雇ツテキル工場ノミニ  
適用サレルトイフ事ヲ忘レテハナラナイ。餘リ小サ  
イノテ統計ニ含まレテキナイ工場ニ雇ハレテキル勞  
働者ニ關スル明白ナ報告ハナイ。ソレ故「第一表」  
ニ示サレタ工場勞働者ノ數ヲ内閣統計局ニ依ル國勢  
調査報告（第二表参照）ニ示サレタ職種ノ製造工場  
ニ従事スル人々ノ數カラ引イテ見ヨウ。ソウスレバ  
一九三〇年（昭和五年）ノ數字ニ關シテハソノ額リ  
ノ二、四四〇、〇〇〇人が大停ニ於テコレ等ノ小  
規模工場ノ勞働者數ニ小獨立業者ノ數ヲ加ヘタ數  
ト見做サレル。此ノ數字ハ全産業ハノ人々ノ四六、  
一パーセントニ等シイ。

若シ數字ガ工場統計（八七〇、〇〇〇）ニ從テサレ  
タ所ノ小規模ノ工場ノ勞働者ノ數ニ加ヘラレルナラ  
バ日本ニ於ケル小規模産業ニ従事スル人々ノ總數ハ  
三、三一〇、〇〇〇人、即チ全産業人口ノ約六二六

一セントニ當ルコトガ分ル。  
 日本ノ輸出貿易ニ於ケル小規模産業ノ重要性ハ更ニ  
 大テアル。大規模な産業ニ依ツテ製造スル生産物  
 ノ値ト農産物及ビ水産物ノ値トヲ外國貿易統計ニ示  
 サレタ日本輸出品ノ總額カラ差引ケバソノ額ハ小規  
 模産業ニ依ツテ生産サレタ輸出品ノ値ト見做サレル。

(以下次頁)

Ref Doc 1161 (4)

ソコデ最近三年間ノ日本總輸出額ノ約六割五分ハ  
小規模工場ノ所産デアルトイフコトガ分ル。コレ  
ハ勿論極ク大雑把ナ數字デアル。實際ニ大規模工  
場デ生産セラレシ生糸ガ小規模工業輸出品ノ部  
ニ入ラレテ居ル一方綿織物ノ如キ重要ナル小規  
模工業製品ガ大規模製品ノ内ニハ入ツテ居ルガ如  
キ特ニ然リデアルカラデアル。

個人工業ニ就テ小規模ノモノガ有勢デアル工業ハ  
食品工業、製材工業其他雑多ノ工業デアル。殊ニ  
前二者ニ至ツテハ當該工業ノ全使用人ノ八割六分  
三厘ト九割一分三厘トヲ又全生産高ノ七割三分四  
厘ト八割八分九厘トヲ夫々占メル。印刷及製本工  
業、金屬工業、セメント工業ニ於テハ小規模工場業員多シ  
ハ製糖工業ニ至ルニ至リ占メ居ル。七割ヲ占メ居ルガ  
生産高ニ於テハ何レモ三・四割ヲ越ヘテ居ナイ。  
日本ノ小規模工業成長ノ原因トナリ或ハ之ニ寄與  
シタ要因並ニ此ノ發展ニ長遠的ナ影響ノ原因ト  
考ヘラレシムルハ次ノ諸論デアル。

- 一、大規模工業ニ對メテ彼ラガ保有スル生産技術  
ト材料獲得ノ管線經驗トを或ハ原料ノ販路  
獲得ノ方法トカ云ツタ要因カラナリ。



Ref Doc 118111

本質的の利益商品ノ販路ノ限界ガ日本ニ限ラレ  
テ居ルトイフコトハ之等小規模工業ノ存在ニ  
リ非常ナ強ミデアル。

二、使用動力型ノ變遷。蒸汽力時代ニ於テハ所要  
動力ヲ供給スルニ必要ナル工場ノ大サノ最小  
限度ハ比較的大キカツタノデ大規模工業ニ有  
利デアツタ。電力ガ使用サレルニ至ツテサウ  
シタ膨大ナモノヲ建設スル必要ガナクナツタ  
電力動力ハ小規模工場ニモ容易ニ送ラレウル  
ソコデ小規模工業モ此ノ點ニ於テ大規模工業  
ニ對シテ其ノ地位ヲ保チ得ラレル。コレハ電  
力使用ガ特ニ盛況ニ行ハレテ居ル日本ニ於テ  
一會然リデアル。

三、豊富ニ存在スル低廉勞力ニヨル利益コレハ恐  
ラク斯クモ多量小規模工場ノ存在スル主要ナ  
理由デアツテ或ル程度更ニ深ク研究スル價值  
アルトコロデアル。

大規模工業ト競争スル小規模工業ノ觀點カラスレ  
バ勞力ニ關スル此利益ハ實ニ賃銀ソノ他ノ努力關  
係費經費ガ絶對的低水準ニアルコトノミナラズ從  
業員モ勞働條件モ共ニ要求ニヨリ極メテ手輕ニ

Ref Doc 11611

變改調節シ得ルトイフ點存スルモノデアル。  
日本ニ於ケル小規模工業ノ根本的問題ノ最後ノ要  
點ハ勞力過剩供給ヲ將來スル人口過多ノ狀態デア  
ル。勞働條件ガ如何ニ理想カラ懸ケ離レテ居ヤウ  
トモソシナコトハ問題デハナイ、生活ニ必要ナル  
最低給與ヲ得ル爲メニ熱心ニ仕事ヲ求メル人が常  
ニ得山アルトイフ位人が多イノデアル。  
人々ノ本職カラ得ル収入トイフモノハ餘分ノ收入  
ヲ他ノ財源カラ得ガナケレバナラナイ種貧窮懸マルモノデアツ  
テ、其ノ財源トイフモノハ多クハ場合小規模工業カラ得ラレ  
ルノデアル。此ノ狀態ニ特殊ナル點ハ是夫ニ於テハ非耕作期間中何  
ラカノ副業ヲ企テナケレバナラズ小工場勞働者又ハ都市ノ安月  
給取りノ家族ハ家庭ノ主ナル稼キ手ノ收入ヲ補足スル爲  
メニ仕事ヲ求メナケレバナラナイトイフコトデア  
ル。云ヒカヘレバ一家庭ノ家長ガ就職シテ居ル庭  
デモ彼ノ收入ノミヲ以テシテハ最低家計費ノ收支  
ヲ償ハスコトガ出來ナイノデアル。  
コレ等小規模ノタメメ賃請仕事ヲスルノハ如上ノ  
人々ノ條件ニビタリト附合スルモノデアル。斯ル  
狀態下ニ於ル勞働トイフモノハ勞働條件ガ良カラ  
ウガ悪カラウガ考慮ノ餘地ナキモノデアル。

Def Doc 116114

茲ニ於テカ小工場ハ之等ノ人々ヲ雇メテ低廉ナル  
賃銀水準ヲ以テ使用シ得ルノデアル。  
ソレ故勞働條件ニ關スル限リ日ニ小規模工業ト  
ハソノ勞働條件ガ常ニ貧弱タラザルヲエナイヤウ  
ナ特殊ナ形ノ工業ヲ意味スル、何トナレバ勞力ノ  
低廉サハ小規模工業ヨシテ機械力使用ノ大規模工  
業ニ對抗セシメ得ルカラデアル。

(以下次頁へ)

第一表 日本工業ニ於ケル小規模企業ノ地位 (昭和七年末)

工 業	工 場 数			使 用 工 員 数			生 産 額 (單位千圓)		
	總数(甲)	小規模工場(乙)	比(乙/甲) %	總数(甲)	小規模工場(乙)	比(乙/甲) %	總数(甲)	小規模工場(乙)	比(乙/甲) %
織 物	21.297	19.739	92.7	881.459	332.759	38.7	2,212.088	697.269	31.5
金 屬	4.651	4.537	97.5	97.469	58.608	60.1	591.135	236.113	39.9
機械器具	6.738	6.494	96.4	194.572	82.863	42.6	598.840	191.413	32.0
セメント	3.245	3.143	96.9	61.813	39.636	64.1	161.716	53.701	33.2
薬 品	3.695	3.181	86.1	136.021	42.982	31.1	937.956	248.888	26.5
木材及家具	5.434	5.402	99.4	60.616	55.357	91.3	158.756	141.308	88.9
印刷及製本	2.988	2.922	97.8	52.352	37.400	71.4	177.797	81.298	45.7
食 品	12.728	12.619	99.1	137.433	118.659	86.3	893.476	653.476	73.4
瓦斯及電気	508	466	91.7	7.968	4.195	52.6	-	-	-
其 他	6.034	5.899	97.8	103.808	68.881	66.4	237.294	152.750	64.4
合 計	67.318	64.402	95.7	1,733.511	840.853	48.5	5,969.060	2,458.810	41.2

同工省工場統計ニ據ル

第二表 企業規模別工業人口分布状況

	全工業 人員数	小規模工業従業員数						中規模工業 従業員数		中小規模工業 従業員数	
		(甲) 工員五名以 下ノ工場	比率	(乙) 工員五名乃 至十名ノ工場	比率	(甲)(乙)集計	比率	(丙) 工員三十名 乃至百名ノ工場	比率	(甲)(乙)(丙)集計	比率
男	3,719,754	2,140,128	57.6	286,921	7.2	2,427,049	65.3	130,483	3.5	2,557,532	68.8
女	1,583,894	752,151	47.5	163,035	10.3	915,186	57.8	163,773	10.3	1,078,959	68.1
計	5,300,348	2,892,279	54.6	449,956	8.5	3,342,235	63.1	294,256	5.6	3,636,491	68.6
男	4,286,530	2,306,821	55.1	360,353	8.4	2,721,174	63.5	167,695	3.9	2,888,869	67.4
女	1,004,300	79,821	8.0	164,771	16.4	244,592	24.4	175,408	17.5	420,000	41.8
計	5,290,360	2,440,642	46.1	525,124	9.9	2,965,766	56.1	343,103	6.5	3,308,869	62.5

出所： 内閣統計局調査報告（十一月一日）並ニ

農商務省工場統計（年末）ニ據ル

薬品工業ノ場合、工：従業員数三十名乃至五十名ハ（丙）ニ含マル

瓦斯及電気、金銅並ニ製鋼工業ニ於テハ工員五名乃至十五名ノ工場ハ

（乙）ニ又工員十五名乃至三十名ノ工場ハ（丙）ニ含マル

Ref Doc 1161(4)

現在ノ日本ノ人口問題ノ観點カラミレバ之等小規模ノ經營ハ過剩ノ勞働供給ヲ吸收シ維持スルニ役立ツアキルモノデアル。

新ノ如キ小規模産業ノ蔓延ハソノ結果トシテ必然的ニ勞働條件ニ對スル不利益ノ増進ヲ齎ス。通信ノ狀態ニ在ツテハヨリヨキ機械ハヨリ高キ勞働生産力トヨリ高キ生活水準トヲ意味スルモノデアルガ、日本ニ見ラレル如キ特種ノ環境ニ在ツテハ、ソレハムシロ少クトモ理論的ニイツテモツト惡イ勞働條件ヲ意味シテキルノデアツテ、サモテクバ小規模産業ハ大規模産業ニ對抗シ得ラレナイノデアル。然シナガラ小規模産業ノ殘存スルコトハ惡意味カラ云ツテ日本ニ必要ナノデアル。新クシテ大規模産業ノ競争力ノ増加シテクルコトハ小規模産業ニ於ケル勞働條件ノ惡化ヲ意味シ、惡イアハ日本全體ノ勞働條件ノ惡化ヲ意味スルコトトナラウ。

#### 低廉ナル日本ノ勞賃

日本ノ勞働水準ガ以來ノ先進國ノソレニ比シテハルカニ低イトイフコトハ事實デアル。然シナガラコノ低廉サノ性質ナルモノハ西洋人ニ十分理解サレテキルトハ限ラナイ、デアルカラ西洋人が自分ノ標準ニヨル比較ヲ行ツテモ東洋人ニハ不合理ニミエルのデアル。我々ハ日本ノ勞働賃金ハ東洋ニ於ケル一般



Ref Doc 1161(4)

ノ水準ニ照シテモ決シテ低イコトハナイトイフ事ヲ  
忘レテハナラナイ。西洋諸國ノ勞働賃金ト比較シテ  
サヘ日本ノ勞働賃金ハ賃金全カホシテキルヤウニ  
ソレ程低クハナイノデアル。

我々ノ提議ヨリスレバ、勞賃ノ比較ヲ爲スニハド  
ンナ場合テモ實際賃金ヲ以テ比較シナケレバナラナ  
イ。勿論日本ト西洋諸國トノ間ニハ社會條件及生活  
様式ニ大差ガアルカラ、カウイフ比較ハ困難ナ事テ  
アラウ。現社マダ實際ノ賃金水準ヲ比較スル一般標  
準ハ分ツテキナイ。但し日本テ現金賃金外ニ、厚生  
事業及家族手當トシテ支出スル金額ハ欧米デ同様目  
的ニ支出スル金額ヲ模倣シテキルヤウデアル。這業  
上ノ後進國トシテノ日本ノ資本家ハ、西洋ノ先進國  
ガ味ハツタ勞働學識カラ教ヘラレ、卒先シテ厚生事  
業ヲ企圖シ總ニ勞働運動ノ後先ヲ伺シテ來ルノデ  
アル。コノ厚生事業ハ附加賃金ノ性質ヲ有ツテキル。  
之等附加要素ヲ計算ニ入レ、バ日本ノ勞働賃金ノ低廉  
サ並ビニ生活水準ノ低サニ關スル西洋人ニ一般ナ考  
ヘ方ハ相當ニ疑ツテ來ルデアラウト思ハレル。

日本ノ勞働賃金ノ低廉デアルノハ、政府側ノ怠慢  
ヤ資本家側ノ勞働者虐待ニ依ルヨリモ次ニ掲ゲル諸  
因ニヨツテ生サレタモノト思ハレル。(一)天然資源ノ  
貧弱及ビ資本ノ不足等勞働條件ニ根本的影ヒヲ與ヘ  
ル国内的諸原因(二)全農的ニイッテ國庫收入ノ僅少ナ  
ル事、特ニ下級官吏、事務員、農民所得ノ僅少ナル

Ref Doc 1161 (4)

コト等勢に於ては箱館に於ては影射ヲ具ヘル内閣原因  
(三) 日云ノ勢に於ては向來同影射ヲ具ヘル外閣原因即  
歐米諸國ノ實業人心長ニ試スル移長政策及之等諸國  
ノ日云製品ニ對スル貿易政策等。(四) 勢に於ては及ビ勢  
情聯合又ハ之に對して等ニヨル勢に對して改善ノ困難性。  
日云ノ勢に於ては影射ヲ具ヘテキル總タル原因中  
最も重大ナルハ日云ガ天然資源ヲ裕クニ所有シテキ  
タイ事ナアル。日云ハソノ本土内ノ利用出來ル天然  
資源ノ量ガ限リテアレキルノニ對シテ加ヘテ西洋諸國  
ガ日云ヘ移長及ビ日云商品輸出ニ對シ人工的防壁ヲ  
造ツメ爲ニ天然資源獲得力ヲハゞメレクノデアアル。  
加之日云ノ近頃領土ニ於ケル天然資源ノ開發ニ對シ  
種々ノ制限ガ加ヘラレテキルノデアアル。

(以下次頁)

Ref Doc 1161(4)

コノ天然資源力ノ貧弱ナル種々相ヲ列擧スレバ  
次ノ如クデアル(一)人口過剰(二)低劣ナル労働生産力  
並ニ其ニ伴フ一人営リ收益力ノ低イコト(三)全体ト  
シテ國家ノ生活水準ノ低イコト殊ニ労働者生活水  
準ノ低イコト(四)天然資源豊富ナル國々ト同等ニ生  
活水準ヲ得ルニハヨリ長時間ヨリ烈シイ労働ヲ要  
スルコト。(五)原料及食糧ノ高價ナルコト及(六)地價  
増大ノ高價ナルコト機械設備ノ増計及一般建設費  
ノ高價ナルコト及利率ノ高イコト等、労働賃金以  
外ノ生産費用ノ高イコト。

之等諸要素ガ一緒ニナツテ強力ナ日本ノ労働條  
件減壓方ヲナツテ働ク傾キガアル。然シナガラ直  
接ニハ日本ノ労働條件ヲ低下サセテキルハ一般農  
民ノ生活水準ノ低イコトデアル。

新シイ労働力ハ殆ド全部農村ノ金剩人口ニヨッ  
テ供給サレルノデアリ從ツテ産業ニ於ケル労働條  
件ヲ評價スルニ當ツテハ勞資共農村ノ收入ヲ考察  
スル。農村ノ労働者ハ自分ガ之カラ從喜セントス  
ル労働ノ諸條件ト之マデ自分ノ携ツテキタ労働ノ  
諸條件トヲ比較シテ産業労働者ノ列ニ加ヘルカド  
ウカラ決定スルノデアル。資本家側ノ立場トシテ

Ab. / Nov. 116111

ハ・農民ヲ惹ツケル差ダケヲ附ケテ、賃金ヲ大体  
小作農ノ收入ト同程度ニ止メヨウトスル。ソレデ  
アルカラ之等農村ノ生活水準ハ労働條件評價ノ基  
準ニナルノデアリ、而シテコノ農村ノ水準ハ明カ  
ニ日本デ最低ノモノデアルカラ（産業）労働者ノ  
状態ハ善カラウ筈ガ無イノデアル。（第三表参照  
）

農民ノ生活水準ガ斯クモ低イノハ彼等ノ技術ガ  
低イ故デハナク又彼等ガ怠慢デアル爲デモナイ。  
更ニ彼等農民ノ組織ガ貧弱デアル爲デモナク地主  
ニ一搾取「サレル爲デモナイ。ムシロソレハ單ニ  
土地ニ對シテ人口ガ過剰デアルトイフ事實ニ依ル  
ノデアル。頭割リノ耕地ハ非常ニ狭小デアルコノ  
人口過剰ノ問題ノ解決ヲ待ズシテハ労働者ノ生活  
水準引上ゲノ希望ハ在リ得ナイ。日本ハコノ問題  
ノ解決ノタメニハ、人口ニ比シテヨリモツト廣イ  
領土ヲ有スル諸外国ノ態度如何ニヨツテ、大キク  
左右サレルノデアル。

5

Ref Doc 1161(4)

第三表 労働者及農民ノ一人當リ一ヶ月收入及支出

		世帯家族 對稱數	家族 人員數	一戸當リ 人員數	一戸當リ 労働 人員數	一戸當リ 非労働 人員數	一戸當リ 労働收入 (圓)	労働人員 一人當リ 收入(圓)	一戸當リ 實際收入 (圓)	一戸當リ 生活費 (圓)
労働者	總計又ハ平均	3.210	13.196	4.11	1.23	2.88	92.92	75.54	91.33	22.23
	工場労働者	2.026	8.321	4.10	1.21	2.89	95.59	79.00	94.64	23.08
	鑛山労働者	447	1.955	4.37	1.35	3.02	78.31	58.01	73.84	16.90
	運輸係労働者	416	1.561	3.75	1.14	2.61	104.08	91.30	98.56	26.28
	臨時雇	319	1.359	4.26	1.60	2.66	81.85	51.16	85.84	20.15
農民	總計又ハ平均	670	3.824	5.71	3.12	2.59	72.76	23.28	96.39	16.88
	自作農	130	764	5.88	3.06	2.82	81.72	26.71	109.00	18.65
	半自作農	323	1.884	5.83	3.22	2.61	76.35	23.71	100.33	17.26
	小作農	217	1.176	5.42	2.98	2.44	60.87	20.43	81.26	14.99

(編纂ハ)内閣統計局發表ノ家計調査報告(1926年9月—1927年8月)ニ依ル。  
 自作農 半自作農 小作農ノ別ハ家族調査並ニ收入支出調査ノ場合ニ於テハ同一ナラズ  
 但シソノ差ハ僅少デアルカラソノ儘トス。

Ref Doc 1161 (4)

### 労働組合及労働法

法律ニ依ラウト意ハ労働運動ニ依ラウト、現在労働条件ノ改善ヲナシテモ效果ガ無イ。日本ノ工業労働者階級ノ特殊ナ事情ヲ考慮ニ入レネバナラス。全国工場労働者ノ五十パーセント以上ハ女子労働者デアリ、シカモソノ過半ハ未婚前ノ二、三年ノミヲ工場デ働タ娘達オノデアル。カヤウナ娘達ヲ説イテ労働組合ニ参加セル事ハ不可能ニ近イト思ハレル。

其ノ他ニモ日本ニ於ケル労働運動ヲ低調タラシメントスル要素ガアル。スナハチ小規模ナル企業団体ヲ包括スル一ツノ組合ヲ組織スルガ如キハ問題外ニ置カレテキルト言フ事實デアル。シカルニ一方、日本ニ現存スル特殊ナ事情ノ爲、大規模ナ工場ノ労働者ハ資本家側ニ味方スル傾向ガアル。小規模工業ニ於ケル労働条件ノ水準ガ餘リニモ低イ爲ニ、大規模工場ニ於ケル労働条件ハ絶對的ナ意味デハ決シテ理想的ト呼ベナイモノデハアルガ、小規模工業ノソレト相對的ニ可成リ良ク見エルノデアル。カヤウナ譯デ、大規模工業ニ於ケル勞賃、雇傭繼續性ノ保障、労働時間、其ノ他一般的待遇ガ小規模工業ニ於ケルソレヨリモ優ツテキルカニ見エルノデアル。労働者ハ資本家ニ對立スル爲ニ労働組合ニ参加センヨリハ



Ref Doc 1161141

ムシロ、ソノ備ヒ主ノ温情主義的ナ庇護ノ下ニ生活ノ保障ヲ求メル方ヲ好ムノデアル。資本家ノ方デモ、他國ノ資本家ノ困難ナ立場ヲ見テ警戒シ、勞賃支拂ノ他ニ福祉ヤ娛樂ノ爲ノ便宜ヲ益々増ス事ニヨツテ勞働者同ノ此ノ態度ヲ促進セントスル。カヤウナ諸デドノ大規模工業デモ共同消費組合、勤務手當其ノ他種々ノ現品支給ハ普通ニ見ラレルノデアル。

遠洲紡績ノ如キ秀レタ工場デハ、コレ等ノ附加的手當ノ爲ニ、勞働者ハ若シモ備ヒ主カラ興ヘラレル種々ノサーヴィスヤ便宜ニ對シ金ヲ拂フト考ヘテ見タナラバ、支給サレタ一回デ以テ實際ハ現金二圓ヲ支給サレタカノ如キ利益ヲ受ケテキル。

カヤウナ次第デ日本ニ於ケル勞働運動ハ勢ヒ小規模工場ニ於ケルモノトナリ勝チデアル。併シソノ様な運動ハ他國ニ類例ナキ或ル特質ヲ持ツテ居ル。

(一) 此等ノ運動ハ利益ノモツト大キナ部分ヲ資本家カラ勞働者ノ手ニ確保セント言フ目的ニ向ツテナサレテキルノデハナイ。之等ノ運動ハ勞資聯合、否モツト精確ニ言フナラバ雇主傭人ノ聯合ノ立場カラ、一般的小規模工場ノ一般的條件ヲ改善セントスル試ミニ過ギヌトイフ様ナ性質ヲ持ツテ居ル小規模ナ電燈工場ノ狀況ガソノ典型

Ref Doc 116114

的ナモノデアル。

此ノ運動ハ小規模工場間ノ競争ヲ排除ス  
ル爲ニ行ハレタノデアル。此業ハ最低価値ノ協  
定ヲ破ツタ工場ニ對シテハ行ハレタ。

(以下次頁ニ續ク)

Ref Doc 116141

(二)、小規模工場ニ於ケル雇主ト傭人間ノ社会的地位ハソレ程大キナ懸隔ヲ持ツテキル譯デハナイ。雇主自身ガ大體勞働者階級ノ出身デアリ、自身ノ傭人ト共ニ勞働ヲ續ケテキルモノモアル。

(三)、雇主傭人間ノ金錢的結合ニモ増シテ、家族制度ノ情的結合ヤ、支配者ト被支配者間、師弟間、指導者ト従者間ニ於ケル封建的羈絆トイフガ如キ事實上更ニ重要ナル結合關係ガソノ上ニアル。又等ハ現實ノ事實ナノデアツテ、單ナル神話的架空ノ話デハナイ。以上ノ様ナ結合關係並ニ(二)項デ前述シタ要素ハ決シテ勞働運動ヲ促進スル助力トハナラナイ。此ノ様ナ附加的關係ニヨツテ負ハサレル義務ノ爲ニ、雇主ガ經濟的窮境ニ面シタトキハ屢々傭ヒ入自身ガ給料ノ減額又ハ同給料デヨリ長時間勞働スルコトヲ申シ出ナケレバナラヌ様ナ立場ニナル。

(四)、日本ニ於ケル勞働運動ノ目的ハ或ル一種ノ勞働者ノタメノミデ無ク、一般普遍的ニ勞働者ノ福祉ヲ増ハ爲デアル。日本ノ工場ハ歐洲諸國ノ如ク段階的發達ラシタモノデハナイ。英國ニ於テハ各類ノ職人ガ夫々ノ同業組合ヲ作ツテ居タトイフ經濟的段階ガアツタガ、日本ノ工場ハ一足跳ビニ革命ヲ行ツタ。故ニソノ勞働運動ハ農民層ヲモ洩ラサズアラユル勞働者ニ利益ヲ與ヘントスル勞働トイフ形ヲトル。

Def Doc 116114

労働運動ト言フ名ノ意味スル所ノモノハ労働組合運動ノミニ限ラレテハイナイ。産業各部門ノ労働條件改善トイフ目的ノ爲ニ労働者ヲ部門別ニ組織スルコトハ現今ノ経済的社会的情勢ニ適シテキナイ。労働者ノ救済要求が果急的デアル事、及び前述ノ結合關係ノ爲ニ、本質的ニ長期在ラ希ビル様ナ運動ハ低調トナルノデアル。

労働條件ハ労働法ニヨツテ改善シ得ルヤ?少クトモソレガ労働法ノ目的デアル旨デアリ、ソシテ過去ニ於テ或ル程度ノ成功ヲ収メテ來タノデアツタ。併シ今日、現存ノ法律ヲ労働條件改善ノ爲ニ適用スル事ハ不可能ノ極ニ思ハレル。茲ニ於テ小規模工業ノ優劣ガ此ノ問題ニ於テ重要ナル役目ヲ持ツテキル事が再ビ明ラカニナル。

我々ハ労働法ガ無效果デアル根本的原因ハ、或ル前提ノ下ニ労働法ガ起草サレタソノ前提ソノモノニ在ルト言フ事實ニ先ヅ注意ラ向ケル。意識的ニモアレ、無意識的ニモアレ、過去ノ労働法ハ我ノ如キ假説ニ基イテナサレタ極ニ思ハレル。

(一)、農林人口ハ工業人口ト共ニ結局ブロレタリヤニナルトイフ假説。若シモコレガ真相ナリトスレバ、農長層ニ見ラレル特殊ナ款意ヲ考慮ニ入レテ居ナイ労働法デモ、農村及び一般労働者階級ノ状態改善ニ成功シタノデアラウ。英國デハコレハ理論現實共ニ眞實デアツタ。

Ref Doc 116114

(二) 農民ヨリモ工業労働者ノ状態ノ方ガヒドイモノデア  
ルカラ、先ヅ工業労働者ノ状態ヲ改善スル事ニ力  
ヲ入レネバナラストイフ假定。

(三) 小規模工業ハ時間ノ経過ト、自身ノ發展ニツレテ  
大規模ニナルトイフ假定。故ニ労働法ハ大規模工業  
ニ適用サレル様ニ起草サレネバナラスト。

以上ノ假定ニ基ヅイテ起草セラレタ労働法ハ自然  
ト工業労働者ノ状態ニ集中サレ、農業者ノ問題ヲ考  
慮外ニ置イタ。現状ガ之等ノ前提ト一致シテ居タ限  
リ之等ノ法律ハ何等カノ效果ヲ與ヘタ。然シ此ノ背  
景的事情ニ変化ガ起ツタノデ今ヤ労働法ノ根本的改  
訂ノ必要ガ考慮セラレル様ニナツタ。

後ニ於ケル發展ノ結果、工業労働者問題ノ解決ハス  
ベテ農民ノ窮境ノ救済ト非常ニ交錯シタ關係ヲ持ツ  
テキルノデ農民ノ状態ヲ考慮外ニ置ク法律ハ此ノ問  
題ト根本的ニ取組ンデキルノデハ無イト言フ事が判  
ツテ來タ。更ニ小規模工業ノ幼兒的段階ニ非ズシテ  
過剰人口トイフ違クベカラサル禍ヲ持ツテ居ル日本  
ノ事情ニ巧ミニ適合シテ發達シテ來タ一面ヲアラハ  
シテキル成人デアリ過剰人口ノ存スル限リ小規模工  
業ハ日本ニ存在スベキモノデアル事が判ツテ來タ。

Ref Doc 1161 (4)

此ノ様ナ日本ノ経済的社会的特殊性ノ認識ヲ俟イ  
タ爲ニ現在ノ法律ガ一般的労働条件ノ改善ニ關スル  
限リ效果無キモノトナツタノデアツタ。現在ノ工場  
法ノ明ラカナル一大欠陥ハ、労働者十人以下ノ小規  
模工場ヲ同法ノ適用外ニ置イテキルタメソノ適用範  
圍ガ非常ニセマイト云フ事實デアル。カヤウナ法律  
ヲ實施スルノハ、ソノ適用外ノ小工業ノ發展ヲ奨励  
スルコトニナル。ソシテコレ等ノ種小工場ノ労働條  
件ハ必然的ニヒドイモノデアルカラ、一般ニ工業ニ  
於ケル労働条件ハ惡化スル傾向トナル。其ノ上此ノ  
法律ノ適用サレル工場ノ中デサヘ監督取締リガ困難  
ヲ極メル様ナ非常ニ多數ノ小規模工場が存在スル爲  
ニ其ノ實施ハ決シテ容易ナル事柄デハ無イ。

ソレカト言ツテ、アラユル大キサト種類ノ工場ヲ  
包括スル最低賃銀及最大労働時間ニ關スル法律ヲ實  
施スルコトハ既ニ此ノ事自身が不可能デアラウ。況  
ンヤ農村ニハ労働供給者ガ種類ニアツテ法的最低標  
準以下ノ賃銀デ大昔ビデ働クコトヲ希望シテキルト  
言フ事實ヲ考ヘル時、殊ニ然リデアル。



Ref Doc 1161 141

其事信ノ下ニアツテハ、日本ノ正シイ政策ハ唯  
ニ工場法ヲシテ現在ヨリヨリ多分ニ包括的ニスル  
ノミデナク、農業及ビ小工業ニ擴ガツテイル諸國  
難ノ根本ヲ衝クヨウナ社會、産業政策ヲ用意シ、  
斯クシテ過剩人口狀態ヲ克服、勞働條件ニ關スル  
法定最小基準ノ適用ガ成功スル基礎ヲ用意スルニ  
アルト見ラレルノデアリマス。

### 國 貨 ノ 低 落

國貨ノ低落ハ日本政府側ノ輸出ヲ刺戟センタメ  
ノ意識的試ミデアツタト云フ一部カラノ叫ビガア  
リマス。併シ年々其ノ信譽ヲ減ベテ見レバ、ソレ  
ハ政府側ノ計費的勢力ニヨルト云フヨリ、寧ロ政  
府側ノ統制出來ナイ要素ニヨリ由來シテイタコト  
ガワカルト思ハレマス。

一九二一年（大正一〇年）頃以來、通貨制度ニ  
關スル日本政府ノ根本政策ハ、舊平價デ金本位ニ  
復歸スルコトデアリマシタ。併シ一九二二年（大  
正一一年）及一九二七年（昭和二年）ノ金融恐慌  
ノ去來ノ爲メソレ自体部分的ニハ斯カル政策ノ固  
有ノ不健全性及ビ一九二三年（大正一二年）ノ大  
震災等ヲ含ム他ノ原因ニ由ルノデアリマスガ  
ソノタメニ其企圖セラレタ政策ハ、實現スルニ

Ref Doc 116114

長年月ヲ要シマシタ。其間ニアツテ商品貿易ノ道  
訓ノ壓迫ノ下ニ、國爲替ノ價值ハ絶エズ下落ノ傾  
向ニアリマシタ。併シ國ノ平價ヲ回復スル意圖ヲ  
以テ出發シテイル政府ニトツテハ、コレハ如何ナ  
ル輕任ヲ加ツアモ防止シナケレバナラヌ情勢デア  
リマシタ。其目的ノタメニ用イラレマシタ主ナ武  
器ハ、口條決済ヲナスベク海外ニ保有セラレテ居  
リマシタ金正貨デアリマシタ。一九一九一二年  
(大正八年一昭和四年)ノ十年間ニ於キマシテ支  
拂ニ使用セラレマシタ此在外正貨ノ金額ハ八億圓  
(舊平價ノ圓トシマシテ)ニ達シマシタ。加ヘテ  
一九二二年(大正一一年)以來同様ノ目的ノタメ  
ノ外國資本ノ輸入ハ、約七億五千萬圓ニ達シマシ  
タ。簡單ニ云ヘバ十五億五千五百萬圓ノ巨大ナ金  
額ガ、國ノ下落ヲ防グタメニ投消セラレタノデア  
リマシタ。是々外國爲替市場ニ於テ活潑デアリマ  
シタ思案ノ圓貨ニ及ボシタ效果モ亦看過サルベキ  
デハアリマセン。

其結果トシテ輸入超過ガ金ノ輸出ヲ導キ物價水  
準ヲ引下ゲルトカ、又輸入超過ガ爲替相場ノ暴落  
ヲ導クトカノ過程ヲ通ジテノ、輸入超過ノ自己調  
整力ハ起リマセンデシタ。斯クシテ輸入超過ハ減  
少セス、而シテ日本ニ於ケル物價水準モ亦比較的  
高位ニ維持セラレタノデアリマス。

Ref Doc 1161 (4)

斯ナル方法ニ於テ円價ハ人爲的ニ高位ニ保タレ  
マシタ。コレハ圓ト圓ヘバ磅トノ購買力平價ニヨ  
ツテモ指示セラレマシヨウ。一九二七―三一年  
(昭和二年―六年)ノ期間ニ於テ、磅價トノ關係  
ニ於テ圓ノ理論的價值ヲ購買力平價ヨリ計算致シ  
マストキハ一九片強デアリマシタガ、實際價值ハ  
二三。四片モシタノデアリマス。

然シコノ不健全ナ狀態ハ長續キ出來マセンデシ  
タ。一九二九年(昭和四年)迄ニ在外正貨ノシタ  
タカナル沽荷ト、外國資金ノ入手困難トハ、日本  
ヲシテ局面ヲ匡救スベキ速カナル措置ヲ取ル必要  
ヲ強要シテイマシタ。デフレカ圓ノ平價切下カノ  
二ツノ選擇ニ直面シテ、政府ハ第一ノ選擇ヲ取り  
マシタ。ソレハ實ニ過去幾年月ニ於ケル一貫シタ  
目的デアリマシタ。一九三〇年(昭和五年)一月、  
日本ハ金本位ニ復歸シマシタ。

(以下次頁へ續ク)

Ref Doc 1161111

シテ本年ヲ極々五ヶ月間ノ通貨相場ノ一割六分ノ騰貴  
ノ結果ハ明カニ顕微鏡的デシタ。物價ハ直グ墜下落シマ  
シタ。比重何ニ加ヘテ世界的不況ノ悪イ影響ガ其デフ  
レト物價下落ノ是ベテノ惡結果ヲ隨伴シテ添加セラレ  
マシタノハ尙ニ不幸デアリマシタ。其時致命的打撃ハ  
大英帝國ガ金本位ヲ離脱シタ一九三一年（昭和六年）  
九月ノ磅價ノ崩壊ノ形ニ於テ與ヘラレマシタ。日本政  
府ガ夫レノ力デ回復セラレマシタ金本位維持ノ政府  
側ノ思ベテノ努力ハ今ヤ放棄サレナケレバナラナカツタソ  
シテ一九三一年（昭和六年）十二月ニ内閣更迭ノ直後金  
輸出禁止ハ再ビ認セラレタノデアリマス。國ノ減價ハ  
豫期サレテ居マシタ。シカシ日本デハ殆ンド誰モ實際  
ニ起ツタヤワナ下落ハ豫言シマセンデシタ。滿洲事變  
ノ重大損喪、上海事變ノ勃發、國際聯盟トノ險惡ナル  
崩壊、政府借入ノ増加ト共ニ日本ハ前例ナキ政治的財  
政的大危機ニ投入マレマシタ。心配セラレタノハ國ハ  
匡救スベカラザル程ニ崩壊スルカモ知レナイト云フコ  
トデシタ。下落ヲ収メル所デハナク政府ハ其ヲ止メル  
爲ニ大イニ努力シマシタ。コレハ、ハツキリト英鎊ノ  
金本位離脱直後ノ一年九ヶ月間ニオケル輸出セラレタ

Ref Doc 1161

大盤ノ金ニヨツテ指示スルコトが出来る。其金流出  
ノ結果トシテ一九三三年（昭和八年）七月末迄ニ日本  
銀行ノ金準備ハ八億圓カラ超過二千五百萬圓ニ減少シ  
マシタ。シカシ乍ラ政治情勢ガ從來ヨリモ更ニ重大  
化シテ來タノデ圓化ハ圓力ニ百圓ニツキ二十弗ノ幅マ  
デ更ニ下格セザルヲ望ムカツタ。遂ニ一九三三年（昭和八年）五  
月一日、日本政府ハ外國為替管理法ヲ施行シマシタ。  
爾來圓ハ一志二片所ニ安定シタノデアリマス。  
國際市場ニ於ケル現 在ノ圓價ハ不當ニ低イトカ評シ  
難イト云フヨウニハ思ハレマセン。圓ノ減價程度ハ推  
カニ若シ一九三〇年（昭和五年）ニ於テ一般的ニ行ハ  
レテ居タ夫々ノ價值ヲ基礎トシテ算出スルナラバ他ノ  
如何ナル通貨ヨリモ大キカツタ。シカシ一九三〇年（  
昭和五年）ノ基礎又ハ水準ハ不當ニ高位ニ置カレタ。  
人爲的ノモノデアル限リ其時ニ於ケル水準ハ比較スル  
ニ適當ナ基礎デアルトハ思ハレヤイ若シ吾々が傍ト第  
ノ料金ニ於テ現在ノ圓價ヲ戰前ニ行ハレテ居タ購買力  
平價ヲ以テ計算スルナラバ吾々ハ各一圓・三二片ト二  
八・七六仙近邊ニアルノヲ發見スルデアリマセウ、シ  
カシテ夫ハ現在ノ實際爲替相場タル冬々一圓・〇〇片  
ト二九・〇一仙カラ遠クナイデアリマス。

Ref Doc 1161(4)

國ノ減價ニツイテ更ニ正確ニ調査スレバ圓價ハ一九二〇・一二〇年（大正九年一昭和元年）ノ期間不景ニ入爲的、不當ニ高位ニ置カレテ后リマシタガ遂ニ平常安定線ヲ見出タト云フベキデアリマシタ。此ノ安定ハ餘リニモ速カニ實現數シマシタノデ圓ガ世界貿易ノ始期ノ上ニ就ラカ減價的影響ヲ及シ其ノタメニ圓ハ故章ニ不當ノ程度ニ下落セシメラレテ結果トノ印象ヲ一掃ニ刷ク迄キ起シタト云フニスギヌノデアリマス。

#### 日本産業ノ最近ノ發展ニ於ケル特質

生産高ヨリ云ヘバ日本産業ハ一九二一年（大正十年）ノ一〇〇、〇ヨリ一九二四年（昭和九年）ニハ一八〇、〇ニ發展シマシタ。若シ物價下落ヲ計算ニ入レレバ實際ニハ一九二四年（昭和九年）ニハ二六九、〇ニ達シマシタ。

シカシ全生産高ノ現狀カラ觀シテ種々ノ産業ニ置カレタ重點ノ置キ方ノ推移トシテ現在ノ發展ヲ印附ケル他ノ特徴ガアリマス其レハ日本ニ於ケル産業的發展ノ道ヲ示イタ幾種ノ工業デアリマシタ。シカシナガラ過去數年ノ内ニ活動ノ中心ハ重工業（冶金、機械製作及化學）ヘ移リマシタ。生産高ニツイテ云ヘバ此等所謂重工業ハ今ヤ全工業生産高ノ五割強分ヲ占メテ居マスガ一九二一年（大正十年）ニハ僅ノ二割五分デアリマシタ。



Ref Doc 116/1121

同ジ期間ノ紡績出產高ハ嘗テノ日本産業ノ全生産高ノ四割四分ノ地位ヨリ三割二分ニ落ナマシタ。従ツテ全産業生産高ノ比率ヨリ云ヘバ紡績ハ下落ノ傾向ヲ取リマシタ。取程度迄日本ハ重工業國ノ體裁ヲ爲シツ、アリマス。而シテコレハ日本ノ厚饒及他ノ金屬ノ大量輸入ノ大キナ理由デサケレバナラナイノデアリマス

日本ニ於ケル現在ノ産業發表ノモウーツノ特徴ハ低級工業ノ設備カラヨリ高度ヘヨリ複雑ナ工業ヘノ進テアリマス。完成品ノ輸出ハ今ヤ全輸出額ノ六割ヲ占メテ居リマス。

最後ノ特徴ハ産業ハ今ヤ外國市場ヲ目標ニ生産シテ居ルコトデアリマス。夫ハ今マデヨリモモツト其原料ニ對シ又製品ノ販賣ニ對シ海外市場ニ依存スルヤウニナツテ來テ居リマス。コレハ特ニ織造工業ノ場合ニサウデアリ、該工業ハ其生産高ノ五割五分ヨリ八割以上ヲ外國ニ輸出シテ居ルノデアリマス。

第四表 各産業投下資本額表 (單位 百萬圓)

種 別		1919-21年平均 (大正8-10年)	1926-8年平均 (大正15-昭和3年)	1934年 (昭和9年)	1935年 (昭和10年)
運輸業 電氣事業	運輸業	446 (11.7)%	398 (25.3)%	223 (16.7)%	133 (9.3)%
	電氣事業	226 (5.9)	39 (2.5)	178 (13.3)	118 (8.3)
	小計	343 (9.0)	345 (22.5)	213 (16.0)	103 (7.2)
製造業	化學工業	200 (5.3)	125 (7.9)	211 (15.8)	409 (28.0)
	機械工業	100 (2.9)	23 (1.5)	57 (5.0)	55 (3.9)
	金屬工業	61 (1.6)	18 (1.1)	77 (5.8)	80 (5.6)
	小計	371 (9.7)	166 (10.5)	355 (26.6)	535 (37.5)
	紡織工業	341 (9.0)	68 (4.2)	102 (7.6)	32 (2.2)
工業	其他	435 (11.4)	200 (12.7)	93 (7.0)	116 (8.1)
	小計	1.147 (30.1)	451 (27.4)	550 (41.2)	682 (47.8)
其 他		1.644 (43.2)	353 (22.4)	171 (12.8)	390 (27.3)
總 計		3.806 (100.0)	1.575 (100.0)	1.324 (100.0)	1.427 (100.0)

日本銀行發行(銀行會社投下資本額)ニ依ル

41

Ref Doc 1161

辯證備文書 1161(4)26頁

第六表 日本産業ノ發達(産業別)

	第一次産業		第二次産業				第三次産業	
	1921	1934	金	1921	1934	機械及ビ工具	1921	1934
生産額	2336907	3167756	250.099	1496793	568.332	1159.168	5.88	1480784
單位千圓)								4.136745
工場数	957442	969320	74.142	134682	176.721	314669	80.754	192.270
工場数	20196	24399	2.789	6610	4.648	9181	2.929	4.313
								10366
								20104
生産額	41.7	53.7	4.8	15.9	10.9	12.3	9.7	16.0
工場数	57.3	44.8	4.5	8.9	10.9	14.5	6.6	8.9
工場数	40.9	30.3	5.6	8.2	9.4	11.4	5.9	5.4

商工省發行(工場統計表)ニヨル

42

Ref Doc 1161 (4)

辯護文書 1161(4)26頁)

第五表 日本産業ノ發達

	株式會社 資本金額 (單位 百萬圓)	生産額 (單位 百萬圓)	雇傭労働者數 (單位 千)	工場數 (單位 千)
1921	8.116 (100)	5.227 (100)	1.636 (100)	49 (100)
1925	9.525 (117)	6.789 (130)	1.808 (111)	49 (100)
1929	11.754 (145)	7.759 (148)	1.825 (112)	60 (122)
1931	11.854 (146)	5.175 (99)	1.660 (101)	64 (131)
1932	11.890 (147)	5.982 (114)	1.734 (106)	67 (137)
1933	12.339 (152)	7.871 (151)	1.901 (116)	72 (147)
1934	13.441 (166)	9.390 (180)	2.163 (132)	80 (163)

商工省發行(工場統計表)及ビ(會社統計表)ニヨル

括弧内數字ハ指數ヲ示ス

PROBLEMS OF THE  
PACIFIC, 1936

AIMS AND RESULTS OF  
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC POLICIES  
IN PACIFIC COUNTRIES

Proceedings of the Sixth Conference of the  
Institute of Pacific Relations, Yosemite  
National Park, California, 15-29 August 1936

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS  
London New York Toronto  
1937

\* \* \* \*

DOCUMENT II

FACTORS AFFECTING THE RECENT INDUSTRIAL  
DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN

Kamekichi Takahashi

Director, Takahashi Economic Research  
Institute, Tokyo

UNDERLYING FACTORS

The remarkable development of Japanese industry in recent years, though sometimes described by casual observers as a phenomenon abruptly taking place, is really an outcome of a natural course of development for a long period in the past, only its final stage emerging with a striking suddenness encouraged by various factors to be expounded below. The true and fundamental explanation of the development should be sought not so much in the depreciation of the yen or low labour costs in Japan as the following facts. First, the efforts undertaken both by the Government and by the industrialists since the Russo-Japanese War to promote industrial development have now borne fruit. To analyse this statement further, (1) the investments in the past have come to

the stage of yielding a return, (2) all the trials and experiments have contributed to the establishment of what we may call the Japanese way of conducting manufacture and business, and (3) the results of rationalization and other sacrifices have come to appear.

Second, various shortcomings of Japanese industry have been overcome. In the past, Japanese industry suffered from (1) the lack of capital and a high rate of capital-interest, (2) lack of skill and experience in making and repairing machinery, (3) poor technical training and low productivity of labour, and (4) difficulty in selling goods on markets already occupied by the industrially advanced countries.

But in recent years the interest-rate on industrial capital has greatly been lowered; the difference between the Japanese interest-rate and that of Great Britain, which was as much as 3 per cent. in the pre-War days, has been decreased to 1 per cent. and is likely to be made still smaller. This tendency is reflected in the change of Japan from a capital importing country to a capital exporting country. In this connexion, we must not overlook the fact that the financial panic of 1927 in Japan taught her valuable lessons, for since then both the country's financial organization and the financial basis of various capitalistic enterprises have greatly been improved.

The disadvantages as to machinery have also been overcome almost completely. The fact that the cost of machinery was unusually high compared with that of labour has induced Japanese industrialists to concentrate their attention on improvements in machinery. Moreover, to such an industrially backward country as Japan, the introduction and improvement of machinery meant a greater competitive power against the advanced countries both in home and overseas markets and therefore an increased industrial activity. Unlike the position in Western countries, it meant more employment instead of unemployment. Thus, not only has improvement in machinery been achieved to a greater extent than in Western countries, but a large measure of self-sufficiency in machinery has been attained. Next, the low efficiency of labour in the past



was due to the lack of mechanical equipment rather than the inherent productive capacity of the labourer himself. Consequently, as experience has grown in dealing with advanced machinery, the labourer has come to acquire a greater skill and, inasmuch as machinery has been improved, the efficiency of labour has gradually been increased. Lastly, the narrowness of markets due to the backwardness of Japanese industry has compelled Japan to take great pains in seeking constantly for better methods of purchasing raw materials and marketing goods; in short, in improving the organizational side of industry. Fruits of these efforts are now being amply reaped.

The strong points of Japanese industry which have come to make themselves felt in recent years may be enumerated as: (1) Geographical advantages. The situation of Japan in the middle of the vast East Asiatic region producing agricultural raw materials and purchasing manufactured goods is very advantageous both from the point of view of access to raw materials and the marketing of industrial goods. Moreover, being an island country, Japan can rely solely on the sea-transportation, which is considerably less expensive than land-transportation. (2) Advantages in relation to standards of living and social customs. In so far as standards of living and customs are concerned, agricultural countries which import manufactured goods such as British India, South East Asia, Latin America, and the Near East are much nearer to Japan than to the advanced industrial countries in the West. This must be one of the big reasons for the success of Japanese industry in recent years. (3) Density of population. Though a serious shortcoming from the social point of view, from the capitalistic viewpoint over-population can serve as a powerful competitive weapon in the form of abundant cheap labour. Especially so, when the productive capacity of labour has been raised. (4) Inborn qualities of the industrial labourer. Unlike some low-living-standard peoples, Japanese are endowed with quite high qualities mentally, physically, and industrially. One notable example is that girls working in cotton mills can master the technical requirements, in the case of better ones, within one month, and even

in the case of inferior ones within three months. And this period has always been on the decline ever since the Sino-Japanese War. (5) Advantages peculiar to a late-comer. Taking lessons from the experience of advanced countries, Japanese capitalists have successfully prevented the relationship between capital and labour from becoming too rigid. They have gone farther than those in the West in undertaking deliberate and progressive reforms in the matter of industrial organization. They have freely drawn on advanced machinery and other equipment, and in building factories and other establishments have imitated or even improved on the most efficient scale and arrangements theretofore existing.

On account of the special circumstances to be referred to below, the rise in wages and other improvements in labour conditions which ought otherwise to have accompanied industrial development did not occur in Japan. In consequence, a decline in the price of manufactured goods coupled with an increase in profits of capitalists has accelerated the competitive power of Japanese industry. Lastly, the slowing up of industrial development in older Western countries has given an opportunity to Japanese industry to attain some of its potential development.

#### IMMEDIATE FACTORS

To these underlying factors have been added more direct causes in recent years, namely, first, the world depression which started in 1929; second, the budgetary expansion of the Japanese Government and the development of Manchoukuo; and third, the depreciation of the yen.

The world depression provided a chance for Japanese economic expansion, for Japanese industry possessed a greater adaptability to the decline of the price level than other countries in the West, especially Great Britain, where the rigid economic relationships proved an almost fatal obstacle in overcoming the depression. Consequently, the competitive power of Japanese industry has substantially increased relative to these countries.

Then, the Manchurian Incident brought in its train the budgetary expansion on the part of the Japanese Government and the depreciation of the yen, both of which have furnished Japanese industry with very effective stimuli. During the period between 1932 and 1935 government expenditures for relief purposes were 660 million yen, while those for military purposes were 1,750 million. The annual average of these expenditures, 600 million yen, was equivalent to 40 per cent. of the total expenditures of the Government for 1930, and these were raised mostly by government borrowings. The present Japanese investment in Manchoukuo is approximately 900 million yen. The fact that the Manchurian market has been secured to Japan should also not be overlooked, although whether this means a net gain or a loss remains yet to be ascertained.

It is true that currency depreciation particularly favoured Japan, for between 1931 and 1935 the yen depreciated by 60 per cent. while the depreciation of the dollar and the pound sterling was respectively 41 and 35 per cent. At the same time there is a still greater reason why currency depreciation was particularly advantageous to Japan: in European countries and the United States the gold embargo and currency depreciation were essentially means of readjusting the industrial and financial dislocations resulting from the collapse of prices, but in Japan, where depression started earlier than in these countries, it was after a wholesale readjustment had nearly been completed in the business world that the gold standard was abandoned and the yen began to fall. Consequently, while in Western countries the effect of currency depreciation was of negative nature, consisting as it did in relieving the burden of depression, in Japan it was a positive one almost wholly serving to consolidate her competitive power in the economic sphere.

#### TIME FACTOR IN THE WORLD DEPRESSION

One very important fact which must not be overlooked in observing the recent industrial development of Japan is that the depression visited Japan considerably earlier than Western countries, for in 1927, when the United States

was still enjoying 'eternal prosperity', Japan was in the middle of one of the biggest financial panics which had ever visited the country. By the time the depression which started in 1929 was raging all over the world Japan was well on its way towards consolidating effective means to overcome the depression, thanks to the drastic rationalization and other methods of readjustment forced upon her in the previous years. It was natural from the time point of view, therefore, that Japan should have been the first to emerge prosperous out of the depression.

This time-difference between the Japanese depression and the world depression may be indicated by a comparison of indices of stock-market quotations in Japan, the United States, and Great Britain. Putting the figures for 1921 in these countries all at 100, the figures for 1929 will be found to be for Japan 71.4, while for the United States and Great Britain they are respectively 301.3 and 147.1. Between 1921 and 1929 the prices of shares were on the decrease in Japan, but they were going up in the other two countries. This tendency has rather been altered since 1931, when the Japanese stock price index reached its bottom and began an upward trend somewhat rapidly. It is true that the indices in the United States and Great Britain have also turned upward, but the rise is much smaller. If 1931 is made a base year, the Japanese figure for 1935 will be found to be much higher than the American and the English, but, if on the basis of 1921, the Japanese index will be only 84.9 as compared to 129.9 and 114.4 for the United States and Great Britain, respectively.

In Japan the period of economic hardships and sacrifices extended from March 1920 to the end of 1931. The various adverse events which Japanese industry had to encounter in that period are (1) the panic in March 1920, (2) the banking failures in November and December 1922, when, despite the Government's emergency measures, as many as seventeen banks failed, (3) the earthquake of September 1923, (4) the financial panic in February and March 1927, when the Government declared a moratorium and guaranteed payments up to 700 million yen

through the Bank of Japan, but the number of banks which had to close their doors amounted to fifty, and (5) the premature return to the Gold Standard in 1929.

During that period the liquidation of financially weak banks was carried out on an extensive scale, the number of ordinary banks in the country registering 1,794 in 1922, 1,417 in 1926, and only 481 in 1930. The amount of capital liquidated during the period of 1921-31 was: authorized capital, 6,060 million yen, and paid-up capital, 3,360 million yen. Reduction of capital has also widely been enforced: the total sum thus reduced in the same period being 1,340 million yen (paid-up capital). The average rate of dividend of industrial firms, which was as high as 33.2 per cent. in 1918, was reduced to 12.7 per cent. in 1921, 8.8 per cent. in 1928, and only 5 per cent. in 1931. In the same year, it must be noted, the interest rate on fixed deposits was 4.2 per cent. at the first-class banks and 4.7 per cent. at the second-class.

#### SMALL-SCALE INDUSTRIES OF JAPAN

A knowledge of the peculiar characteristics of Japanese industry is essential for understanding the recent industrial development in Japan as well as the labour conditions which are a powerful force in Japan's trade expansion. One of the more outstanding characteristics is the prevalence of so many small-scale industries which constitute both in the number of establishments and workers employed more than one-half of all Japanese industries. Unlike the small-scale industries in Western countries, these small-scale establishments in Japan are not the beginnings of an industry which will grow into a large-scale industry. Rather are they units of industry which, though small in size, are fully matured, and not small units of a potentially large-scale industry. These small-scale industries are an indigenous growth resulting from the social and economic conditions prevailing in Japan. Their unique and lasting continuance may, therefore, be expected.



According to the definition adopted by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, generally a 'small-scale' factory means a factory employing less than 100 workers, and in the case of the chemical and the gas and electricity industry, in which machinery is a more important factor of production than labour, it means a factory employing less than 50 and 30 workers respectively. Adhering to this definition and in accordance with the Factory Statistics published by the same Ministry, we may indicate the importance of small-scale industries in Japan by the following figures (1932): the number of the small-scale factories constitutes 95.7 per cent., the number of workers employed 48.5 per cent., and the value of the products 41.2 per cent., respectively, of the total number of factories, the total number of workers, and the total amount of products of the country. But we must not forget that these statistics cover only factories employing more than 5 labourers. There is no direct information regarding the workers employed in those factories which are too small to be included in the statistics. Let us, therefore, deduct the number of factory labourers, shown in Table 1, from the number of people engaged in manufacturing industries of some kinds, shown in the Census Report by the Government Bureau of Statistics (see Table 2). Then, referring to the 1930 figures, the remainder, 2,440,000, may be regarded roughly as the number of workers in these ultra-small factories combined with that of small independent industrialists. This figure is equivalent to 46.1 per cent. of the whole industrial population. If this number is added to that of the small-scale factory workers as defined in the Factory Statistics (870,000), the total number of people engaged in small industries in Japan will be found to be 3,310,000, or approximately 62 per cent. of the whole industrial population.

The importance of the small-scale industries in the export trade of the country is even greater. Deduct the value of the products manufactured by the large-scale industries and that of agricultural and marine products from the total value of Japanese exports as shown in the Foreign Trade Statistics, and regard the rest as the value of the export goods produced by the small-scale



industries. Then we find that in the last three years about 65 per cent. of the total exports from Japan have been coming from the small-scale plants. This is, of course, only a rough figure, especially because silk, which is produced substantially in the large-scale factories, is included in the category of small-scale industry exports while such important small-scale industry goods as cotton tissues are included in large-scale industry products.

As to individual industries, those industries in which the small-scale units predominate are the food-preparing, timber, and other miscellaneous industries. Especially in the first two the number of workers employed amounts to 86.3 and 91.3 per cent., and the value of products constitutes 73.4 and 88.9 per cent., respectively, of the total workers and the total products in the respective industries. In the printing and bookbinding, metal, and cement industries the number of small-scale factory workers occupies about 60-70 per cent. of the workers engaged in the respective industries, but the percentage of the value of products in each case does not exceed 30-40 per cent.

Among the factors which have caused or contributed to the growth of the small-scale industries in Japan and to which their unique and lasting development may also be ascribed are:

1. Certain essential advantages which they possess over the large-scale industry arising from such factors as technique of production, special channels for securing raw materials, and methods of marketing the manufactured goods. The extent to which the market for goods is limited to Japan contributes in no small measure to the existence of these small-scale industries.

2. Changes in the type of motive power employed. In the age of steam-power, the large-scale industry was advantageous because the minimum size of the plant necessary to supply the requisite motive power was comparatively large. The necessity of establishments of such immense size was dispensed with when electric power came into use. Electric power can be easily transmitted to small unit factories, and hence, the small-scale industry can hold its own against the large one in this respect. This is particularly true in Japan, where the use of electric power is so extensively diffused.

3. The advantages coming from the vast source of cheap labour. This is probably the main raison d'être of so many small-scale factories and deserves somewhat more extended consideration.

From the point of view of the small-scale industry competing with the large one this advantage as regards labour consists not only of the absolute low level of wages and other costs of labour, but also of the greater ease with which both the number of employees and labour conditions can be adjusted to changes in demand.

In the last analysis the fundamental cause of the small-scale industry in Japan is the state of over-population which results in an over-abundant supply of labour. There are so many people that, no matter how far from ideal the working conditions may be, there are at all times many people eager for work in order that they may earn the minimum sustenance necessary for life. The income from one's main calling is so meagre that additional income must be derived from some source, and that source is in many cases supplied by the small-scale factories. Typical of this situation is the necessity on the part of farmers to undertake some kind of subsidiary work during the non-farming seasons or that of the families of small-factory workers or low-salaried city employees to seek jobs for supplementing the income of the main earner of the family. In other words, even where the head of the household is employed, his earning alone cannot meet the minimum family budget. Doing piece-work for these small-scale factories is peculiarly adapted to meet the condition of these people. Labour in such circumstances cannot stop to consider whether the working conditions are good or bad. Hence the small factories are able to employ these people at very low wage levels.

In so far as labour conditions are concerned, therefore, the Japanese small-scale industry means the particular type of industry in which labour conditions are bound to be poor, for it is the cheapness of labour that enables the small-scale industry to compete with machine-employing large-scale industry. From the point of view of the present population problem in Japan, these

TABLE 1. POSITION OF SMALL-SCALE ENTERPRISES IN JAPANESE INDUSTRY (END OF 1932)

Industries	No. of Factories			No. of Workers Employed			Value of Products (1,000 yen)		
	(A) Total	(B)	Percentage	(A) Total	(B)	Percentage	(A) Total	(B)	Percentage
		Small-scale	of		Small-scale	of		Small-scale	of
		Factories	(B) in (A)		Factory	of		Factories	(B) in (A)
Textile . . . . .	21,297	19,739	92.7	831,459	332,759	38.7	2,212,038	697,269	31.5
Metal . . . . .	4,651	4,537	97.5	97,469	58,608	60.1	591,135	236,113	39.9
Machinery and Tool . . . . .	6,738	6,494	96.4	194,572	82,863	42.6	598,840	191,413	32.0
Cement . . . . .	3,245	3,143	96.9	61,613	39,636	64.1	161,716	53,701	33.2
Chemical . . . . .	3,695	3,181	86.1	136,021	42,982	31.1	937,956	248,388	26.5
Timber and Furniture . . . . .	5,434	5,402	99.4	60,616	55,357	91.3	158,756	141,208	88.9
Printing and Bookbinding . . . . .	2,983	2,922	97.8	52,352	37,400	71.4	177,797	81,298	45.7
Food-preparing . . . . .	12,728	12,619	99.1	137,433	118,659	86.3	893,476	653,476	73.4
Gas and Electrical . . . . .	508	466	91.7	7,968	4,195	52.6	..	..	..
Other . . . . .	6,034	5,699	94.6	103,808	68,881	66.4	237,294	152,750	64.4
Total . . . . .	67,316	64,402	95.7	1,733,511	840,853	48.5	5,969,060	2,458,310	41.2

Source: Factory Statistics by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

TABLE 2. DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIAL POPULATION BY SCALE OF ENTERPRISES

Table 2. Distribution of Industrial Population											
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Sources: Census Report by the Cabinet Bureau of Statistics (Oct. 1).  
Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce

Factory Statistics by the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce (End of year).

In the case of the chemical industry, factories employing 30-50 workers are included in (C).  
In the gas and electrical, metal, and steel industries, factories employing 5-15 workers and those employing 15-30 workers are included respectively in (B) and (C).

small-scale establishments are serving the function of absorbing and sustaining the over-abundant supply of labour.

An inevitable result of such prevalence of small-scale industry is the constant pressure brought to bear upon labour conditions. Under normal circumstances, better machinery would mean higher productivity of labour and a higher standard of living, but under the special circumstances obtaining in Japan, it rather means, theoretically at least, still worse labour conditions, simply because otherwise the small-scale industry could not successfully compete with the large one. And yet the survival of the small-scale industry is, in a sense, a necessity to Japan. Thus, an increased competitive power of large-scale industry would mean a degradation of labour conditions in the small-scale industry and consequently a general degradation of labour conditions throughout the country.

#### CHEAPNESS OF JAPANESE LABOUR

It is true that labour standards in Japan are considerably lower than those of advanced countries in Europe and America. The nature of this cheapness, however, is not always fully comprehended by the Occidental, and hence his comparisons do not seem reasonable to the Oriental. We must not forget that labour in Japan is by no means cheap in the light of the standards which generally prevail in the East. Even when compared with labour in the Western countries, Japanese labour is not so cheap as direct money wages would indicate.

From our point of view, any comparison of wages should be that of real wages. Of course this comparison would be difficult because there is such a wide gap in the social conditions and mode of living between Japan and Western countries. At the present time, a common criterion by which to compare real wage levels has yet to be found. Indeed, the sums expended on welfare work and family allowances in addition to money wages in Japan seem to exceed expenditures for similar purposes in Europe and America. Emerging late into the circle of industrialized nations, the Japanese capitalists, profiting from the experience of labour troubles through which their Western seniors went, have taken the initiative in undertaking welfare work to forestall any labour



movements. This welfare work is in the nature of additional wages in kind. If these factors are taken into account, it is likely that the prevailing Western conception of the cheapness of Japanese labour and of the lowness of the Japanese standard of living will be considerably altered.

The cheapness of Japanese labour may be regarded as a result of the following causes rather than that of either inattentiveness on the part of the Government or sweating on the part of capitalists: (1) Factors within the country fundamentally affecting the conditions of labour, such as the meagre supply of natural resources and the shortage of capital. (2) Factors within the country which relatively affect the conditions of industrial workers, such as the low income of the nation as a whole, especially among lower government officials, office-workers, and farmers. (3) Factors outside the country indirectly affecting Japanese labour conditions, such as the immigration policies of Western countries against Oriental immigrants, and the trade policies pursued by these nations with respect to Japanese goods. (4) The difficulty of improving labour conditions through labour legislation and labour combinations or movements.

Of all the factors affecting labour conditions in Japan, the most powerful is her poor command of natural resources. Starting out with a restricted amount of natural resources available in the homeland, Japan's command of natural resources was further checked by the artificial barriers erected against the emigration of her people and the export of her commodities by the Western nations. Moreover, various restrictions are placed upon the development of natural resources in the neighbouring territories of Japan.

The various aspects of this poor command of natural resources may be enumerated as follows: (1) over-population, (2) low productivity of labour and a consequent low per capita earning power, (3) low standard of living of the nation as a whole, especially of the working population, (4) longer and harder work required to attain the same standard of living as that which prevails in countries abounding with natural resources, (5) expensiveness of raw materials and foodstuffs, and (6) high costs of production other than labour, including



high land prices and rent, the high cost of installing machine equipment and construction costs in general, and high interest rates.

All these factors combined tend to exert a powerful depressing force upon labour conditions in Japan. Directly, however, it is the low standard of living prevailing among the agricultural population that drives Japanese labour conditions down.

New labour is almost entirely supplied by the excess agricultural population, and therefore in estimating labour conditions in industry both labour and capital look at the income of the rural people. The rural worker decides whether he or she should join the ranks of industrial workers by contrasting the prospective labour conditions with his or her customary ones. The capitalist on his part keeps his wages on more or less the same level as the earnings of tenant farmers with just enough difference to attract the rural population. The standard of living in these rural communities therefore acts as the base from which the labour conditions are gauged, and since this rural standard is indisputably the lowest in Japan, the condition of the industrial worker cannot be any too good (see Table 3).

The reason why the standard of living of these farmers is so low is not because their ability is low, nor because they are idle. It is not so much because their organization is poor, nor is it so much because they are 'exploited' by their landlords. Rather it is simply due to the fact that the land is insufficient for the population. The cultivated area per capita is too small. Without a solution of this problem of over-population, there can be no hope of raising the living standard of industrial workers. For a solution of this problem, Japan is dependent to a large degree upon the attitude of other countries endowed with larger territories in proportion to the size of their respective populations.

TABLE 3. PER CAPITA MONTHLY INCOME AND EXPENDITURE OF INDUSTRIAL AND AGRICULTURAL WORKERS

		No. of Families Investi- gated	No. of Persons in the Families	No. of Persons per Family	Working Persons per Family	Non- working Persons per Family	Earned Income per Family (yen)	Earned Income per Working Person (yen)	Actual Income per Family (yen)	Living Ex- penditure per Person (yen)
Indus- trial	Total or Average	3,210	13,196	4.11	1.23	2.88	92.92	75.54	91.38	21.23
	Factory Workers	2,825	8,321	4.10	1.21	2.89	95.59	79.00	94.64	23.08
	Mining Workers	447	1,955	4.37	1.26	3.02	78.31	58.01	73.84	16.90
	Transportation Workers	416	1,561	3.75	1.24	2.61	104.08	91.30	98.56	26.23
	Casual Workers	319	1,359	4.26	1.00	2.66	81.55	51.16	85.84	20.15
Agricul- tural	Total or Average	670	3,824	5.71	3.12	2.59	72.76	23.26	86.76	16.88
	Owners	130	764	5.83	3.36	2.82	51.72	15.71	109.36	18.65
	Part-Owners	323	1,684	5.23	3.22	2.61	78.35	23.71	100.33	17.26
	Tenants	217	1,176	5.42	2.93	2.44	60.87	20.43	81.86	14.99

Compiled on the basis of Report on Family Budget Investigation (Sept. 1926-Aug. 1927) by the Cabinet Bureau of Statistics. Classification of Owners, Part-Owners, and Tenants is not identical in the case of the family investigation and that of the income and expenditure investigation, but the difference, which is small, is ignored here.

## LABOUR ORGANIZATION AND LEGISLATION

Improvement of the conditions of labour through either legislation or labour movements is ineffective at the present time. The peculiar composition of the Japanese industrial labouring class must be taken into consideration. Over 50 per cent. of the total number of factory operatives is composed of female workers, a majority of them being young girls who work at factories for only two or three years previous to their marriage. It would hardly be possible to induce such persons to join labour unions.

There are other factors tending to discourage labour movements in Japan, namely the fact that any organization encompassing the small-scale units is out of the question. On the other hand, the peculiar circumstances which exist in Japan tend to make the workers in the large-scale establishments side with the capitalists. Because of the extremely low level in the conditions of labour in the small-scale industries, the conditions in the large-scale establishments appear comparatively attractive even though they may not be ideal in the absolute sense. Thus the conditions in the large-scale industries with respect to wages, security of continued employment, working hours, and facilities in general appear superior to those in the small establishments. Rather than join a labour union to oppose the capitalist, the worker prefers to seek the security of living within the sheltering fold of paternalism of his employer. The capitalist, on his part, profiting from the difficulties of capitalists in other countries, tries to stimulate this attitude among the workers by increasing facilities for welfare and recreation in addition to the money wages paid out. Thus such things as co-operative consumers' societies, employment relief, and various other allowances in kind are common in the large-scale industries.

In better establishments, such as the Kanegafuchi Cotton Mills, it is said that, because of these additional allowances, for one yen paid out in money wages the worker actually enjoys the benefits of two yen in cash, were he to pay for the various services and facilities which his employer provides for him.

Thus, what labour movements there are in Japan are most likely to be found in the small-scale industries. Such movements, however, have certain peculiar qualities which are not paralleled in foreign countries.

1. The movements are not directed toward securing for the workers a greater portion of the profit which goes to the owners. They are rather in the nature of attempts on the part of capital and labour combined, or more accurately, employer and employee combined, to improve the general condition of the small-scale establishments in general. The situation in the small-scale electric lamp factories is typical. The movement was directed toward the elimination of cut-throat competition among the small-scale factories. Strikes were called against the factories which had violated the minimum selling-price agreements.

2. The social position between employer and employee in the small-scale industries is not marked by a great gap. Most of the employers themselves are from the ranks of workers, while others still continue to work alongside their employees.

3. In addition to the pecuniary tie between employer and employee, there are additional ties, and in fact more important ties, such as the paternal tie of the family system and the feudalistic bond between ruler and ruled, master and apprentice, or leader and follower. These are actual facts and not mere myths. These ties as well as the factor in (2) above are certainly not conducive in exciting labour movements. The duty imposed by these additional relationships often cause the employees themselves to make offers to work for reduced pay or to work longer for the same pay when their master is faced with financial difficulties.

4. The object of the labour movement in Japan is not to promote the welfare of just one type of worker, but that of all workers in common. Japanese industry did not develop by stages as in the European countries. In England there was a stage when the several types of craftsmen had their own guilds, but in Japan industry took the revolution at one jump. Labour

movements therefore take the form of movements to benefit all the workers including the agrarian population as well.

What goes under the name of a labour movement is not confined to a trade union movement. Economic and social conditions are not favourable to organizing labour into units for the purpose of bettering the condition of workers in each branch of industry. The immediate needs of workers as well as other ties alluded to above tend to discourage a movement which is essentially a long-time affair.

Can the conditions of labour be improved by labour legislation? At least that must be the purpose of labour legislation, and a certain amount of success was achieved in the past. But to-day to apply the existing laws so as to better labour conditions seems wellnigh impossible. Here again the predominance of the small-scale industries plays a vital part in this problem.

We direct our attention first to the fact that the basic cause of the ineffectiveness of labour legislation was in the premise on which such legislation had been drafted. Consciously or unconsciously, legislation in the past seems to have been based on the following hypotheses:

1. That the agricultural population, together with the industrial, would eventually become a proletariat. If this had been the true state of affairs, even such labour legislation as would disregard the peculiar situations obtaining among the agricultural population would have succeeded in improving the condition of the rural people and of the labouring classes as a whole. In countries like England this was true not only in theory but in reality.

2. As the condition of the industrial worker was worse than that of the farmer, the main emphasis should be directed toward alleviating the condition of the former first.

3. That the small-scale industries would gradually become large ones with the passage of time and their development. Labour legislation should therefore be drafted so as to be applicable to the large-scale industries.



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Naturally legislation drafted upon the foregoing postulates concentrated upon the condition of the industrial workers and left the problem of the farmers out of consideration. As long as the actual situation was in accord with the premises, these laws did some good. But there has been a change in that background and drastic revisions of the laws are now considered necessary.

In the light of later developments it was learned that any solution of the industrial workers' problems was so interrelated with the alleviation of the poor condition of the farmers that any legislation leaving the condition of the farmers out of consideration was not tackling the problem from its real roots. It was further learned that the small-scale industries were not infant stages of large-scale industries, but were full-grown adults representing a development indigenous to the conditions which existed in Japan where over-population was a necessary evil, and that as long as over-population existed the small-scale factory was here to stay.

Failure to recognize these unique traits of economic and social conditions in Japan has rendered the present laws ineffective so far as the improvement of the general conditions of labour is concerned. One obvious shortcoming of the present Factory Law is that it has but limited operation, small factories hiring less than ten workers falling outside the scope of the law. To enforce such a law would encourage the growth of small factories outside its purview, and as the labour conditions in these ultra-small factories are necessarily poor, labour conditions in industry as a whole tend to be depressed. Besides, even among the factories to which the law is applicable, its enforcement is by no means an easy matter because there are so many small-scale factories among which supervision and inspection are extremely difficult.

On the other hand, the administration of the minimum-wage and maximum-hours laws that would include all factories of all sizes and types would be, by itself, an impossibility. Especially would this be true in view of the excess supply of labour in the rural districts which would be more than glad to work for wages below the minimum legal standard.

Depreciation of the yen had been anticipated. But hardly anybody in Japan had predicted such a fall as actually took place. With the serious development of the Manchurian Incident, the outbreak of the Shanghai Incident, and the threatening relations with the League of Nations, together with the increase in government borrowings, Japan was thrown into a political and financial crisis of unprecedented magnitude. The fear was that the yen might collapse irretrievably. Far from soliciting the fall, the Government went to great lengths to stop it. This is clearly indicated by the large amount of gold exported in the period of one and three-quarter years immediately following the departure of Great Britain from the gold standard. As the result of the gold drain, by the end of July 1933 the gold reserve of the Bank of Japan had decreased from 800 to 425 million yen. But, inasmuch as the political outlook became more serious than ever, the value of the yen was further forced down to the point of barely \$20 per hundred yen. Finally, on May 1, 1928, the Japanese Government put the Foreign Exchange Control Act into operation. Since then the yen has been stabilized around one shilling and twopence.

The present value of the yen in international markets does not seem to be unduly low or unwarranted. The extent to which the yen depreciated was undoubtedly greater than any other currency if calculated on the basis of the respective values prevailing in 1930. But inasmuch as the 1930 standard or level was an artificial one kept at an unduly high point, the level at that time does not seem to be a proper basis for comparison. If we calculate the present value of the yen, in terms of the pound sterling and the dollar, with the purchasing-power parities which prevailed in the pre-war days, we shall find it somewhere in the neighbourhood of 14.32 pence and 28.76 cents, respectively, which is not far off from the current exchange rates of 14.00 pence and 29.01 cents, respectively.

A more accurate summary of the depreciation of the yen would be to say that the value of the yen, which had been kept at an unduly artificial and unduly high level during the period 1920 to 1930, has at last found its normal level of stabilization. It is merely because this stabilization was effected

so quickly that it did have some disturbing influences on the equilibrium of world trade, and hence created an impression abroad that the yen was being purposely depreciated to an undue extent.

CERTAIN CHARACTERISTICS IN THE RECENT  
DEVELOPMENT OF JAPANESE INDUSTRY

In terms of output, Japanese industry has expanded from 100.0 in 1921 to 180.0 in 1934. If the fall in prices is taken into calculation, it actually amounted to 269.0 in 1934.

But apart from the total output point of view, there are other characteristics which mark the present development as the shift in emphasis placed on the various kinds of industries. It was the textile industry which had led the way to industrial development in Japan. Within the past few years, however, the centre of activity has been shifted to the heavy industries (metallurgical, machine-making, and chemistry). In terms of output these so-called heavy industries now constitute 44 per cent. of the total industrial output, whereas it was only 25 per cent. in 1921. The output of the cotton industry in the same period has fallen from a position where it once represented 44 per cent. of the total output of Japanese industry to 32 per cent. In terms of ratio to the total industrial output, therefore, the cotton industry has taken a downward trend. To a certain extent Japan is making her appearance as a heavy industry country, and this must largely account for her great purchases of scrap-iron and other metal.

Another characteristic in the present development of industry in Japan is the advance from the stage of low-grade manufactures to that of higher and more complicated manufactures. The export of finished goods now occupies 60 per cent. of the total amount of exports.

The last characteristic is that industry is now producing with foreign markets in view. It is becoming more dependent than ever for its raw materials and for sale of its manufactured products on overseas markets. This is especially true in the case of the textile industry, which exports more than 55 to 80 per cent. of its output to foreign countries.

TABLE 4. CAPITAL FLOTATION IN DIFFERENT INDUSTRIES

(In millions of yen)

Industries	Average of 1919-21	Average of 1926-8	1934	1935	
	per cent.	per cent.	per cent.	per cent.	
Transportation	446 (11.7)	398 (25.3)	223 (16.7)	133 (9.3)	
Mining	226 (5.9)	39 (2.5)	178 (13.3)	118 (8.3)	
Electrical	343 (9.0)	354 (22.5)	213 (16.0)	103 (7.2)	
Manufacturing Industries	Chemical	200 (5.3)	125 (7.9)	211 (15.8)	400 (28.0)
	Machinery	110 (2.9)	23 (1.5)	67 (5.0)	55 (3.9)
	Metal	61 (1.6)	18 (1.1)	77 (5.8)	80 (5.6)
	Total	371 (9.7)	166 (10.5)	355 (26.6)	535 (37.5)
	Textile	341 (9.0)	66 (4.2)	102 (7.6)	32 (2.2)
	Other	435 (11.4)	200 (12.7)	93 (7.0)	116 (8.1)
	Total	1,147 (30.1)	431 (27.4)	550 (41.2)	682 (47.8)
Other	1,644 (43.2)	353 (22.4)	171 (12.8)	390 (27.3)	
Gross Total	3,806 (100.0)	1,575 (100.0)	1,334 (100.0)	1,427 (100.0)	

Source: Capital Flotation of Banks and Companies, by the Bank of Japan.

TABLE 5. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN

	Capital of Joint- stock Companies (in millions of yen)	Value of Products (in millions of yen)	Workers Em- ployed (in thousands)	No. of Factories (in thousands)
1921	8,116 (100)	5,227 (100)	1,636 (100)	49 (100)
1925	9,525 (117)	6,789 (130)	1,808 (111)	49 (100)
1929	11,754 (145)	7,759 (148)	1,825 (112)	60 (122)
1931	11,854 (146)	5,175 (99)	1,660 (101)	64 (131)
1932	11,890 (147)	5,982 (114)	1,734 (106)	67 (137)
1933	12,339 (152)	7,871 (151)	1,901 (116)	72 (147)
1934	13,441 (166)	9,390 (180)	2,163 (132)	80 (163)

Source: Factory Statistics and Company Statistics, by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Figures in parentheses are indices.

TABLE 6. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN, BY INDUSTRIES

	Textile Industries		Metal		Machinery and Tool		Heavy Industries		Total	
	1921	1934	1921	1934	1921	1934	1921	1934	1921	1934
Value of Products (1,000 yen)	2,336,907	3,167,756	250,099	1,496,793	568,322	1,159,168	5,88	1,480,784	1,327,209	4,136,745
No. of Workers Em- ployed	937,442	969,320	74,142	184,682	176,721	314,669	108,754	192,270	359,617	691,621
No. of Factories	20,196	24,399	2,789	6,610	4,648	9,181	2,929	4,313	10,366	20,104

Percentages

Value of Products	44.7	33.7	4.8	15.9	10.9	12.3	9.7	16.0	25.4	44.2
No. of Workers Em- ployed	57.3	44.5	4.5	8.5	10.9	14.5	6.6	8.9	22.0	31.9
No. of Factories	40.9	30.3	5.6	8.2	9.4	11.4	5.9	5.4	20.9	25.0

Source: Factory Statistics, by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry